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‘A Hazardous Experiment’: The First World War and Changing British Civilian and 
Military Attitudes to the People of India 
 
Karen Leenders 
 
This thesis extends the current scholarship of the social impact of the First World War 
by analysing the influence of the contribution of the Indian soldiers on the Western 
Front on civilian and military perceptions of Indian people and how this varied between 
those who encountered Indian soldiers in person and those who did not. The work sits 
on the historiographical boundary of the First World War, Empire and the social history 
of Britain in the post war years and makes use of newspapers, first person accounts 
and manuscript sources.  
 
The impact upon the civilian population is analysed by examining the manner in which 
Indian people were represented in the media in the years before the war and 
comparing this with later representations in the years during and after the war. The 
work of Porter and Mackenzie and the ongoing debate about the significance of the 
Empire to the British people is used to ground the argument. The thesis fids that, 
despite an increased awareness and interest in India and its people during the war, 
the public soon settled into a pre-war apathy towards its Empire. 
 
The military chapters briefly examine the history of the Indian Army and its time in 
France and the changes made by the British Army to facilitate the service of the Indian 
soldiers in Europe. It discusses the negative view of the Indian Corps which has been 
perpetuated by historians during the twentieth century and provides contradictory 
arguments against a number of these assertions.  
 
The thesis concludes that, while the Indian Corps’ time in France positively impacted 
on British civilian and military opinion of Indian people, those who directly encountered 
them formed the most favourable views.  
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6. Introduction 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At the start of the First World War there were grave concerns in the British military 
establishment about involving troops from Undivided India in a European war, 
particularly in the European theatre. Lieutenant-Colonel J.W.B. Merewether, The Chief 
Record Officer of the Indian Corps, recorded in his memoir that their participation in 
France was considered to be ‘a hazardous experiment.’1 This thesis will examine how 
British military opinion shifted from this standpoint to a position of high regard as the 
war progressed. Alongside this, the civilian population developed its understanding of 
and formed a new sympathy towards the people of India. 
 
This thesis extends the current scholarship of the social impact of the First World War 
by analysing the influence of the contribution of the Indian soldiers on the Western Front 
on British civilian and military perceptions of Indian people and how this varied between 
those who encountered Indian soldiers in person and those who did not. The work sits 
on the historiographical boundary of the First World War and the social history of 
Britain in the post war years and makes use of newspapers, first person accounts and 
manuscript sources.  
 
The impact upon the civilian population is analysed by examining the manner in which 
Indian people were represented in the media in the years before the war and comparing 
this with later representations during and after the war. Those who encountered the 
Indian soldiers in Britain dwelt principally in those towns on the south coast which 
hosted wounded men in hospitals. A case study of the public reaction in the town of 
Brighton will illustrate the positive reception given to the soldiers and demonstrate that 
British people who encountered the Indian soldiers formed more positive opinions of 
them than those who did not. 
 
The military chapters examine the history of the Indian Army and its time in France and 
the formal military changes which were wrought in the aftermath of the war, at least in 
part as a result of the changed perceptions of the Indian Corps following its success in 
                                                          
1 Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. B. Merewether, The Indian Corps in France (London: Murray, 1918), 469 
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France. It discusses the negative view of the Indian Corps which has been perpetuated 
by historians during the twentieth century and contrasts this with the highly positive 
view of contemporary military men of all ranks who held them in high regard.  
 
It will be shown that those who encountered the Indian soldiers, whether from the 
civilian or military worlds developed far more positive views than those who depended 
on stereotypical representations, even though the nature of these stereotypical 
representations also changed over the course of the war. It is these subtleties which this 
thesis will explore and analyse.  
 
The thesis concludes that the Indian Corps’ service in France positively impacted on 
British public opinion, both within civilian and military circles, and that it was those who 
directly encountered and interacted with the soldiers who formed the most favourable 
views. This therefore be used to draw out the changing opinions of the general public 
and military establishment. The choice to focus on the civilian and military perspective, 
rather than the political implications, will serve to fill a gap in the narrative of empire, as 
the juxtaposition of India’s First World War service and its effect on British perceptions 
of empire has not been as well served by historians as the imperial dimension, which 
historians such as Bernard Porter, Cain and Hopkins and Christopher Bayley cover, 
alongside the more traditional Oxford History of the British Empire and its later companion 
volumes.2 As well as illustrating how perceptions changed in the years before, during and 
after the war, this thesis will seek to explain how the changes in perception came about.  
 
While their service in Europe between October 1914 and December 1915 will be the 
focus of the study, Indian soldiers also served extensively in India and the Middle East 
and India provided considerable financial and material assistance to Britain and its allies. 
The focus of this thesis will be on the Indian soldiers’ time on the Western Front as the 
prospect of Indian soldiers fighting in the white European theatre caused consternation 
in Britain before the war and only those who served in Europe had the opportunity to 
                                                          
2 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1995 (Harlow, Pearson 
Longman, 1976); Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000 (London, Longman, 
2001); Christopher Bayley, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830 (Oxford, 
Offord University Press, 1982); William Louis, Oxford History of the British Empire, Volumes 1-5 (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1999). For a detailed discussion of the political considerations regarding the 
deployment of Indian soldiers in Europe, see George Morton-Jack The Indian Army on the Western Front 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 51, 134 
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interact with the British civilian population and vice versa. Although Indian troops had 
fought for Britain outside India previously, for example during the Boer War in South 
Africa, they had never been deployed in Europe and certainly never in a war between 
white European participants. 
 
The Indian Corps arrived in France in the autumn of 1914 and fought consistently until 
their departure in December 1915. Arguably, Britain was among the least prepared 
country in Europe for a land war and could certainly not muster armies on the scale of 
those of the Germans or French, despite its huge Navy. Germany’s Schlieffen plan was 
to sweep through the Low Countries and occupy France before any serious reaction 
could be mobilised. However, by the autumn of 1914, the German advance had stalled 
and both sides were starting to dig in. British losses had been very high, especially during 
the Allied retreat from Mons in mid-September and the Battle of the Marne, which 
forced both sides to a halt in a position that would remain almost static for the next 
four years. It did not take long before the British realised that the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF) would need to be reinforced urgently. The initial decision that had been 
taken on 25 August was to send the Indian Corps to Egypt, but their plan was quickly 
modified after some 15,000 BEF men had been lost in the previous five days alone.3 
There were not enough reserves within the British Army and two days later Kitchener 
ordered the Indian Corps to France. Although the Indian Corps had been expecting a 
swift departure and mobilisation orders for the Meerut and Lahore divisions had been 
issued on 7 and 8 August, it was monsoon season and it was not easy to mobilise as 
many troops were on leave far from their stations. Nevertheless, two convoys set sail 
from Karachi on 24 August and 21 September and met up to pass through the Suez 
Canal. On 26 September, the Lahore Division arrived in Marseilles and left for Orleans 
four days later, arriving at their dispersal position on 3 October.  
 
The final battle of the first autumn of the war and the first to involve the Indian troops 
was the First Battle of Ypres, part of the Race to the Sea. The Germans were advancing 
towards the Channel ports of Dunkirk and Calais and the British were largely forced 
into a defensive stance to protect their supply lines. On 22-23 October, the Ferozepore 
                                                          
3 Jeffrey Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve: The Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914-1915’, Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12, 1, 1983, 54  
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Brigade of the Lahore Division went into action for the first time. On 28 October, the 
47th Sikhs of the Jullundur Brigade and the 9th Bhopal Infantry of the Ferozepores played 
a major part in the taking of Neuve Chapelle which, although quickly retaken by the 
Germans, meant that a long-standing gap in the Allied line was closed, if only for a short 
while. After this there were no more battles that year due to the weather, which was 
particularly harsh and did not allow easy movement for either side. It was during this 
time that the Indian soldiers experienced the first mine attack of the war. On the 
morning of 20 December 1914, close to Givenchy, ten mines - each subsequently 
discovered to have detonated 50kg of explosive -  exploded from positions tunnelled 
from saps in the German front-line system. Between 22 December and 2 February 1915, 
the men were relieved by the British 1 Corps and had the chance to be away from the 
line for the first time since they had arrived in early October.  
 
The next time the Indian Corps would be called into action would be early March 1915 
in the battle of Neuve Chapelle. The intention of the offensive was that the Indian Corps 
would make up half of the attacking force and other half would be made up of British 
soldiers. The plan was to attack the German held hamlet of Neuve Chapelle from the 
north and south west, capture it and move on to take the higher ground of Aubers Ridge 
not far beyond via the Bois de Biez. By the following day, it became obvious that the 
Indian Corps would not be able to take the whole of the wood and fighting was called 
off.4 Their next major engagement was the Second Battle of Ypres which had been in 
Allied hands since the previous autumn and the Germans were anxious to retake the 
town. On 22 April 1915, the Germans achieved a significant advance although the 
engagement changed little and is notable only for the introduction of gas. On 9 May 
1915, the Dehra Dun Brigade led an attack which was half of a pincer movement to take 
the Bois du Biez which they had failed to take two months earlier. However, the 
preceding artillery barrage had failed to destroy the German front line and the men were 
stranded in no man’s land.  Subsequently, during the summer of 1915, General James 
Willcocks, Commander of the Indian Corps, oversaw a large reorganisation of his men, 
with several battalions sent to Egypt and the Middle East and reinforcements arriving 
almost weekly. The major change was that all the British members of the Corps were 
                                                          
4 Merewether, The Indian Corps In France, 208 
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placed into the Lahore Division on the line and all the Indian troops placed in the Meerut 
Division, to be held in reserve. This reflected the importance to the British of maintaining 
morale among the Indian soldiers as well as the significant difficulties posed by finding 
reinforcements for the Indian Corps. No sooner was this completed than Willcocks was 
summoned to Headquarters and dismissed after difficulties in maintaining a working 
relationship with Lord Haig and command was passed to the former commander of the 
Meerut Division, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Anderson, another long-time soldier of 
the Indian Army. The Indian Corps’ next action, on 25 September 1915 at Loos, was 
diversionary, aimed at distracting German attention from the main attack immediately 
south of the Indian position and to tie down any German soldiers which could have been 
sent south as reinforcements. By the end of the day, all the Indian survivors were back 
in their original trenches, the battle over for them.  
 
Although no one knew it yet, the Battle of Loos was to be the final significant engagement 
of the Indian Corps in France, although the Cavalry regiments were to stay for the rest 
of the war. On 26 December 1915, the last of the Indian infantry troops set sail from 
Marseilles and the Indian Corps ceased to exist. From France, the Indian soldiers were 
moved to Mesopotamia (now Iraq), via Egypt. Conditions in Mesopotamia were 
extremely arduous as summer temperatures soared to 48˚C. Before the war, 
Mesopotamia had been part of the Ottoman Empire, with which Britain had good 
relations. However, the Ottoman Empire was forging links with Germany and seemed 
ever more likely to join the war alongside it. The British priority in the occupation of 
Mesopotamia was to secure the oilfields in the south, for the benefit of the British Navy.5 
However, there was also concern in the India Office that any discontent so close to India 
would spread, thereby risking British security as well.6 The 6th (Poona) Division of the 
Indian Corps had arrived at Fao in the far south of Mesopotamia on 6 November 1914 
and by the 22nd had occupied Basra. The decision was taken to press on to Baghdad 280 
miles to the north but they were beaten back to Kut-al-Amara and besieged there by 
the Turks on 7 December 1915. Between then and 22 April 1916, the Indian troops 
fought no less than six battles to relieve Kut but the garrison surrendered before they 
could prevail on 29 April. It was almost another year before the Meeruts finally marched 
                                                          
5 Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (Faber and Faber, London, 1930), 154 
6 Hew Strachan, The First World War (Pocket Books, London, 2003), 106 
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into Baghdad in March 1917, under a considerably reorganised force. By the spring of 
1918, both divisions were in Palestine, after a short diversion for the Lahores to Egypt. 
 
In Palestine, the Meeruts and Lahores were to complete the final push north towards 
Damascus, led by Sir Edward Allenby. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) had 
started the war protecting Egypt and had gradually expanded its role to invade Palestine 
and drive the Ottoman forces back into Turkey. The Indians joined possibly the most 
mixed Force of the entire war, with four Indian divisions, the Anzac Mounted Division, 
the West India Regiment, the Jewish Legion, a French and Syrian joint division and an 
Australian division. What would come to be called the Battle of Megiddo began on 18 
September 1918 and progressed almost unhindered. Thus, the Lahores and the Meeruts 
ended their war. From the earliest days of the war when their mobilisation orders were 
issued, to France, Mesopotamia and Palestine, they had fought continuously until just 
days before the Armistice.  
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMPIRE TO THE BRITISH PUBLIC  
From the outset of war, vast sums of money and enormous resources were poured into 
the British war effort from the colonies and dominions.7 The propaganda value of these 
contributions was not lost on the British government and, increasingly, the war was 
promoted as a communal enterprise as Britain and its colonies and dominions worked 
together, as the postcard image below shows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
British Library – 1915 Propaganda Postcard, https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/are-we-afraid-no 
                                                          
7 George Robb, British Culture and the First World War (London: Palgrave, 2002), 13 
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Note that although the bulldogs are all similar and all stand upon a Union flag, the dog 
representing Britain is the most central and considerably larger than those of the other 
empire nations.  
 
The Times History of the War, which commenced publication soon after the declaration 
of war, commented on the early response of the empire nations, ‘Most conspicuous of 
all was the absolute unanimity of all races within the Empire in support of the Mother 
Country.’8 A later edition marked the contribution of the various countries and people 
of the empire to the war effort in considerable detail over six pages and included the 
entry: ‘one tonne of butter from Mrs. Hindson and family for the use of British soldiers.’9 
While this was apparently an insignificant contribution from an obscure Canadian 
housewife, it went to illustrate the individual commitment of the people of the empire 
as well as that of their governments. The theme of unity continued for the whole war, 
with the various achievements of the soldiers of empire being extensively reported and 
apparently well received. 
 
The thesis examines the particular attention given to Indian soldiers, but it is important 
to remember that this was set against a wartime background which saw much more 
prominent role given to empire in public life. In part, this was a result of increased 
exposure due to a number of factors: newspapers inevitably reported the military 
activities of the empire troops, government propaganda efforts also made their way into 
the national press and organisations such as the British Empire Union promoted the 
unity of the empire. Inevitably, at the end of the war this prominence decreased and 
daily or weekly exposure to news about men of empire fighting for Britain ceased.  
 
As this thesis will explore, it was a complex combination of factors, the military 
contribution of the Indian soldiers of the empire, shifting attitudes to the importance of 
the empire in the minds of the public and the general feeling towards consensus and co-
operation, that made a conceptual space for the British public to view India as country 
                                                          
8 Armies of the Dominions, The Times History of the War¸ Vol 1, Chapter VII, 1914, 141  
9 The Response of the Dominions, The Times History of the War, Vol II, 1915, 271 
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in its own right. Once this perception was established a new, more positive, vision of 
India developed. 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The historiography of the Indian soldiers in Europe falls broadly into three schools. Much 
recent work investigates the first person Indian experience, both in terms of their time 
in Europe and by setting this in the context of their lives in India outside their military 
careers.  The second school focusses on criticism of the performance of the Indian Corps 
and the possible reasons for the difficulties they are alleged to have encountered. The 
third school has researched the encounters, and the nature thereof, between the Indian 
soldiers and the people they met during their time in France and how this affected the 
Indian soldiers’ attitudes in the years after the war. It is this aspect which this thesis will 
build upon to analyse the development of British civilian and military attitudes. 
 
The first and most recent school on the subject of Indian soldiers during the First World 
War, sits at the juncture of post colonialist theory of subaltern studies and the memory 
school of First World War studies. The discipline of subaltern studies sought, in the 
words of Barbara Bush, to ‘prioritise the active agency’ of former colonial subjects,10 as 
illustrated in this context by the work of Gajendra Singh and Vedica Kant. Singh’s analysis 
of the evidence left behind by Indian soldiers in both World Wars looked to draw out 
the experience of the men and to place that experience in the context of the overall 
Imperial project. His particular focus included an exposition of the similarities of the 
Army rules that governed both the British and Indian armies and also discussed the 
difficulty to date with remembrance in India, given the political emphasis on nationhood 
in the post-independence years.11 Vedica Kant’s beautifully illustrated If I die here, who 
will remember me? drew out both the experience of the men at war and also the home 
front in India, with a particular interest in the Muslim experience and the Germans’ 
attempts to exploit religious differences in the Corps.12 Both writers sought to place the 
Indian soldier at the forefront and separate his experience from that of the overall 
picture of the Western Front. 
                                                          
10 Barbara Bush, Imperialism and Postcolonialism, 55 
11 Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars (London: Bloomsbury, 2014) 
12 Vedica Kant, If I die here, who will remember me? India and the First World War (New Delhi:  Roli Books, 
2014) 
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Santanu Das in Race, Empire and First World War Writing sought to set the Indian soldiers’ 
experience within the work of Pierre Nora and Jay Winter on memory and the First 
World War.13 While Nora and Winter’s work concentrated on the European 
perspective, Das expanded the model to include the Indian experience.  The central 
premise of the collection of essays was to illustrate the notion that memory extends far 
beyond the limited range of Eurocentric myths to which historians such as Dan Todman 
and Samuel Hynes contend that the First World War has been reduced in order to 
facilitate popular understanding of the subject.14  Das’s work demonstrated the influence 
of the subaltern school as did his later 1914-1918: Indians on the Western Front.  By the 
use of a broad range of photographs he sought to show the men about their daily 
business as well as using images from India at the time to provide an insight into how an 
Indian soldier lived at home before and after the war. The thrust of the work was not a 
military history but firmly placed the soldiers in the international narrative of 
remembrance and brought the men to life without reducing them to a set of clichés 
about ‘heroes and martyrs’.15 By extension, Anglo-Nigerian historian David Olusoga’s 
television series and book The World’s War drew out the global Imperial contribution to 
the First World War and aimed to ‘play a small part in the slow process of historical 
recovery.’16  
 
The second school, which was prevalent during the latter part of the twentieth century, 
focussed on perceived problems encountered by the Indian Corps. Jeffrey Greenhut’s 
work painted a dark view of the Indian soldiers as rather ineffectual, not particularly 
courageous and desperately in need of strong British leadership in order to function. His 
1981 study argued that the racist attitudes of the British impacted negatively on the 
Indian soldiers’ fighting effectiveness.17 He contended that the British attempts to keep 
the Indian men apart from white British and French women was designed to preserve 
                                                          
13 Santanu Das, ed, Race, Empire and First World War Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, Representations, 26, 7-24; Jay 
Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning (Cambridge: Canto, 1995) 
14 Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (London: Hambledon, 2005), xiii, Samuel Hynes, A War 
Imagined: The First World War and English Culture (London: Bodley Head, 1990), 439 
15 Santanu Das, 1914-1918: Indians on the Western Front (Gallimard/Ministère de la Défense-DMPA, 
Mission du centenaire de la Première Guerre mondiale, Paris, 2014), 149 
16 David Olusoga, The World’s War (London: Head of Zeus, 2014), xv 
17 Jeffrey Greenhut, ‘Race, Sex and War: The Impact of Race and Sex on Morale and Health Services for 
the Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914’, Military Affairs, 45, no. 2, (1981), 71-74 
15. Introduction 
 
the perceived Imperial prestige of the white woman but that by keeping the men strictly 
isolated on their bases and restricting the deployment of white women nurses to treat 
Indian troops, the British increased discontent among the men and decreased the 
effectiveness of medical treatment available to them.18 He further asserted that the 
inherent British assumption of superiority over the Indian soldiers meant that no Indian 
was allowed to assume a position of command or authority and thus the myth of their 
inability to lead themselves was buttressed. In his 1983 paper Greenhut claimed that the 
Indian Army’s time on the Western Front was largely wasted and only of use inasmuch 
as there were no British troops available, the New Army not having reached France in 
1914 and the BEF being severely under resourced.19 While these points are indeed 
relevant, his analysis is negative and does not reflect more positive aspects of the Indian 
experience.  
 
A change of tone can be seen in George Morton-Jack’s 2014 primarily military history 
The Indian Army on the Western Front which sought to position the Indian Army’s 
contribution in the context of its previous military endeavours and overall contribution 
during the First World War.20 As well as complex discussions of their tactical successes 
he argued that the Indian troops have not been treated kindly by subsequent military 
historians and sought to redress the balance. Quoting from a newspaper article in The 
Times in 1914 praising the Indian soldiers, Morton-Jack asserted that ‘such acclaim is not 
misleading; rather, it is due something of a revival.’21 Morton-Jack was referring to 
criticism of the Indian troops’ time in France which had its roots in the assumptions 
made by the British military that there would be difficulties in the management of the 
Indian troops in Europe.  
 
The third area of historical investigation concerned the connections formed between 
the Indian soldiers in Europe and their British and French hosts.22 Morton-Jack’s 2006 
                                                          
18 Greenhut, Race, Sex and War, 18 
19 Greenhut, The Imperial Reserve, 54-73  
20 George Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to France and 
Belgium in the First World War. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
21 Ibid., 27 
22 Separate from the work directly concerning the Indian experience is a relatively small body of work 
which looks at the European experience, such as Dominiek Dendooven’s examination of Belgian civilian 
experience of living alongside non-white troops and workers, including Indian and West Indian troops 
and members of the Chinese Labour Corps, ‘Living Apart Together: Belgian civilians and non-white 
troops in wartime Flanders’, in Race, Empire and First World War Writing, ed. Santanu Das  
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paper The Indian Army on the Western Front 1914-1915: A Portrait of Collaboration placed 
the Indian soldiers as willingly assisting the British, fully aware of their importance and 
successful in their task.23 In his third work on the subject, Europe Through Indian Eyes, 
Omissi explored the soldiers’ interactions with British and French civilians. He concluded 
that exposure to ‘ordinary’ white people strengthened the relationship between Indians 
and Europeans as the Indians took the opportunity to learn from their encounters and 
appreciated the respect shown to them as fighting men24. The Indian point of view served 
as a parallel to the British civilian and military encounters which built new relationships 
and influenced opinion concerning the Indian soldiers. 
 
Against the point of view given by Omissi, D.C. Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan argued that 
the respect and affection shown by the French people and the living standards they saw 
in France gave rise to discontent against the British. The men felt that French civilians 
treated them better than did British civilians in India and came to see this as a failing of 
British behaviour. Ellinwood and Pradhan conducted a number of interviews with 
veterans, many of whom claimed that the British military had ‘become polite’ but after 
the war they reverted to their previous behaviour. This, together with the example set 
by the French, sat badly with the veterans, who became more discontented and inclined 
to protest against the British.25 This point was taken up by Budheswar Pati, in his 1996 
book India and the First World War, who saw the First World War as the ‘foundation’ for 
the nationalist independence campaign of Gandhi. He dealt with its effects on the 
government, British people and the population of India, contending that the military 
effort brought together all groups, both political and religious, in a ‘common platform’ 
from which the movement gained strength when the war was over and the new fight 
began in earnest. 26  
 
It is in the context of relations between British and Indian people on both social and 
military levels that the term Social Darwinism occurs in this thesis. Social Darwinism is 
a term with a complex historiography of its own. Broadly speaking, it seeks to apply 
Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection to illustrate a range of social hierarchies. In 
                                                          
23 Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914-1915, 2006, 3 
24 David Omissi, ‘Europe through Indian Eyes: Indian Soldiers encounter England and France’ English 
Historical Review, 122, 496, sp. 371, 2007 
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the nineteenth century Francis Galton used Darwin’s theory to describe class inequalities 
but it soon came to be used in a racial sense.27 It was also used in an imperialist context, 
where it was used to provide a justification for the imperial project. Stephen Howe 
described this in terms of the superior cultural achievements of European people and 
the obligation that confers on them to improve the standards of other less advanced 
countries, thus redefining the empire in terms of an ‘educational or civilising influence.’28 
Santanu Das used the term in the context of the Martial Race Theory which the British 
Army used to select certain racial groups in India for army service, ‘Victorian social 
Darwinism and indigenous caste hierarchy, this theory emphasised that some ‘races’ … 
were inherently more ‘many’ and warlike than men from other parts of India.’29 Howe 
took up this point and extended it to the genderised aspect of Social Darwinism, 
highlighting the distinction in terms of the ‘feminised’ Bengalis, rarely recruited, set 
against ‘India’s so-called Martial Races … very clearly identified with stereotypes of 
masculinity.’30 It is the imperial context in which the term will be used throughout this 
thesis.  
 
It is this third school, which investigated the relationships between Indian and European 
people, which is most relevant to this study as it is these relationships which drove the 
changes in attitude among British people upon which this thesis is focussed. This school 
held a mirror to the treatment the men felt they received from British and French 
civilians. However, whereas the historians cited above studied the reactions of Indian 
soldiers, this thesis will extend this work by focusing on the changes which took place 
in the minds of British civilians and the military establishment during the period. It will 
examine how British people who met Indian soldiers showed a keen interest in them 
and, how those whose information was derived only from representations differed in 
their views. The military representations are necessarily more formal but the success of 
the Indian Corps in France and the later changes wrought in the Indian Army, in terms 
of permitting Indians to become commissioned officers, demonstrate how regard grew.  
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The significance of its empire to the British people remains a hotly debated topic. While 
it is not the focus of this thesis to rehearse the debate, aspects of it impact directly on 
the discussion of how the British public reacted to the presence of the Indian soldiers in 
both Britain and the Western Front. John Mackenzie, who pioneered research in this 
area, saw the empire as fundamental to the British world view and that it ‘came to infuse 
and be propagated by every organ of British life.’31 Mackenzie’s chosen approach was to 
deviate from what he considered to be the accepted historiographical norm by using an 
evidence-based approach to examining British attitudes to its empire.32 He claimed that 
the empire was more often than not ‘remote from everyday experience, yet apparently 
crucially influencing it for the better.’33 His 1984 book Propaganda and Empire sought to 
show that while considerations of the empire as an entity in itself featured little in the 
lives of British people, they were in fact surrounded by its influences in the form of 
vehicles such as goods for sale, entertainment, media, education and literature as well as 
exhibitions and societies which promoted the empire among a more educated and 
arguably middle-class elite. Mackenzie took this ‘assemblage of shards’ as evidence of a 
deep vein of Imperial culture driving the country and transcended class divisions.34 
 
Later developments, led by the work of Bernard Porter, argued that, beyond the ruling 
elite, most people had no real interest in the empire except for patriotic fervour during 
war time.35 Porter’s case was that Mackenzie’s shards argument was an 
overgeneralisation and that the whole gamut of Imperial ‘finds’ cannot necessarily be 
attributed to an overarching Imperial spirit but simply to other ‘home grown 
constructions, based on domestic values and prejudices, which might have been exactly 
the same if the empire had not existed; and which were then imposed on the Empire, 
regardless.’36 Crucially, he argued that the empire had no real need of the majority of 
British people and, equally, the British people had little real use for the empire. By 
contrast with Mackenzie’s saturation argument, Porter sought to split off the day to day 
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artefacts of empire from the larger notion of a society dominated by empire and found 
that even at its times of greatest influence and size, ‘Britain had never been a convincing 
Imperial society.’37  
 
The debate carries on and other scholars have deepened its complexity, such as the 
work of Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose, who asserted, with Porter, that the empire was 
‘simply there’ and not a topic for general consideration.38 However, there remains 
general agreement that the presence of empire was felt all about. Mackenzie’s examples 
were certainly apparent to all and Porter agreed with this but did not feel that this 
necessarily implied that this general awareness had to imply that the population felt that 
the empire actually affected them, despite its presence. Separately, Hall commented that 
although by the middle of the nineteenth century, most Britons had seen people of 
colour, they had rarely interacted with them.39 It is at this point that the debate and this 
thesis meet. A key part of the thesis is to examine how interactions between the British 
public and military and the Indian soldiers affected the way in which the British people 
viewed the people of India. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
This thesis uses a range of sources to explore the attitudinal changes towards India and 
its people during the period. Formal military accounts will be used to show how the 
Indian Corps was viewed during its time in France by those who commanded it. The 
military accounts of the war lie in the War Diaries, which are minutely detailed hand 
written daily accounts designed to provide the general staff with information about the 
activity of any given unit for planning purposes. These will be used together with other 
documents, such as regimental diaries, Orders of Battle, certain Operational Orders and 
some personal accounts which form The Official History of the War.40 These documents 
are a detailed operational account, which provide a comprehensive account of every 
action in which the Indian Corps was engaged but offer little subjective insight into how 
they were viewed by the military hierarchy. However, in a section concerning the 
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departure of the Indian Corps from France the Official History set up some of criticisms 
which were to follow them through the next century: how they dealt with the French 
climate; their heavy losses and the difficulties with reinforcements; the loss of British 
officers and the poor quality of their replacements and those of the reserves in general. 
It concluded that the Indian Corps ‘played its part well and bravely’ and left France 
because the new units arriving in France made its continuing presence unnecessary.41 A 
further source of information about how the British military viewed the Indian Corps 
are Despatches. These accounts were the reports of the Commander in Chief to the 
War Office and were published in the London Gazette. The Official History and the 
Despatches in the London Gazette were both public documents and, as such, their 
contents represent a view that the military establishment were happy that the public 
should take account of. Parliamentary records such as Hansard can provide insight into 
British political priorities. For example, the issue of admitting Indian soldiers as officers 
in the Indian Army was being considered by parliament as early as September 1915, 
although it was not implemented until after the war.42  Documents which were not 
necessarily confidential but were not published for public consumption, such as the 1918 
military manual Our Indian Empire: A short review and some hints for the use of soldiers 
proceeding to India provide a valuable insight into the opinions of the British military.43  
 
More direct insight into the attitudes of senior military personnel are provided by 
memoirs of British officers who led Indian soldiers both during the First World War and 
in the years preceding the war.  Two direct first-person accounts by senior British 
officers in the Indian Army of their time on the Western Front have been extensively 
drawn upon, those of General J. Willcocks and Lieutenant-Colonel J.W.B. Merewether.44 
General Willcocks had served almost his entire career in the Indian Army and had 
commanded Indian troops in both Sudan and Burma as well as commanding the West 
African Frontier Force. On his return to India, his short and ferocious campaigns in the 
North-West Frontier Province had led to a Punch cartoon entitled ‘Willcocks’s 
Weekend War’ in 1908.45 During the First World War he served as a staff officer and 
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was awarded the GCMG.46 Despite his experience, he was unable to form a working 
relationship with Kitchener in France and was dismissed in September 1915 and left 
France immediately. Lieutenant-Colonel Merewether was also a long serving career 
officer who had followed his father into the Indian Army and had commanded Indian 
troops in Aden and East Africa in the early part of the century. He served with the 
General Staff in France, gaining a CIE for his services in 1916.47  Both men, therefore, 
were able to claim with confidence that the Indian Corps was able to conduct operations 
abroad and this is reflected in their memoirs. Both volumes of memoirs deliver 
conventional military histories of the Indian Corps’ time in France which are overlaid 
with their personal opinions and reflections.   
 
Further insight into changing British attitudes can be gleaned from the letters home from 
the Indian soldiers. However, seeking the viewpoint of the Indian soldiers presents some 
difficulties as the only direct source of their thoughts and feelings are their letters, 
extracts of which were preserved by the censorship process they underwent in France. 
The focus here is on a very specific set of letters, those from the Indian infantry soldiers 
on the Western Front up to December 1915, and the fears, tales and opinions in those 
letters necessarily represent a small proportion of Indian combatants. Some 600 letters 
from the time the Indian Corps spent on the Western Front have been analysed as part 
of this thesis from the remaining extracts of letters totalling several thousand, covering 
the whole period and every theatre of Indian military involvement in the First World 
War. This represents the most detailed study of the Indian soldiers’ letters from France 
and Britain yet conducted, considerably greater than that of David Omissi in his Indian 
Voices of the Great War, the largest available study of the letters, which samples letters 
from the whole canon and includes just 206 from this period. While there are difficulties 
interpreting these letters, they provide an insight into how the soldiers viewed the 
British in the changed context of warfare on their home continent and to some extent 
reflect the changes in attitude among the British officers and imperial rulers. 
 
The use of newspapers as evidence for the opinions of their readership is not without 
difficulty but it does provide a context for those opinions and, to some extent, both 
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leads and reflects them.  Justin Fantauzzo, in his discussion on the war in the Middle East 
and public opinion, stated that newspaper circulation, ‘grew by leaps and bounds. In 
Britain, the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror and Daily Sketch reached around 1 million readers 
annually … the Daily Express’s circulation almost doubled.’48 
 
A Constructionist view of the relationship between the media and the public presents it 
as a two way dynamic, with the media capable of manipulating the information which it 
receives with an eye on its target audience, such as the propaganda efforts supplied by 
the Press Bureau, and a public equally capable of filtering the information it receives 
according to its own social and political identities, often disregarding information which 
does not accord with its views.49 The efficacy of attempts to sway public opinion via mass 
media, such as the government’s positive positioning of the Indian soldiers is generally 
held to have some effect, subject to the caveats above regarding the target audience and 
their own particular characteristics. Adrian Bingham cited the example of the press in 
1918 which ‘worked hard to encourage eligible women to vote’ in the first general 
election after their enfranchisement, although he conceded that the effect of these 
efforts can never be clearly established.50 Aaron Reeves and Robert de Fries found that 
newspaper coverage of the 2011 riots in British cities did influence public opinion, with 
newspaper readers more likely to regard welfare recipients in a negative light than those 
not exposed to print media.51 This would suggest that, in some part at least, the media 
did have a positive effect on the opinions of British people during the war, although this 
was most pronounced in those who encountered Indian soldiers, both in the civilian and 
military populations.  
 
Despite the variety of sources, the correlation between evidentiary material and public 
opinion is not a necessary one and a debate continues as to how clear any connection 
may be. Furthermore, ‘public opinion’ is itself a term fraught with difficulty as the public 
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in question is not necessarily a homogenous group, consisting for the purpose of this 
thesis of the people of Great Britain, separable into numerous subdivisions such as 
gender, class and in particular racial prejudice or otherwise and their status as civilians 
or soldiers. D. G. Boyce considered that any subdivision such as those above merely 
results in ‘generic statements’ about smaller groups of people, whose individual opinions 
remain unknowable.52 Perhaps the least applicable to this study are those most 
commonly used, those of gender and class. The military framework was exclusively male 
and any opinions, either from formal military sources or individual memoirs are 
necessarily from a male perspective and a female reading public would be unlikely to 
have the detailed military knowledge to accept these at anything other than face value. 
From a military perspective, the range of sources offered is inclusive of those of the very 
highest rank, staff officers in the field and private soldiers’ memoirs, so can be taken to 
be representative of the spectrum of social class. The class divide among the public who 
absorbed the impressions given directly or indirectly is less clear to see. Although the 
literary sources may appear to be appear to be the most susceptible to class influence, 
readership of novelists such as Kipling as widespread and the type of children’s’ 
publications used as source material were accessible to the majority of children. The 
spread of military sources above can be considered to be comprehensive of social 
classes, although the readership may of course not be. Given that, the war and the thirst 
for war news was sufficiently widespread and all-consuming that it can be assumed that 
a representative cross section of social classes were made aware of the contribution of 
the empire to the war effort. In the case study of the response of the people of Brighton, 
this is less clear, although the weight of numbers attending events such as the first arrival 
of Indian troops at the railway station and the curious gaze of the public at the soldiers 
and the gifts made to them could be seen to be comprehensive of the town’s social make 
up. 
 
There are parallels here with the discussion above concerning the extent to which the 
British public concerned itself with its empire or otherwise. Neither case is subject to 
comprehensive proof but the weight of evidence can suggest conclusions. Taken 
together, these varied sources reveal the changing manner in which Indian people and 
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soldiers were represented and how they interacted with the British public and military 
during the period.  
 
CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
The first part of this thesis analyses the British civilian experience of Indian people and 
soldiers in the years before, during and after the war and examines how attitudes 
towards Indian people were affected by knowledge of their service in France. The second 
part concerns the military perspective: the caution with which the deployment of Indian 
troops in Europe was met, their success as fighting men and the high praise they garnered 
in the official records of the war. The key conclusion in common between both aspects 
is the high esteem in which the Indian soldiers came to be held as a result of their war 
service in France, particularly when more positive media representations were backed 
up by personal interactions. 
 
Careful analysis of the British domestic viewpoint in the first chapter will illustrate how 
Indian people were represented before, during and after the war and highlight the 
changes which occurred. This will provide a context and, to some extent, an explanation 
for many of the attitudinal changes which were to take place in Britain. The chapter will 
principally use newspaper sources to illustrate the changing representations of Indians 
in Britain as the perceptions of Indian people moved from the largely negative before 
the war, through a position of heroism during the war to a more nuanced view in the 
years after the war. It will show that this developed from a view of Indian people in 
Britain which was largely led by clichéd stereotypes. It will be shown that during the war, 
such images were not seen to be suitable depictions of soldiers fighting for the empire 
and positive representations in the media became the norm. After the war, the most 
negative images melted away, although the image of Indian people as ‘exotic’ remained a 
hardy stereotype. The work of Rudyard Kipling will be used to illustrate this train of 
representation throughout the period though the depictions he chose to use. 
 
The second chapter contrasts this view with that of British people who actually met and 
interacted with Indian soldiers during the war. Necessarily, this is a small group as few 
Indian soldiers ever visited Britain, with the exception of wounded soldiers who were 
hospitalised in towns across the south coast. The town of Brighton will be used as a case 
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study to examine how these encounters took place and the positive, not to say 
affectionate, attitude which developed towards them. The propaganda value of the 
success of the hospitals will also be examined. It will be shown that those who met 
Indians developed more positive views of them than did those who relied solely upon 
representations in the media for their knowledge.  
 
In Part Two, the third chapter will examine how the Rebellion of 1857 led to dramatic 
changes in the military establishment and precipitated some of the negative assumptions 
which were to come to the fore in France. Despite the sixty years since it had occurred, 
change was slow to follow and the effects of those changes necessarily took still longer 
to emerge. Particular reference will be made to the Martial Race Theory of recruitment, 
which was itself the source of a number of difficulties faced by the Indian Corps in France. 
It will examine the relationships between British and Indian troops and compare the 
views of the soldiers and senior and staff officers who had most contact with Indians. It 
will show that, in a similar manner to the civilian population, those who fought alongside 
the Indian soldiers and knew them tended to form better opinions of them than those 
who did not, who tended to adhere instead to the fears that preceded their deployment.  
 
The purpose of the fourth chapter is to place the difficulties that the British Army 
anticipated that the Indian Corps would face within the context of the overall thesis by 
demonstrating that these ‘difficulties’ were constructs of the type of prejudicial thinking 
inherent at this period. In this instance, the Social Darwinist anticipation proved 
unfounded but, as will be shown, was taken up again later in the twentieth century by 
historians discussing the Indian contribution on the Western Front. The chapter will 
examine the concerns that were held about deploying Indian troops in Europe: that they 
would not be effective without the close leadership of British officers, that they would 
not be able to cope with the climate of northern France, that they were prone to 
indiscipline and self-inflicted wounds, and that there was a risk that they would be disloyal 
to the Raj.  It will show that those fears did not manifest themselves on the battlefield 
and that the conduct of the Indian soldiers was comparable with that of their British 
counterparts. It will then consider the negative presentation of the Indian soldiers in the 
later twentieth century historiography, most of which perpetuated the concerns above, 
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and contrast this with the overwhelmingly positive view of them which was prevalent at 
the end of the war among those who knew the Corps and their part in the war best. 
 
The final chapter draws together both the civilian and military perspectives to detail 
British reactions to the Indian Corps’ service in France and attitudes to Indian people 
during the post war period. It finds a public which is more amendable and better 
informed towards Indian people and which expressed discontent with the Jallianwalla 
Bagh massacre. However, this is contrasted with the Race Riots which broke out in the 
same years in port cities across the country. It will examine government efforts to 
propagate a more inclusive view of empire via the British Empire Exhibition and Empire 
Marketing Board. By comparison, the granting of commissions to Indian soldiers is 
contrasted with negative, if not prejudicial  aspects of the Imperial War Graves 
Commission’s activities. 
 
The thesis will conclude that the British view of India and its people was changed by its 
involvement in the First World War. The evidence will show that the increased 
awareness of and interaction with Indian soldiers led not simply to the development of 
more sophisticated and rounded representations of Indian people by the media and 
generated widespread respect and support. However, the acclaim should be set against 
both individual and governmental actions which were prejudiced against Indian people 
and there is no evidence to suggest a longer-term continuation. Rather, this ambivalence 
appears to have set the tone for the years ahead.  
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Chapter One - ‘The dusky sons of Hindostan/Will by our banner stand’ – 
Representations of Indian people in Britain  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the manner in which Indian people were 
represented in the media in the years before, during and after the First World War and 
how the nature of these representations was changed by the participation of Indian 
troops in the war. Each section will form a comparison based on similar sources of 
information about Indian people to give an overview of the prevailing trends. In order 
to give as broad a scope as possible, a variety of sources will be used: newspapers and 
weekly publications will be used to show how Indian people appeared in public life while 
literary accounts will present a more idealised view and children’s literature will be 
examined for its ‘educational’ aspect as a means of forming the opinions of the next 
generation. While there has been extensive study of representations of empire in the 
domestic context, there has been far less study of this aspect of the depiction of Indian 
people during this period, although further information has been sourced from 
commentators on the history of Britain’s South Asian population. The work of Rudyard 
Kipling, the ‘poet of empire’, will be used as a case study to illustrate the changes which 
occurred in the depiction of Indians during the period.  
 
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, most British people were unlikely ever to 
meet or converse with an Indian person in Britain. Although the population of Indians 
was fairly disparate, they tended to live and work in very specific areas. Rozina Visram 
estimates the number of Asians in Britain in 1914 at ‘several hundred’ semi-permanent 
residents, most of whom were lascars (sailors), ayahs (nannies), princes and royalty as 
well as anywhere between 700 and 1200 students.1 The importance of the diversity of 
the population, not just in background but social class, is emphasised alongside the 
difficulty of establishing the number of Indian people accurately by Michael Fisher et al.2 
For this reason, most people’s impressions of Indian people came from media and 
cultural representations, for example occasions such as Empire Day celebrations created 
in 1909 as a national event, primarily for young people, by Reginald Brabazon, Earl of 
Meath. Jim English argued that, although a festival aimed at schools, it had a cultural 
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significance beyond young people and was also celebrated among the adult population.3 
His analysis of memoirs from the early years of the twentieth century shows a 
widespread awareness of the celebration, with some 200,000 adults joining 40,000 
children for its inaugural celebration in Preston in 1909.4 Three years later, The Times 
reported Empire Day as ‘a festival of world-wide importance. Today many millions of his 
majesty’s subjects will take part in it.’5 Shortly before this report, The Times had published 
a letter from the Earl of Meath asserting that 260 education committees in Britain were 
endorsing the festival, with some 17,000,000 people celebrating the day across the 
world.6 The numbers of people involved demonstrates the high degree of receptiveness 
to learning about and celebrating the empire during the period, although, as has been 
seen above, the impact of Empire Day remains disputed among historians.  
 
As will be shown, while the stereotypical manner in which Indian people were 
represented in the media did not alter as the years passed, the content of the 
representations changed dramatically. In the absence of any substantial interactions 
between British and Indian people in Britain, representations continued to form a series 
of reductionist stereotypes upon which the public had to rely. Santanu Das noted that 
the use of such stereotypes was not just a British, but pan European, phenomenon, 
particularly with regard to Indian fighting men.7 While the content changed and became 
more positive as time went on, the insubstantial and stereotypical nature of the 
representations altered little.  
 
REPRESENTATIONS OF INDIAN PEOPLE IN THE YEARS BEFORE THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR 
This section will show that before the war the representations of Indian people fell into 
a limited number of stereotypes, presenting Indian people in the media as variously 
helpless victims in need of assistance; exotic; or threatening and even liable to acts of 
civil disobedience. Each representation achieved notice in its own way, which provides 
insight into the knowledge and opinions available to British people before the 
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contribution of the Indian soldiers became better known in the early years of the First 
World War.  
 
National events always included India and its people and were unfailingly popular. From 
a cultural point of view, the British public was very receptive to Indian influenced 
entertainment. At the Franco-British Exhibition of 1908, there was an Indian pavilion in 
which at least two performances daily played to some 3000 people in a show which 
featured sword swallowers, acrobats, jugglers, performing elephants and ‘seven nautch 
girls, who are not made to go beyond the limited gyrations to which they are accustomed 
in real life merely to please onlookers who may not have seen an actual Indian nautch.’8 
This comment reflects an awareness by the reporter, who was presumably himself 
British, that Indian people and customs were not always accurately represented in 
Britain.    
 
There are echoes of this lack of authenticity in shows such as the popular revue of 1879, 
Indianationality, which had a successful run at the Oxford Music Hall in London. The show 
was billed as ‘a gorgeous musical Indian sketch. New scenery, dresses, music, 
attitudinisations [sic], and patriotic songs in which Miss Edmonds and an ensemble of 
ladies and youths will appear.’9 The show included a song written for it by G W Hunt 
called ‘New Patriotic Song’ which included the lines ‘the Indian tiger’s awake’ and ‘The 
dusky sons of Hindostan/Will by our banner stand.’10 This rather prophetic lyric shows 
the confident expectation of Indian military support for the British. 
 
On a less populist level, the 1911 Festival of Empire in its Indian section chose to ‘confine 
the exhibition to the decorative and applied arts of the country, and to models, tableaux, 
and other articles illustrating the life of the people and the history of the country.11 
Among the exhibits were the diary of the daughter of Clive of India, ‘Mrs Herringham’s 
reproductions of the famous frescoes of the Ajanta Caves’, and ‘copies of the Scriptures 
in manifold Indian languages.’12 Note that these were British representations of India and 
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showed that the curators were apparently choosing not to display authentic Indian 
images to the British public, although these would presumably have been reasonably 
accessible to the curators. 
 
For young people, publications such as The Boy’s Own Paper were written to provide a 
steer as to how the empire should be viewed, often with confused results. It is 
characteristic that these stories often involved colonial people as a foil to the endeavours 
of doughty British heroes, rather than as personalities in their own right. In ‘Gulab Singh: 
A Story of Peril and Heroism’, a story published in Boy’s Own in 1889, contains a further 
message, that of the importance of loyalty to Britain, is illustrated. In this scene, Jack and 
his faithful servant Gulab Singh have been kidnapped by Mohun Lal and are being 
threatened with execution in the name of Indian independence. As Mohun Lal invites 
Jack and Gulab to watch their last sunset, the following conversation takes place: 
 
 ‘God bless you Gulab!’ said Jack. ‘You have been a faithful servant.’ 
‘Faithful to his master – a dog of an Englishman – but false to the country of his 
birth!’ interrupted Mohun Lal. 
‘Thou liest, Mohun Lal!’ said Gulab, with spirit, ‘To my country I am not untrue 
… the men of the Punjab know not the King of Delhi, but remain true to the salt 
of their friends and masters.’13 
 
Not only have the rebels imperilled a white person but they are threatening Gulab, an 
Indian, on exactly the same basis: retribution for the British reaction to the rebellion of 
1857. Mohun Lal continues, ‘Mutineers, as the English dogs call us … are blown from 
the mouths of cannon. We will see how an Englishman looks strapped to cannon’s 
mouth.’ Just as the cannon was about to be fired, a group of troops arrived, led by Jack’s 
friend Alick and an Indian fakeer, and rescued Jack and Gulab. Jack reflected on the 
fakeer’s motivation to help him rescue Jack and Gulab, ‘the shrewd villagers saw that by 
returning me to the English, they would be marked as loyal and probably receive a 
handsome reward; whereas if it had been discovered that they had rescued an English 
officer, that they would certainly have their village burned by their troublesome 
neighbours the English.’ The story concluded as Jack and Alick nursed Gulab back to 
health from his wounds and rewarded him for having saved their lives.14 
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This story put forward some interesting concepts for a young English boy: that not all 
Indian people were loyal to the British and some had the power and resources to capture 
a young English officer. However, the end of the story was clear on all counts: the rebels’ 
attack was foiled and it was the British ingenuity of Alick who saved the day, leaving 
Gulab helpless and injured to be carried out of danger by Alick and Jack and ‘nursed as 
if he was a brother’, before being returned to his family.15 The closing message was clear, 
the British had the power not only to put down rebellions but to take charge of the lives 
of Indians who required their assistance. 
 
While stories like these were doubtless well received by small boys looking for tales of 
adventure and excitement, their effect as propaganda was not missed. Anti-Imperialist 
commentator J. A. Hobson, writing in 1902, claimed that such stories and efforts to 
influence children through means such as Empire Day celebrations at school were no 
more than an attempt to ‘feed the always overweening pride of race at an age when self-
confidence most commonly prevails, and by necessary implication to disparage other 
nations, so starting children in the world with false measures of value and an 
unwillingness to learn from foreign sources.’16 Nevertheless, their popularity remained 
and the generation brought up on stories such as this and the national faith in empire 
went on to dominate public life in the years during and after the war. 
 
Representations such as these, which are designed to place British people in apposition 
of superiority over Indian people in various contexts are broadly illustrative of the Social 
Darwinist thinking prevalent in the years before the war. Social Darwinism was primarily 
a late nineteenth century concept which attempted to reinterpret Charles Darwin’s 
theory of the survival of the fittest to reflect, in this case, the superiority of the British 
over their colonial Indian subjects. This theme will recur in the thesis in both the context 
of civilian representations of Indian people and in the assumptions made by the military 
leaders that the Indian soldiers would not be able to cope with condition on the Western 
Front. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR ON REPRESENTATIONS OF INDIAN 
SOLDIERS  
This section will focus on the representations of Indian soldiers during the war, using 
both first person stories, regional and national daily newspapers and weekly publications 
and literature for adults and children. These will be used to illustrate how the 
representation of Indians in this period differed from that in the years before the war. It 
will examine how literature, as well as the press, contributed to a new view of Indian 
people now they had entered the public arena as soldiers. The representations 
promoted by the press were to a large extent determined by content provided by the 
Press Bureau, which sought to provide propaganda stories to maintain public morale and 
Indian soldiers were part of that narrative. The motivation for this seems clear: the image 
of Indian people in the years before the war was not conducive to their presenting a 
reassuring presence in France and so a new set of representations was required, 
suggestive of loyalty to the crown and military competence. 
 
New weekly publications about the war started remarkably soon after the declaration 
of war. War Illustrated was published for the first time on 22 August 1914, just 18 days 
after Britain entered the war. The Times History and Encyclopaedia of the War was 
published weekly from 25 August 1914. Each issue dealt with a specific topic concerning 
the war and chapters were often written by well-known writers and journalists. A self-
appointed role of the press was to provide the British public with information about 
Indian society. The Times History gave detailed introductions to the various ethnic groups 
which made up the Indian Army and their religions and customs, as well as providing 
detailed battle analysis. Punch, albeit in a light-hearted manner, emphasised their loyalty 
to the crown and their ferocity in battle, as did numerous other publications. There 
were plenty of endorsements of their bravery and ability from British privates and 
officers and even accounts of the Germans’ fear of them and admiration of them as 
adversaries. An interesting strand, bearing in mind that the empire had a marked 
tendency to view its subjects as naïve children, often prone to over-excitement, was the 
repeated emphasis on their stoicism and steadfastness under fire. The image that a 
British reader of newspapers and weeklies would have gleaned of the Indian soldiers was 
one of a stalwart, brave and formidable army which was devoted to its King Emperor, 
not so far distant from the image of a British Tommy. 
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The issue of non-white men fighting in a white European war had been a concern in 
political and military circles before the war and was tackled head on in the October 1914 
edition of the History, claiming that, ‘the instinct which made us such sticklers for 
propriety in all our dealings made us feel more reluctant than other nations would feel, 
to employ coloured troops against a white enemy.’ It went on to admit that it would not 
have been ‘possible’ or ‘wise’ to ‘refuse’ to admit Indians to the European theatre of war. 
The Times History revisited the problem of ‘The Employment of “Coloured Troops’ in 
June 191517. Now able to add evidence to its former reassurances, it firmly stated that 
‘The ignorance which prompted the scruple was one of the first illusions which the war 
swept away.’18 The use of quotation marks in the subtitle and the firm tone of its 
statement show that any issues around a racial bar to fighting in Europe must be 
considered, by the Times History at least, to be closed.  
 
A clear message that racial prejudice towards the Indian soldiers would be unpatriotic 
came from a Press Bureau Dispatch published in the Newcastle Daily Journal, ‘Letters … 
make it clear that the German military authorities have specially charged their troops 
with the task of inflecting the severest possible punishment upon forces whose 
civilisation they deny.’19 By a simple oppositional move, the public was drawn into 
accepting the Indian civilisation in the face of German racism, while additionally 
emphasising that the Germans saw the Indians as a particular threat. 
 
The critical message for the British authorities was to present the Indian soldiers to the 
public in a reassuring light as competent fighters who would serve Britain effectively in 
France. This was achieved by a number of stories released by the Press Bureau but also 
by publications such as Punch, which gave light hearted accounts of the Indian Corps. 
Punch served to present the Indian soldiers in an inclusive light, by treating them in the 
same manner as they would any other topic of interest. This theme of inclusiveness is 
also seen in letters home from British soldiers which were published in local newspapers 
as well as in press pictures such as the photograph from War Illustrated below. The loyalty 
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18 The Times History of the War, Volume 2, issue XXII, n.d., c. June 1915, 317 
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of the Indian soldiers was also an important message, both to allay public concerns that 
non-white troops would not serve well in Europe and that India would be safe after the 
end of the war. 
 
Almost as soon as the Indian soldiers arrived in France, positive stories covering their 
courage and fighting ability started to emerge in the press. On 2 October 1914, a story 
appeared in the Dundee Courier, which credits The Times as its source, which described 
their arrival in Marseilles:  
 
It is no exaggeration to say that the regiments brought over from the East are 
composed of noble and majestic specimens of manhood … first came a 
detachment of stalwart Sikhs, for the greater part head and shoulders above the 
spectators. Immediately the police guarding the route were swept aside. The 
ranks were rushed, men and women shook the laughing soldiers by the hand, 
and young girls showered flowers upon them, pinning roses in their tunics and in 
their turbans … when the sturdy Gurkhas – still smiling, of course … the crowd 
considered they could better show their regard by allowing the soldiers the right 
of the pavement instead of the cobbled streets.  Accordingly, men, mountain 
battery mules, and officers; horses marched along under the awnings of café 
terrasses, men and women standing on chairs and tables waving hats, sticks, and 
handkerchiefs and expending every ounce of lung energy shouting ‘Vivent les 
Anglais,’ ‘Vivent les Indiennes.’ Quick witted Indians voiced their gratitude by 
replying, ‘Veeve France,’ and by making repeated use of a phrase in Hindustani, 
the intonation of which was suspiciously reminiscent of the British soldiers’ 
dearly-beloved ‘Are we downhearted? No!’ Our Indian troops, comparable as 
they are to any martial force in the world, have only one fear – it is that the war 
may be over before they get to the Front.20 
 
This passage, which almost certainly derives from the Press Bureau, is worth quoting at 
length as it contains many signals to its readership as to how the Indian soldiers should 
be viewed. They are considered to be ‘noble and majestic specimens of manhood,’ Sikhs 
are noticeably tall and Gurkhas ‘sturdy’. Not only were they physically impressive but 
the crowd was sufficiently moved by their presence to step out of their way through 
sheer respect and allow them the shade of the pavement, while they stood in the road 
to watch the men march past. Even in their first moments in France, the report suggested 
that they had recognised a few words of French and were able to reply in that language, 
as well as having a grasp of English military slang, illustrating their quick wit and 
intelligence. Finally, just as for so many Britain recruits, they were deemed to be anxious 
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to reach the trenches as soon as possible in case the war ended before they could get 
there. All these prompts worked to create an image for the public of the Indians as 
eager, fit and intelligent fighting men, whose presence could only be of benefit to Britain. 
 
The June 1915 edition of the Times History, entitled ‘The Indian Army in the Trenches’, 
reviewed the Indian Army’s experience in France from its arrival to December 1914 in 
considerably more detail than had been available when they arrived in France.21 It 
introduced the idea that the Indian men were relatively indifferent to the mayhem 
around them, ‘One of the first regiments to go into action was heavily shelled whilst 
entrenching. An officer who was present particularly observed the indifference of the 
men throughout this, which was – to them – a novel experience. It was noticed that 
after the first few shells they hardly troubled to look round.’22 This was reinforced 
further in an account of a wounded man, ‘One heard of the Dogra Naik who was very 
badly hit in the stomach, and who, though dying and in mortal pain, never made a sound, 
and when carried into the hospital tried to raise on his stretcher and salute. He lingered 
half an hour and never even moaned all that time.’23 It seems that the writer was trying 
to relate their ability to remain calm under fire to the established idea of the stoic British 
Tommy. 
 
Among other publications to acknowledge the Indian contribution was Punch, the weekly 
satirical magazine, which enjoyed a boost in sales after the declaration of war.24 As the 
Indian soldiers were en route from India, Punch published the sketch below. Although 
the role of the cavalry was to be much diminished by the war the message was clear: the 
Indian soldiers would be patriotic and fierce in their defence of their King Emperor. 
Later that month, the Indian Corps was clearly positioned by Punch as beside and equal 
to the British Army in an article about the possibility of invasion by the Germans, ‘When 
the Regular Army and the Reserve Army and the new Million Army and the Indian Army 
and the Overseas Army and the Territorial Army are all entering Berlin together, then 
the defence of England (we hope) will rest entirely upon us.’25 
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Punch Magazine, 9 September 1914 
 
British readers were also given an insight into the German view of the Indian soldiers as 
good soldiers. The Times History explained that, although the British position in India was 
secure, it was regarded as a disadvantage by other European powers to have to commit 
resources and men into defending its Indian borders from attack and claims that ‘at the 
outset of the present conflict the German Press confidently relied upon trouble in India 
37. ‘The Dusky Sons of Hindostan’ 
 
as a factor on their side.’26 That same month, The Western Daily Press, in a news article 
headed ‘Our Indian Troops – Their Great Triumph’ quoted from a Press Association 
report that ‘The Germans say that the Indians personally are much stronger and more 
nimble than German soldiers and it is therefore impossible for the latter to vanquish 
them in hand-to-hand fighting, unless the Indians are outnumbered.’27 
 
Such claims were given further legitimacy in the eyes of the public by the publication of 
accounts of British soldiers who fought alongside the Indian soldiers. These take the 
form of letters home which were passed on to the local press by their families. In the 
spring of 1915 The Times published a letter from a British officer in the Indian Army 
entitled ‘The Dash of the Indian Troops – Dodging Jack Johnsons,’28 which once again 
emphasised their stoicism and fighting ability.  In the letter, an officer of the Indian Army 
paid tribute to the spirit and endurance of the native troops: 
 
The Indian troops did awfully well. They say their dash was wonderful … My men 
have stood 10 days shelling with the utmost indifference. The biggest guns they 
have ever seen before have been field guns. One day we had 50 Jack Johnsons in 
an hour falling all about our trenches. They were aimed at some houses behind 
us, where the artillery observers were concealed, and they absolutely knocked 
the place to pieces, making holes 8ft to 10ft broad and 4ft or 5ft deep. Luckily 
none pitched in the trench, although they fell within a foot or two … The men 
didn’t mind them a bit.29 
 
In April 1915, Driver William Barr wrote of his impressions in a letter to his brother, 
 
At night time you could go by an Indian sentry without seeing him, although he 
soon sees you. They are very smart fellows ... and some can speak English fairly 
well – acting as clerks and orderlies for officers, etc. They feel the cold very much 
and say, ‘France and trenches no good.’ I get on with them all right. Some are 
very cheeky, others are afraid to speak or come in where you are … They are 
pretty smart at drill etc. Their writing is funny, like Chinese. I think this is all 
about the Indians.30 
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In another first person account, published in November 1914, Captain Taylor, ‘remarks 
they do not call it fighting when bullets are flying round all night and only one man hit. 
Their officers, he said, “have to jump on them” to keep them in the trenches.’31 A letter 
to The Newcastle Daily Journal said that, ‘The Indians are good soldiers; they have done 
well since they arrived.’32 
 
While not originally written for publication, by virtue of their publication in newspapers 
these letters acted as propaganda, providing accounts of men encountering peers from 
a vastly different world, noting their idiosyncrasies as well as their bravery. Often these 
letters emphasised how the Indian soldiers were unmoved by the carnage they saw 
around them, which must have given a particular emphasis to the accounts of their 
bravery. Just as with the official stories, these accounts presented the men in a wholly 
positive light: as wise, brave soldiers, who are friendly, if sometimes shy, towards the 
Tommies. 
 
Other newspaper accounts of positive relationships between British and Indian soldiers 
offered similar propaganda value. A story in The Newcastle Daily Journal, attributed to a 
national newspaper so probably also originating from the Press Bureau, claimed that ‘the 
men are conspicuously good rifle shots and born trackers and hunters. Also, they are 
very clannish and conservative; but while not readily fraternising with other Indian 
troops, they quickly become great friends with British soldiers whenever and wherever 
they meet.’33 From this the public could glean that not only were they effective fighters, 
they would work well alongside British troops and were happy to do so. Photographs 
such as the one below must also have added to the general feeling of acceptance towards 
the Indian troops among the British public by showing British and Indian soldiers to be 
relaxed and comfortable in each other’s company. 
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War Illustrated, V3, 42, 1915 
 
As well as the news media, the camaraderie between British and Indian troops was noted 
for a children’s audience. The comic Picture Fun Weekly on Boxing Day 1914 published 
the story ‘Cuffy the Colonial’ in which Cuffy and his friend ‘Sinjin the Sikh’ replaced the 
Kaiser’s Christmas pudding with a bomb. As the frame and caption below show, the 
cartoon is, by today’s standards, racist and mocks Sinjin’s accent:34 
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‘Cuffy, the Colonial, and Sinjin, the Sikh, pinch the Kaiser’s Christmas Pudding’, Picture Fun Weekly, No 
307, 26 December 1914, frame 4 
 
However, the cartoon cannot simply be read by twenty-first century standards. To a 
young boy one hundred years ago, it would have seemed far more like a boyish prank 
carried out by two men acting in cooperation against a common enemy, the Kaiser. In 
the first frame Cuffy asked Sinjin ‘Ever taste Xmas pudding Singy?’ whispered Cuffy. ‘No! 
Then we’ll have one between us.’ The cartoon ended as the bomb exploded and the 
two men escaped: ‘Ha ha’ cried Cuffy, ‘we’ve done that very neatly, but we’d better get 
off; it’s time we were out of the picture. Besides we want to sample the Kaiser’s pudding.’ 
Sinjin appeared to be happily in cahoots with Cuffy and they worked in partnership to 
carry out their plot, although Cuffy is clearly in charge of the enterprise. 
 
Images of British and Indian soldiers enjoying each other’s company, praise of them in 
both formal and first person accounts and even children’s’ cartoons all served to 
promote the Indian soldiers as competent soldiers equal in ability, if not status, to their 
British counterparts. A suggestion of inclusiveness and even affection came from Punch’s 
treatment of the Indian soldiers. Punch treated the Indian soldiers with its customary 
robust humour, referring to the Indian Corps as the ‘Jugglers’ Corps,’35 to the Gurkhas 
as ‘Gherkins’36 and claiming that ‘the Indians have an extraordinary way of fighting. They 
jump up, shoot with wonderful precision, and disappear before one has a chance to 
notice them properly. Our contemporary has evidently not been studying the pages of 
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Punch, or it would know that the disappearance is worked by the well-known Indian trick 
of throwing a rope into the air and climbing up it.’37 While by today’s standards this could 
be seen as offensive, in the context of the standards of the day, this was little more than 
affectionate teasing and can be read as inclusive of the Indian soldiers in the melee of 
comic sketches in the magazine, although the humour depends on the depiction of 
Indians as exotic and thus ‘other’. 
 
The loyalty of the Indian troops to the Raj was also a feature of media reports designed 
to reassure the British public about their reliability. The Times History’s first mention of 
the Indian soldiers was in an issue designed to introduce the empire’s contribution to 
the war effort in the last week of October 1914.38 The issue, titled ‘The Native Indian 
Army’ provided an introduction to the Indian Army, with sections describing the 
different racial groups and attributing various military strengths to each. The following 
week’s issue reported the work of various dominions and parts of the empire, while the 
second half reported that ‘even more striking and not less spontaneous were the 
expressions of passionate loyalty to the Throne and empire which came from India.’ The 
edition concluded that ‘Indian loyalty owed its existence not only to the monarchic 
instincts of its peoples and its martial pride, but to their gratitude for the benefits of 
British Government and to their determination to uphold at all costs the empire to 
which they were so deeply indebted.’ 39 
 
A novel, first published in 1917 in Adventure Magazine in America and in 1918 in book 
form in Britain and America, gave a similar perspective on the British view of the Indian 
soldiers as loyal fighters. Its author, Talbot Mundy, was a Briton who had lived in India 
and East Africa before settling in New York. Hira Singh – when India came to Flanders was 
his tribute to the Indian soldiers in France: ‘May this tribute to the gallant Indian 
gentlemen who came to fight our battles serve to remind its readers that they who give 
their best, and they who take, are one’ reads the introduction.40 In the book a group of 
Sikh soldiers were captured by the Germans and found themselves in the Half Moon 
Camp, where the Germans attempted to convince them to defect, believing them to be 
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Muslims and as such prepared to consider joining with the Ottoman Empire on the side 
of the Germans. As Sikhs, this did not resonate with them but they played along in order 
to be sent to Turkey. Once in Turkey, they escaped from the Germans, and by a 
complicated combination of fighting, guile and trickery made their way to Afghanistan 
and thus into India, where they were given a heroes’ welcome.  
 
Mundy’s Indian soldiers were full of intelligence and cunning and also deep loyalty to the 
Raj. It is in order to keep fighting for the British that they made their escape, rather than 
to reach India in order to desert. At one point, Ranjoor Singh, their leader, was 
questioned by his men and replied ‘”and as to whether I am true or not, it is enough 
that each should know his own heart. I am for the raj!” … then I spoke up, for I saw my 
opportunity. “So are we for the raj!” said I. “We too sahib!”’41 This was enough to unite 
his men and they carried on and finally crossed into India where the first person to greet 
them was ‘a long-legged English sahib [who] heard our story and said “Shabash!” to 
Ranjoor Singh, which means “Well done!” They were then invited to take ‘the salute of 
a whole division.’ Their final reward was the promise of promotion to commissioned 
officer for the narrator.42 Thus the group of independent and resourceful men returned 
home as heroes to take full advantage of their new status as commissioned officers; 
commissions granted, of course, by the British. 
 
This was one of a number of literary representations of the Indian troops for various 
British audiences, all of which reflect the trend towards viewing the men as heroic and 
loyal soldiers, some of which were written by men who knew he Indian soldiers well. 
General Willcocks, Commander of the Indian troops, wrote an 18 stanza poem in the 
Indian style in praise of the Indian soldier which was originally published in Blackwood’s 
Magazine in December 1917. He had already written a military-orientated account of 
the Indian soldiers’ time in France in the July edition. The poem was told from the point 
of view of Hurnam Singh, who had fought in France, five years after his return home, 
having lost an arm in combat and told his tale to the ‘village yokels’ to whom he has 
returned.43 The poem recounted the men’s journey to France, the places they saw and 
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fought in and compared the war to the Mahabharata. It emphasised the bravery of the 
men and specifically mentions Durwan Negi’s bravery.44 Towards the end, he concluded 
that,  
 
 The Jehlum’s banks had witnessed oft her banks stained with gore, 
Had heard the tramp of countless feet, 
Had known both triumph and defeat,  
But never had her waters swirled 
A prouder message to the world 
Than Hurnam’s story bore.45 
 
While he brought the pride of the old soldier back to India and the banks of the river 
Hurnam sat beside, Willcocks was also clear that Hurnam’s loyalty lay with England, ‘For 
India’s sons had sealed their oath, according to their laws … and died in England’s 
cause.’46 The use of the word ‘oath’ is reminiscent of the expression of taking the salt, 
which occurs as an expression of duty and loyalty in a number of Indian soldiers’ letters 
home.  
 
In the months immediately following the Armistice the Times History published a series 
of articles summarising various aspects of the war. Among them was a chapter devoted 
to the success of the Indian Corps during the war and the competence and even heroism 
shown by the Indian troops. With regard to their military contribution in Europe, it 
wrote:  
 
It required … profound confidence in the essential loyalty of India to denude her 
without the slightest hesitation of almost all her British garrison as well of her 
Indian troops and to throw all her military resources into the melting pot in 
order to fill the gaps in our fighting line in France which … could not have been 
filled from any other quarter during the supremely critical period when the 
Germans, having failed to reach Paris, were making their great effort to break 
through to Calais and the French channel coast.47 
 
This quotation is significant as it not only reflects that Britain had left her most prized 
asset, India, almost unguarded during the war but also is overt about the impact the 
arrival of the Indian Corps made. Not only does it recognise that there were gaps in the 
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line during the early months of the war but further states that there was no other source 
of fighting men to fill those gaps. The unspoken claim is that without the swift arrival of 
Indian reinforcements, the Germans could have won the Race to the Sea in the autumn 
of 1914, which would have dramatically altered, if not the outcome of the war, certainly 
its conduct in its first year. In a similar vein, The Times reported on a lecture in March 
1919 at the Royal Institution about the Indian military contribution to the war effort. Sir 
John Fortescue, who had been engaged by the British government to write a popular 
history of the First World War, claimed in the lecture that there were times when a 
senior commander ‘preferred Indian soldiers to the British’ and concluded that the India 
had shown both ‘astonishing gallantry [and] loyalty for which we ought to be devoutly 
thankful.’ 48 
 
Concluding its account of the first three months of the Indian Army’s involvement, the  
Times History aimed ‘to give some idea of the various castes, creeds and communities 
from which it is drawn; to describe the peculiar difficulties that confronted them in a 
strange land under entirely novel conditions of warfare; and to record the fine spirit with 
which they surmounted these, upholding their high traditions, and proving, as in their 
past, their fidelity and devotion to the British Crown.’49 Once again, the values of bravery 
and loyalty are stressed, in what was the last issue devoted solely to the Indian troops 
as they left France some months later. Once again, although designed to be informative, 
the exotic and separate view of Indians is shown in these attempts to explain their 
various ethnicities to the public. 
 
However, even as the Indian soldiers were being depicted in a new and heroic light, 
some clichés endured and they were still sometimes portrayed as childlike or exotic. In 
the June 1915 issue of the Times History there was an interesting note about how the 
Indians reacted to trench warfare. In the border skirmishes in India, they lived in large 
camps which they left only to undertake raids on small targets, often by stealth, and 
almost always involving hand to hand combat, and returned to the safety of the camp 
after the engagement. As the Times History phrased it, ‘they like to stalk their men and 
shoot him. But in this war, mines, barbed-wire entanglement, shells, siege-guns, 
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mitrailleuses50, all the machinery of the “higher civilisation,” were  most palpable 
phenomena on the other side … “Sahib, why did you not teach us these things?” a sepoy 
said reproachfully to his British officer, unconscious that the same wizardry was being 
brought into play by his own Sahibs against the enemy.’51 While this seems to draw out 
the popular view of Indian people as childlike and full of wonder at the modern European 
world, the truth was that their British officers were barely more experienced in this kind 
of warfare than the Indian soldiers they led. 
 
The next section is even more revealing:  
 
The Indians who gave themselves to our cause did so at an even greater sacrifice 
than our own, for the meaning of the struggle did not touch them as nearly as it 
did us. To them the German was merely a savage with diabolical inspirations, a 
merely physical menace. The gospel of Treitschke52 did not trouble their 
philosophy. Honour – personal, communal and national – was the only reward 
they looked for. The first advance of the Indians under machine gun fire was a 
new spiritual triumph for the East.53  
 
The idea that Indians were unable to understand the war in terms of political philosophy 
and could only comprehend it in terms of devilment might seem disingenuous today but 
sat perfectly comfortably with the British notion of Indians as uneducated and childlike. 
The point about honour, or izzat, rests on a genuinely important concept for the Indian 
soldiers, and one which the British Army depended upon.  
 
Such clichés persisted despite warnings by newspapers such as The Times which 
cautioned against such representations of Indian soldiers as exotic, in the expectation 
that this would diminish their reputation as reliable soldiers and asserted firmly, ‘there 
is no need for lyrics, or for allowing imagination to run riot just because the service of 
these troops in Europe is more or less of a novelty, and because the races represented, 
their uniforms, and their customs, appeal to the emotions. The Indian Army is an army 
of professional soldiers and not picturesque characters in a drama.’54 The Midland Daily 
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Telegraph stated that ‘A word of caution should be uttered with regard to the amazing 
adventures and exploits which have been attributed to them; such recommendations are 
desired neither by officers nor men.’55 Whether these two reports were both sourced 
from a single Press Bureau release cannot be shown but it seems likely given that such 
similar stories occur within a short space of time. Both seem to have given a clear 
message against viewing the Indian soldiers as exotic or in some way different to the 
British troops. Given the earlier representations of Indian people as exotic, the aim 
seems to be to separate the soldiers from any impression that they may be in some way 
similar to the nautch girls and musical hall diversions of the pre-war years.  
 
After the war, in addition to marking the contribution of the Indian soldiers, cultural 
representations of India recommenced in Britain and there was a return of Indian culture 
to the London stage. In part, at least, this served to re-establish the stereotype of Indian 
people as exotic and marked a partial return to the portrayals of the pre-war years.  In 
May 1919, for example, two of Sir Rabindrath Tagore’s plays were performed at the 
Prince of Wales Theatre. The Daily Mail was impressed by the sole Indian member of 
the cast, who was ‘so obviously the real thing as a general that it became impossible to 
take the others at face value.’56 A translation of an Indian play Sakuntala was much praised 
later that same year starring Sybil Thorndike and was staged by Kedar Nath Das Gupta 
and the Union of East and West to promote cultural understanding between Britain and 
India.57 In 1920 Ali Khan sang classical arias and ‘it was considered a new sensation to 
hear the art of the West interpreted by a son of the East and the audience was very 
appreciative of a strong and resonant voice (no doubt unconventionally produced) … 
which may not have gone to the heart of Mozart and Verdi.’58 Uday Shankar visited 
London in 1920, as described by the Daily Mail, ‘a male musician in gorgeous raiment 
squatting on the platform.’ The concert was well received by the critic but he could not 
help but notice that when Shankar played the violin ‘his bowing wrist was not used in 
the way that a mere European teacher requires of his pupils.’59 It is notable that when 
the Indian musicians played western instruments or music, the critics stressed their lack 
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of European training while appearing to praise the musical content of the evening. 
Nevertheless, the musicians and actor in the pieces above were performing in their own 
right, rather than as the decorative objects of productions such as the Indianationality 
musical in the years before the war or Britons cast as Indians. Much as the exoticism of 
the Indians had been played down during the war years in favour of a more warrior like 
image and its return marked the end of their depiction in this manner and a reversion 
to the previous stereotypical representations as exotic and other. 
 
RUDYARD KIPLING, THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
The examples of literary representations of Indian soldiers and people that have been 
explored above demonstrate a general trend amongst a variety of authors, but this 
section will use of the work of Rudyard Kipling to trace the changing attitudes of a single 
– influential – individual. His work will be used as a case study to trace the development 
of changing attitudes towards Indian people in the years before, during and after the war. 
Kipling’s writing clearly illustrated, and to some extent led, the changes in developments 
described above, from his early depictions of Indian people as obedient recipients of 
British charity, to heroic soldiers, to his later work, where Indian people feature as 
respected agents in their own right.  
 
Rudyard Kipling was born in India in 1865 and returned there for seven years after his 
schooling in England, where he started his writing career before leaving for England again 
in 1889. By the time of the First World War, Kipling was an established writer whose 
commentary and fiction about the empire, and India in particular, held tremendous 
influence over public opinion. His work was later considered by Edward Said to be 
sufficiently illustrative of the British view of India for him to use the quotation below 
from Her Majesty’s Servants in his definitive study of the Imperialist mind set, Orientalism, 
to illustrate the ‘monstrous chain of command’ perpetuated by the British in India. 60 
 
Reflecting some of the themes prevalent in British society about Indian people, Kipling’s 
early depictions were similar, often representing Indian people as passive and childlike. 
In his 1894 Jungle Book story, Her Majesty’s Servants, Kipling described the Imperialist 
‘order of sovereignty’:  
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They obey, as the men do. Mule, horse, elephant, or bullock, he obeys his driver, 
and the driver his sergeant, and the sergeant his lieutenant, and the lieutenant his 
captain, and the captain his major, and the major his colonel, and the colonel his 
brigadier commanding three regiments, and the brigadier his general, who obeys 
the Viceroy, who is the servant of the Empress.61 
 
The quotation came from a scene in which an ‘old, grizzled, long-haired, central Asian 
chief’ admires the order and precision of a British parade in India, and it was explained 
to him by a ‘native officer’ that order is created by the fact that all the animals and men 
obey their orders as those orders are indirectly given by Queen Victoria herself. This 
sense of imperialist hierarchy was also present in a scene from The Story of Muhammad 
Din, in which a small Indian boy asked to play with the master’s polo ball, ‘The polo-ball 
was an old one, scarred, chipped, and dinted. It stood on the mantelpiece among the 
pipe-stems which Imam Din, khitmatgar62, was cleaning for me. "Does the Heaven-born 
want this ball?" said Imam Din, deferentially. The Heaven-born set no particular store by 
it; but of what use was a polo-ball to a khitmatgar?’63 This conversation presented the 
Indian servant as a humble supplicant and his imperialist master as a benevolent if 
patronising donor, reflecting the use of the stereotype of Indian people as passive 
recipients of charity from the British.  
 
Kipling started writing about the Indian soldiers very soon after they arrived in France. 
In December 1914, he published six articles in the Daily Telegraph, concerning various 
aspects of the war, the fifth of which was entitled ‘Indian Troops’.64 Kipling had visited 
Indian troops training in the New Forest on 22 November 1914, as noted by his wife 
Carrie in her diary: ‘Rud out to inspect the gun battery and to talk with his Indians.’65 
(Note her use of the word ‘his’ to indicate Kipling’s personal feelings towards the men.) 
There was a further brief entry in Charles Carrington’s notes from Carrie Kipling’s diary 
that on 26 January 1915 ‘Rud [went] to Brighton to see Indian wounded.’66 It seemed 
certain that he used these visits, which illustrate his interest in and commitment to 
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supporting the Indian troops, to seek inspiration for both the Indian story in The New 
Army in Training and later in The Eyes of Asia alongside his own experiences of living in 
India in his youth.  
 
It may well have been Kipling’s visit to the Indian troops in November which inspired a 
theme in his ‘Indian Troops’ article in the Daily Telegraph which mentioned a common 
complaint among Indian soldiers in Europe: the rain. In Kipling’s article, a Naik [Corporal] 
complained that, ‘It is not the cold for which we have no liking. It is the wet.’67 Kipling 
concluded the article with the words ‘truly, this is the war of “Our Raj!”’68 The article 
and the details above were very much in tune with the media reports of Indian soldiers 
in the early stages of the war which tended to present the Indian troops in a highly 
positive light, highlighting their loyalty to the Raj and placing them in close harmony with 
the men of the BEF.  
 
In 1916 Kipling was given access to extracts of letters from Indian soldiers in Europe, 
after he was sent a selection of Censor Reports by Sir Dunlop Smith, a retired member 
of the Indian Civil Service. It should be noted that the Censor Reports contained extracts 
from letters; there is no way to tell if they were edited as they were transcribed, how 
accurate the translation was, or even if the original sense that the correspondent wished 
to convey was preserved. Kipling used these Censor Reports to form the basis of the 
four short stories which made up The Eyes of Asia, which was published in the USA in 
1918 but not in the UK until after Kipling’s death. 
 
A theme in the letters which particularly impressed Kipling was the soldiers’ 
observations about the importance of education, especially for girls.   Each of the four 
stories in The Eyes of Asia emphasised the soldiers’ views on the importance of education 
in different ways. In ‘A Retired Gentleman,’ Subedar Major Bishen Singh Saktawut, 
convalescing in Hampshire, writes that ‘our women should be taught.’69 The patient in 
The Fumes of the Heart, who is himself dependent on his doctor to write for him, also 
makes the case for female education, ‘we have only yoked one buffalo to the plough up 
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till now. It is now time to yoke up the milch-buffaloes. Tell the village elders this and 
exercise influence. (Write that down strongly, Sahib. We who have seen Franceville all know 
it is true).’70  
 
Kipling cast an interesting light on the colonial perspective of the importance of 
education and the men’s expanded horizons in a letter to Dunlop Smith, ‘What struck 
me most … was their insistence on education – female education too … What they 
mean by “education” is, I think, capacity to use and profit by the civilisation they have 
seen – such as churns, ploughs, washing tubs and so on … here you have hundreds of 
thousands of men who have gone abroad and discovered the nakedness of their own 
land’71  In fact, the impression given by the stories is that it is education in the scholarly 
sense that is significant, rather than merely copying European technology. However, 
Kipling’s comments chimed with a well-used trope of Imperialist thought, that Indian 
people were childlike. In that context, it is easy to imagine that a washing tub or plough 
can appear to be a symbol of civilisation, despite its obvious exaggeration, and Kipling 
retained that stereotype.  
 
The Eyes of Asia, although Kipling’s most substantial tribute to the Indian soldiers, was 
not his last. His 1919 poem Epitaphs of the War 1914-1918, consisted of a number of 
short verses dedicated to those who served and suffered during the war, and included 
the couplet Hindu Sepoy in France: 
 
This man in his own country prayed we know not to what Powers. 
We pray Them to reward him for his bravery in ours.72 
 
Once again, the bravery of the Indian soldiers is honoured, even as Kipling invoked the 
cliché of exoticism. However, by comparison with the earlier description of the military 
hierarchy from the Jungle Book, it represents a considerable departure.  
 
Perhaps also reflective of Kipling’s desire to show public respect for the Indian (and 
other empire) soldiers’ contribution to the war effort was his choice of the phrase ‘The 
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Glorious Dead’ for the temporary Cenotaph built for the Peace Day celebrations in July 
1919 which can be read as being deliberately phrased to include men of the empire as 
well as British troops. 
 
These examples of Kipling’s interest in the Indian soldiers in France belong to a wider 
thread of Kipling’s work concerning the relationship between the Indian Army and the 
empire. The passage from The Jungle Book, written in 1894, which took the Indian Army 
as an image of the imperial hierarchy, was written some twenty years before the 
outbreak of the First World War. Kipling returned to the theme in Kim in 1901,  through 
the minor character of the  aged rissaldar whose loyalty to the Raj during the Rebellion 
had brought him not only financial reward but status: though long retired, he remained 
‘a person of consequence’ upon whom even Deputy Commissioners made social calls.’73  
Kipling’s earliest First World War writing about the Indian soldiers concluded with the 
comment that the war is that of ‘the whole Raj’, once again emphasising the loyalty of 
the Indian soldiers, by now arrived in Britain for training. Long after the war, in 1932, 
Kipling wrote the short story The Debt which was set in the home of the ‘Doctor of the 
Gaol’ somewhere in North India.74 Its principal character was the convict ‘One Three 
Two’, formerly a retired ‘non-commissioned officer’ of an Indian regiment, ‘who had 
unluckily shot a kinsman on the wrong side of the British frontier’. ‘The error in 
geography came from a head-wound picked up at Festubert’ and his death sentence had 
been commuted to life imprisonment after an appeal ‘engineered and financed by the 
Colonel and officers of his former regiment.’ ‘One Three Two’ (whose real name was 
Zuhan Khan),75 who now oversees the convicts working in the Doctor’s garden, had 
made himself the ‘bodyguard’ of the Doctor’s little son William, to whom he tells the 
story.’76   It is important to note that in these stories the loyalty between the British 
empire and its subjects was mutual: not only did the rissaldar and ‘One Three Two’ show 
loyalty to the Indian Army, their loyalty was in turn rewarded, even many years later. 
Further, Kipling chose to refer to the theme of the Indian soldiers’ contribution in France 
during the First World War some fourteen years after its end and to reflect upon the 
gratitude of the British to the soldiers. 
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The connection between Kipling and the Indian soldiers extended beyond the literary. 
In 1921, he attended the unveiling of the Chattri memorial to the Indian soldiers who 
died in hospital in the town. His attendance was reported in the local newspaper: 
‘Around that marble Chattri on the open Brighton Downs, in the presence of men of 
India as well as men from India, in the presence of Rudyard Kipling, our story-teller of 
India and the poet of Empire, met the very elements that most accurately symbolised 
that Empire.’77 Still later, in 1927, Kipling attended the unveiling of the memorial to the 
Indian soldiers at Neuve Chapelle in France, alongside the Maharaja of Kapurthala, 
Marshall Foch, Lord Birkenhead and Indian troops ‘representing all castes.’78 The 
sculptor Sir Charles Wheeler recalled in his autobiography that at the ceremony ‘many 
of our French hosts asked me to point out Kipling … [and] became entranced by the 
words of Rudyard who, though not on the speech list, spoke briefly and movingly about 
the bravery of the Indian soldiers fighting on European soil.’79 
 
This case study of Kipling’s work has shown that the changes in the dominant 
representations of Indian people in the media were reflected even in the attitudes of one 
prominent individual. From the obedient servants of the Raj in the late nineteenth 
century, through to the carefully drawn similarity between the Indian soldier and the 
British Tommy complaining about the rain in France, through to his prayers for their 
bravery in 1919, the work of Kipling shows that the experience of the First World War 
caused significant changes in dominant representations of Indian people. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that Indian people and soldiers were represented in a very 
different style in the years before, during and after the war. Before the war, depictions 
focused on the Social Darwinist model of Indian people as exotic aliens, rebels and 
passive recipients of British authority. During the war, however, reporting of the 
endeavours of the Indian Corps in France showed the Indian soldiers to be resourceful, 
competent and loyal comrades to the British Tommy. The literary contribution during 
the war had a similar focus to the news reporting. Cuffy and Sinjin worked together to 
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trick the Kaiser, and Hira Singh and his comrades in Talbot Mundy’s tale managed to 
escape the Germans and find their way to India, to be praised by the first Englishman 
they found there. Willcocks, who knew the Indian Army well, noted in his poem the 
bravery and pride of the Indian soldiers in France. These representations are a far cry 
from the impoverished ayahs and rebellious students of the news reports before the war 
began. 
 
However, even as the representations developed into a more positive view, the 
depictions of Indian people remained one dimensional and fundamentally stereotypical. 
The stereotype which did not change throughout the whole period of this study is that 
of Indians, soldiers or otherwise, as exotic, particularly with reference to their 
appearance and often to the exclusion of any other descriptor. As has been seen, in 
1908, the Franco-British exhibition represented India in a show featuring ‘jugglers, 
performing elephants and seven nautch girls,’80 and accounts and pictures of royal events 
often featured Indian princes. During the war, similar expressions were used. Soldiers 
were variously described as ‘trackers and hunters,’81 or ‘noble and majestic specimens’82 
and the Brighton Herald wondered what magic carpet had brought such picturesque sights 
to the town.83 When Uday Shankar played to critical acclaim in London in 1920, 
comment was passed on his ‘gorgeous raiment,’ while his playing technique was 
unfavourably compared with the European style.84 
 
It is curious that, even as other stereotypical descriptions were diminishing, this most 
deeply Orientalist representation continued. It seems to be the case that, even as British 
representations of Indian people seemed to mature in the years after the war, the most 
significant descriptor of Indian people, as soldiers or civilians in Britain, remained the 
emphasis on their difference. However, and despite the persistence of these attitudes, 
the First World War had changed for the better the portrayal of Indians, and particularly 
Indian soldiers, in the British media. 
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Chapter Two 
‘Crowds and Cheers and Bunting’: Changing Attitudes of the British Public1 
 
This chapter will examine the experience of civilians in Britain who encountered Indian 
soldiers and how these encounters contributed to changing the public mood towards 
Indian people. By contrast with the previous chapter, this will not rely on depictions of 
the Indian soldiers at war but on the experiences of those who met them. While the 
evidence base for this is obviously smaller, as the Indian soldiers inhabited only a small 
part of the south-east coast of Britain, these encounters were recorded in memoirs and 
the reports of local newspapers. It will be seen that far fewer stereotypical depictions 
appear in these accounts and that after the war ended, the commitment to 
commemorating the Indian soldiers far exceeded their relatively small presence in 
Britain. While the population of Indian people in Britain was very small in the years 
before the war, there were some well-known individuals who received coverage in the 
national and local press. There were also a number of retirees from service in India, 
some of whom created the Indian Soldiers’ Fund to provide comforts for the Indian 
troops in France and Britain, and the impact of this Fund will be examined. The 
experience of Brighton will be used as a case study to examine in detail how the public 
reacted to being exposed to the wounded Indian soldiers in the hospitals in the town. 
The principal sources for this section will be local newspapers and memoirs, although 
the existing body of writing on the subject of Brighton and the Indian soldiers will also 
be used. The historiography of the Indian population of Britain is relatively small, 
consisting principally of the work of Sumita Mukherjee, Rozina Visram and a series of 
essays edited by Michael Fisher, Shompa Lahiri and Shinder Thandi, as well as a small 
number of more specific journal articles.2 The historiography of Brighton is necessarily 
yet more limited and tends to focus on specific elements of the Indian wounded soldiers’ 
time in hospital, such as Kate Teltscher’s study of two Indians resident in Britain, 
including Sake Dean Mahomed of Brighton and Samuel Hynes and Alan Lester’s 
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consideration of the propaganda and political implications of Indian wounded on British 
shores.3 
 
INDIAN PEOPLE IN BRITAIN BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
Although small in number, the Indian population in Britain before the First World War 
was very diverse and one in which different groups had varying levels of contact with 
the general population. Among them were Indians at both ends of the social scale, 
showing that the upper echelons of society were not closed to Indian people, despite 
some popular prejudice. Visiting princes were the most noticeable Indian presence in 
Britain. Their frequent attendance at royal functions, especially in the latter years of the 
nineteenth century as Queen Victoria’s enthusiasm for all things Indian was at its height, 
added ‘emblems of the wealth and opulence of the empire.’4  The relatively high numbers 
of students were accounted for in the main by ambitious Indians who wanted a career 
in Indian government. The Indian Civil Service exams had to be studied for and taken in 
England and only barristers who had trained in Britain could practice in India, thus 
ensuring a steady stream of students to Britain.5 When Mahatma Gandhi wrote an open 
letter to the India Office at the start of the war offering the support of Indians in Britain, 
among the fifty-three signatories were doctors, barristers, traders and students.6   
 
Indians had also made their contribution to the government of Britain. Dadabhai Naoroji 
was elected as Liberal MP for Central Finsbury in 1892 and Mancherjee Merwanjee 
Bhownaggree was twice elected as Conservative MP for North-East Bethnal Green in 
1895 and 1900. Both were explicit that part of their role was to raise issues concerning 
India in Parliament as well as serving as constituency MPs and this was reported to be 
widely appreciated by both the public and the press.7 This is not to say that neither 
encountered racial prejudice: Naoroji was haunted by the nickname ‘Blackman’, after a 
comment by Lord Salisbury in 1888 that the British would never elect a black MP. 
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Despite this, Naoroji had sufficient confidence in the British public to realise that he 
would be done no harm by Salisbury’s racism.8 Less overt but not untypical were the 
descriptions used about Naoroji in the press: the St Stephen’s Review referred to him as 
‘the fire-worshipper from Bombay’ and the Evening News and Post as having ‘the deep 
eyes of the Hindu’ and ‘considerable learning in the deep lore of the East.’9 Sumita 
Mukherjee concluded that despite the racism that followed both men during their time 
in Parliament, they nonetheless generated respect and the fact that their support for 
India was appreciated, as shown by the support shown to them, indicated some degree 
of popular support for imperial solidarity.10 
 
At least two Indian landowners took up residence on country estates in Britain when 
their estates were annexed by Britain during the nineteenth century. Duleep Singh and 
Ranjisinhji both adopted the mores of the country landowner and took advantage of the 
social cachet this offered.11 Both, however, eventually tired of the life and left Britain. 
Duleep Singh, after thirty years in Britain, became once again a Sikh in 1886 and 
supported the self-rule for India agenda.12 Ranjisinhji returned to India to rule Nawangar 
but never left his British past behind to the extent of fully supporting self-rule.13  Cornelia 
Sorabji, a Christian Parsi, became the first woman to study law in Britain, at Somerville 
College in Oxford. Despite graduating successfully, she was not allowed to practise, not 
because of her Indian heritage but because no woman was allowed to practice law until 
after the First World War.14 
 
While these people may not have been widely known among the British public in the 
late nineteenth century, Abdul Karim, Queen Victoria’s munshi, was much talked of. 15 
The Queen’s court was extremely prejudiced against Abdul, perhaps because of what it 
perceived as his undue influence, particularly as an Indian man, and he was swiftly 
returned to India on her death in 1901. No such controversy attended the Nobel Prize 
awarded to Rabindrath Tagore. Born into a wealthy Calcutta family, by the outbreak of 
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war Tagore was already well travelled and had spent two periods in Britain since his 
education in Brighton. In 1913, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature ‘because 
of his profoundly sensitive, fresh and beautiful verse, by which, with consummate skill, 
he has made his poetic thought, expressed in his own English words, a part of the 
literature of the West.’16 Although in his later years he became a thorn in the side of the 
British establishment in India, at this time he was living among London’s intellectual elite 
and was knighted in 1915. 
 
While these disparate individuals are far from illustrative of the Indian population in 
Britain in the years before the First World War, they do show that the establishment 
was not completely closed to Indian people. While prejudice undoubtedly abounded, it 
was possible for Indians to rise to intellectual heights and to mix with people of influence. 
 
Concerns about disaffection among Indian people were prevalent in Britain and students 
were considered the most problematic group of Indians in London from the point of 
view of the British government. Although in the early years of the twentieth century 
they were a fairly small group, improved travel opportunities meant that it was a growing 
population and the government was anxious that they did not become a hotbed of 
radicals. There was some evidence to justify this concern, primarily centred on India 
House, a hostel for students established in London in 1905 by Shyamji Krishnavarma, 
himself a believer in independence for India. In 1907 the Lee Warner Committee was 
set up to investigate the political activity of Indian students in Britain. In the event, after 
interviewing some 100 witnesses (35 of whom were Indian and 65 British), the report 
was shelved until after the war as its findings were inconclusive, although there was little 
doubt that political activity was ongoing. An advisory committee, the Bureau of 
Information was recommended to further monitor activity.17  
 
While there was undoubtedly some activity of this sort, the scale of activity was limited 
and was not considered a threat until the events of 1 July 1909.18 At a reception for the 
National Indian Association at the Imperial Institute in London, Sir Curzon Wyllie, who 
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‘at the time of his death he held the position of political aide-de-camp to Lord Morley’ 
having formerly held senior office in the Indian Civil Service, was shot and killed along 
with an Indian, Dr Cawas Lalcaca, who had tried to shield him from the assassin. 
Although Wyllie had served on the Lee Warner Committee and thus incurred the wrath 
of Madan Lal Dhingra, his assassin, he had ‘devoted himself to associations and charities 
for the benefit of Indians.’19 The assassination was immediately widely condemned, both 
in London and in India where flags flew at half-mast and public offices were closed at the 
news.20 The Times, in its account of his funeral stated that ‘quite an hour before the 
service began, crowds had assembled about the square to witness the funeral.’21 In India, 
the brothers of Madan Lal Dhingra went to Simla and ‘expressed the family’s extreme 
shame and horror at the murder … They begged Lord Minto to convey their sympathy 
to Lady Wyllie, and their feeling of abhorrence to the British nation.’ Additionally, ‘his 
father writes that he did his utmost to rescue him from India House and other malign 
influences.’22 
 
The Times was quick to connect the assassination with the political activities of Indian 
students in Britain, despite the Bureau of Information’s efforts to provide ‘valuable aid 
to young Indians.’23 The Bureau, created as a result of the Lee Warner Committee’s 
work, was rather more than a benevolent organisation and is described by Shompa Lahiri 
as ‘an official framework of control and a means of curtailing seditious influences.’24 Both 
the Bureau and the management of possibly seditious Indian students continued to be 
an issue for government as a debate in the House of Commons in 1910 showed: ‘Sir 
Mark Stewart: Will they be careful as to whom they appoint in charge of these young 
men in London? Mr. Montagu: Lord Ampthill's committee will consider both educational 
and moral questions. The whole case will be very carefully dealt with in my statement.’25 
Note the ambiguous wording in this exchange. Lord Montagu was urged to be careful 
whom he appointed and assured the Tory MP that ‘moral considerations’ would be taken 
into account. This is a clear reference to the Bureau’s function of surveillance as well as 
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assistance. By 1912, in a debate in the House of Lords about Indian students in Britain, 
some five staff were assisting Mr Mallet, the newly created Secretary for Indian Students 
at the India Office.26 Despite the official consternation, there were no further incidents 
involving Indian students in the years before the war, although the dramatic events and 
the extent and manner in which they were reported must have left an impression on the 
British public. 
 
Indians in Britain did not live only among social and intellectual elites. At the opposite 
end of the social spectrum was the ayah.  From 1900 the world of the ayah in London 
(and thus almost all ayahs in Britain) was dominated by the Ayah’s Home in Hackney. It 
was set up and run by the London City Mission, ostensibly to provide accommodation 
and employment opportunities for ayahs who could not live in in the smaller British 
establishments of their employers or who had been abandoned by their employers once 
the long journey home was complete but also to attempt to convert them to 
Christianity.  The ayahs rarely attracted government attention as they were by and large 
able to look after themselves with the help of the Home and did not require state 
assistance. They did, however, attract the attention of the public, which was fascinated 
by their exotic dress and jewellery, while regarding them as childlike, a description seen 
so often of Indian people who caught the eye of the British at home and in India, as found 
in the previous chapter. 27  
 
In addition to the Ayah’s Home, the London City Mission (LCM) sought to work with 
Lascars, a constant presence in the docks of London. In 1900 the LCM estimated that 
there were some 20,000 Lascars per year passing through London.28 Much of their work 
was carried out through the Stranger’s Home for Asiatics, Africans and South Sea 
Islanders in Limehouse, East London. The Home provided accommodation and a 
recruitment centre for some 220 Lascars from its opening by Prince Albert in 1856 and 
was subsidised by central government as well as charitable donations. An unnamed LCM 
missionary reported in their magazine in 1900 that the admiration of the Lascars for 
Britain gave them an opportunity to preach to them, although the depth of their 
conversion was open to interpretation: ‘Padri Sahib, when we are in Bombay we are 
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Muhammedans, but when we come to London, you are our religious teacher, and we 
do not wish it to be otherwise.’29 By 1914, in the LCM Annual Report, missionaries were 
finding the Lascars a different prospect, ‘these visitors from distant lands meet with much 
that tends to close their hearts against Christian instruction. If at any time, they 
encounter scorn, ill-treatment, or injustice from Englishmen, they are not likely to 
esteem highly the faith of those at whose hands they have suffered.’30 Despite this, it was 
claimed that they could be won round with a magic lantern show, where they would ‘sit 
for an hour and a half as quiet as mice.’31 Both reports mention that the men 
remembered their encounters in London and corresponded while at sea or sought out 
the mission on their return to London. The tone of both reports portrays the Lascars 
as childlike and easily swayed by a magic lantern show, which belies their experiences as 
international travellers moving from ship to ship and country to country. 
 
Perhaps the most prevalent cliché was that of Indians as exotic products of the 
mysterious East, which extended even as far as men who had been elected to Parliament, 
such as Naoroji, the ‘the fire-worshipper from Bombay’32 who struggled to shake off the 
“Blackman” nickname. By using expressions such as these, their talents were reduced to 
those of the music hall acts and nautch girls. This served an obvious purpose in ensuring 
that despite their popular support and generally high esteem, they could never be treated 
as equal to their British counterparts. 
 
Another theme that runs through popular channels of the day is that of Indian people as 
subservient and in need of conversion to the Christian faith. Edward Said used the 
quotation in the previous chapter from Rudyard Kipling, which placed Indian people, as 
drivers and very occasionally sergeants, at the bottom of nature’s natural order to 
illustrate the intrinsic imbalance of relative strength and weakness between East and 
West.33 Perhaps the ultimate symbol of weakness is to have to be the recipient of charity, 
such as the ayahs and lascars of the London City Mission’s homes. By reducing the lascars 
to childlike figures entranced by a magic lantern show, they are shown not as 
independent people with international careers but reduced to silence as the British 
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missionaries show them the true way to worship. Similarly, the ayahs were depicted as 
women abandoned and in need of help, rather than as women willing and able to earn 
their own living and find employment even in a foreign capital. 
 
Yet, despite this, Indian people could be regarded as threatening and rebellious, as shown 
by the government’s desire to monitor the activity of students in London. In the wake 
of the assassination of Sir Curzon Wyllie, The Times reported that ‘there is a strong 
feeling in well informed circles that more determined efforts than hitherto should be put 
forth to suppress the activity of the agents of sedition,’ although it is also clear that the 
crime was as much denounced by Indians living in London as by British people.34 
 
Indian people also lived lives of influence and acceptance by Britain’s social and 
intellectual elite, as seen by Duleep Singh and Ranjisinhji’s lives as county landowners, 
Frederick Akbar Mahomed’s celebration by his medical peers in The Lancet or Abdul 
Karim’s influential position in the court of Queen Victoria.  Perhaps it is significant that 
the only one of these four examples who enjoyed sustained success in Britain and 
continued to win acclaim was Frederick Akbar Mahomed, who had been born and bred 
in England and married an English woman and so must have had a far subtler knowledge 
of how to fit into society and who had his obvious success in his chosen profession to 
bolster his standing before his death on 22 November 1884.35 
 
For all the success stories, the overarching image of Indian people for the British public 
remained governed by their Imperial outlook and vision of the inherent superiority of 
the British nation and its people and, by extension, the inferiority of the Indian race. 
Although this position had its critics it would go on to present a dilemma for a 
government which found itself suddenly dependent on the Indian military for assistance 
in France.  
 
THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR ON ATTITUDES TO INDIAN PEOPLE 
IN BRITAIN  
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As discussed in the previous section, in the years before the war there were few 
opportunities for British people to meet Indians in Britain but the war brought wounded 
Indian soldiers to hospitals in a small number of towns on the south coast and local 
people were eager to interact with the patients. In addition, a group of people who had 
once lived and worked in India created the Indian Soldiers’ Fund (ISF) to provide 
‘comforts’ for the troops and support the hospitals in Britain. Both these interactions 
will be used to illustrate the depth of interest in the Indian soldiers and a case study of 
the experience of the people of Brighton will illustrate the consequences of interactions 
between Indian soldiers and the civilian population of Brighton.  
 
Indian soldiers in Brighton 
Unlike the majority of British people, the people of Brighton lived alongside the Indian 
soldiers from the autumn of 1914 until the end of 1915 during which time the town 
hosted several hospitals for wounded Indian soldiers. As the principal location for the 
wounded, there was an unusual amount of interaction between the local people and the 
soldiers, which provides an insight into how they were seen by British people. Brighton 
had been chosen to receive war wounded along with a number of towns on the south 
coast which were easily accessible from France and began to receive Indian soldiers in 
late November 1914.  Local newspapers have been used as source material to describe 
the extent of public enthusiasm for their visitors and a number of first person accounts 
describe direct encounters between local residents and the Indian soldiers. 
 
As with the majority of Britons before the First World War, the population of Brighton 
was unfamiliar with Indian people although there was a well-known Indian family who 
had lived in the town for three generations in the nineteenth century. Sake Dean 
Mahomed and his wife were part of the development of Brighton as a place to visit, 
opening Mahomed’s Baths on the seafront in 1814. He was appointed ‘shampooing 
surgeon’ to both King George IV and William IV.36 His son also owned a Turkish bath in 
Brighton and one of his grandsons was a vicar in Hove in the late nineteenth century.37 
Frederick Akbar Mahomed was the third generation of his family to live in Brighton. The 
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grandson of Sake Dean Mahomed, he was lauded in an article in The Lancet in 1879 for 
his pioneering research into the causes of high blood pressure. The poet Rabindrath 
Tagore also found a warm welcome when he arrived to live with his sister-in-law in 
Brighton in 1878 and attended a local public school. He noted in his memoirs that, ‘One 
thing in the Brighton school seemed very wonderful: the other boys were not at all rude 
to me. On the contrary, they would often thrust oranges and apples into my pockets 
and run away. I can only ascribe this uncommon behaviour of theirs to my being a 
foreigner.’38 In 1895, the popular cricketer Prince Ranjitsinhji, known as Ranji, moved to 
Brighton to play for Sussex Cricket Club, staying at the club for the rest of his 
professional career, which included international matches for the England Team. Visram 
describes him as something of a celebrity, stating that the number of songs in his honour 
was second only to those praising the renowned cricketer W.G. Grace.39 
 
It had become apparent early in the autumn of 1914 that the hospitals in France would 
not be able to cope with the number of casualties and sites on the south coast of England 
were sought. On 21 November 1914 Sir Walter Lawrence, Commissioner for Indian 
Hospitals, visited Brighton and requested, in the name of the King,  the use of the Pavilion 
and other sites for hospitals for Indian soldiers, to which the mayor Alderman John 
Otter agreed, stating ‘Understanding that the Royal Pavilion at Brighton is specially suited 
for hospital treatment of Indian troops, the Corporation beg to place it at His Majesty's 
disposal for that purpose’.40 It is notable that even at this early stage the Indian-style 
exterior of the Pavilion was linked to the Indian soldiers and doubtless the images that 
it would generate were also not lost on Lawrence and his colleagues as material for 
propaganda.  
 
The Pavilion estate was converted in just fourteen days to provide 724 hospital beds 
across the site by December 1914.41 Particular attention was paid to respecting the 
religious requirements of its patients, as described by Joyce Collins,  
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There were to be nine kitchens serving the Pavilion/Dome complex …These 
would cater specifically for Muslims or for either meat-eating or vegetarian 
Hindus. Special arrangements were made for the ritual killing of animals and the 
storing of meat. There were separate places for washing up, for bath-houses and 
latrines … since wards were to be mixed, there would be two taps in each, one 
for Hindus and one for Muslims …notices were prepared in Urdu, Hindi and 
Gurmukhi … a Sikh temple (known as a Gurdwara) was erected on Pavilion 
Lawns and space was set aside on a grass plot in front of the Dome where the 
Muslims could pray facing Mecca.42 
 
The news that the Indian soldiers were soon to arrive was widely reported and on 30 
November The Argus reported that ‘thousands’ of people had gathered outside the 
station to greet the wounded Indians.43 Unfortunately they were disappointed as the 
arrivals were British. That the crowd gathered at all illustrates the level of interest in the 
Indian wounded. In the event they arrived almost unnoticed during the night.44 As time 
went on, some local people did peek through the fence to see ‘some exceedingly 
picturesque sights – sights so thoroughly Oriental that one is tempted to rub one’s eyes 
and wonder what magic carpet has carried one so suddenly from the prosaic 
commonplaces of North-street to the romantic colour and strange groups of the distant 
East.’45 The soldiers were often happy to entertain the onlookers. The Herald reported 
on a group of Indian soldiers playing with a British soldier and exchanging his cap for a 
turban and noted that, ‘what added to their joy was the joy of the onlookers standing 
upon the dwarf wall and peering as best they could through the fence and bushes.’46 The 
Herald also claimed that its coverage of the preparations for and arrival of the Indian 
soldiers had given it its largest ever daily sales, some 3500 more copies than its previous 
biggest selling edition.47 
 
D.R. Thapar, an Indian medical officer, described escorting patients on walks in Brighton, 
‘we were photographed at almost every step and when we halted for 5 minutes every 
half hour, we were surrounded by a crowd offering sweets and cigarettes. Elegant ladies 
in their expensive furs and gentlemen in top hats used to alight from their big long cars 
wanting to shake hands with these stalwart wounded heroes.’48 He also described having 
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to make shortlists of local people who would have the soldiers to tea, such was the 
demand for their company.49 
 
Local children were just as interested in the soldiers: schoolboy Albert Paul told of being 
taken on a school trip to visit the Pavilion Hospital and receiving a ‘great welcome’ from 
the soldiers and  being given ‘chu-pattie’ [chapattis], which they were ‘very proud’ to 
receive.50 Another local child described talking to the soldiers ‘through the railings with 
nods and smiles.’51 The Brighton Herald reported parents giving the soldiers their babies 
to cuddle and queuing to shake hands with the soldiers and declared, ‘what stories there 
will be to tell these babies when they grow up, - how they had been fondled by wounded 
Indian soldiers who had come over to fight for England in the great European War.’52 
Albert Paul remembered that ‘it became a familiar sight to see a crutch flung over the 
high fence and then another crutch followed by an Indian soldier with one leg scrambling 
down the fence.’ He went on to say that any publican caught serving alcohol to Indian 
soldiers would be ‘heavily fined and also be liable to have their licences taken away.’53 
 
The Herald listed some of the gifts donated to the wounded soldiers by local people, ‘a 
load of 270 great coats, sent by a donor who heard that the Indians were cold. A quantity 
of dressing jackets. A gorgeously striped turban cloth, sent by a lady with the express 
provision that it was to be given to a Pathan.  A large consignment of apples, with a note 
to this effect: “These apples were picked with paper round the finger so that those who 
eat them can be assured that they have not been spoiled by European touch.”’54 This last 
shows that the local people clearly tried to send gifts appropriate to their impression of 
an Indian soldier’s needs and religious beliefs. An Indian Gift House was established at 
the Pavilion Hospital by local resident Mrs Brailey, which accepted and distributed gifts 
for soldiers in Brighton and had sufficient to send some to hospitals further afield.55 The 
Pavilion Blues, the magazine for patients in the Pavilion Hospital after the Indian soldiers 
left, reported that The Gift House was maintained after the Indian soldiers by the Ladies’ 
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Committee of the Pavilion Military Hospital, although, ‘we don’t deal in hair oil, turbans 
or toothcanes any more.’56 
 
The attentions of the people of Brighton did not go unnoticed by the wounded Indians, 
who wrote home to tell of their good treatment.  Havildar Ghufran Khan wrote from 
the Pavilion Hospital to praise the provision made for Muslim troops to keep Ramadan.57 
Another was delighted with his hospital, presumably the Royal Pavilion, ‘I cannot 
sufficiently praise the building, it is a very splendid building.’58 Sub-Assistant Surgeon 
Abdulla Isar Singh, in a letter dated 23 April 1915, reported his joy at a visit from the 
King-Emperor, the sight of whom ‘delighted the hearts of all.’59 In a letter from a 
wounded soldier to a friend still in India, the writer suggested that he do his best to stay 
away from the front, even by feigning sickness, as conditions were so terrible. Even so, 
he praised his time at the Pavilion hospital, saying in the next paragraph that ‘we are very 
well looked after … our hospital is in the place where the King used to have his throne. 
Every man is washed once in hot water … men in hospital are treated like flowers, and 
the King and Queen sometimes come to visit them.’ 60 
 
An unnamed Subedar-Major of the 6th Jats wrote in early January 1915 that, ‘the 
inhabitants are very amiable and are very kind to us, so much so that our own people 
could not be as much so.’61 A medical subordinate (an Indian civilian member of the 
support staff), claimed that ‘Everyone seeks every opportunity of becoming fast friends 
with us and of serving us in any way in their power.’62 This letter is interesting as he 
would have not been in military uniform or showing a wound, yet the people still appear 
to have been happy to meet and interact with him. Also, he referred to the people 
seeking to serve him, a critical word bearing in mind the power dynamic between the 
British civilians and the Indian men. The Pavilion Blues claimed that, ‘Jack Sepoy, to give 
him his familiar title’ was convinced in an unknowing echo of Brighton’s reputation as a 
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place to take the water that, ‘the rapidity with which their wounds healed was in great 
measure due to the … excellent air and water.’63 
 
Particularly appreciated were the visits paid by members of the royal family to the 
Pavilion. As well as the King and Queen, the men were visited by Queen Alexandra, the 
Queen Mother, as described in a tourist guide to the town written in 1926, ‘against the 
bright light of that scene, where a Queen of England stood weeping, holding the hands 
of a poor dying soldier from a far-off Indian village, those antics of Regency days, told so 
often in hackneyed repetitions, fade into their proper perspective.’64 This sentence 
summarises much about the Indian patients’ stay in Brighton: the memory that formed 
part of the townspeople’s own view of their town; the human tragedies playing out and 
the conscious connection with royalty which served not just to lift the spirits of the men 
but to send a message to India about their importance to the Raj, to which end the visits 
of the King and Queen were widely reported in the local and national press. 
 
The Chief Constable of Brighton wrote to the Indian Soldiers’ Fund on February 1915 
to report that, ‘convalescents had been allowed to patrol any part of the town, to their 
great enjoyment and that though they had been there for some weeks, not a single 
unpleasant incident of any kind had occurred, nor had any complaint been made 
concerning the conduct of any of them.’65 The Brighton Herald, registered some 
indignation about the security provision for the soldiers after a fence was erected around 
the Pavilion grounds: ‘one can of course understand that the authorities do not want 
idle throngs massing here in the very heart of the town and repeating some of the scenes 
that at first were witnessed at the Dyke-road Hospital; but most of us feel that the town 
deserves a little more spectacle for its money.’66  
 
However, as time went on, restrictions were imposed on the soldiers. The restrictions 
on the soldiers’ movements outside the Pavilion grounds were deeply resented by the 
men and Samuel Hyson asserted that conditions in Brighton were the strictest of all the 
Indian hospitals.67  The men’s letters reflect their anger at the restrictions imposed upon 
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them, as in this letter from Bhan Singh, who complained that ‘they do not allow us to go 
out of the hospital. There are guards of British soldiers set round the hospital and the 
place is enclosed with wire too.’68 A further example was quoted by Rozina Visram, ‘If 
you ask me the truth, I can say that I have never experienced such hardship in all my life. 
True, we are well fed, and are given plenty of clothing; but the essential thing – freedom 
– is denied.’69 The subject appears to have been much discussed among the men, as is 
reflected in the use of the expression ‘treated like prisoners’ which occurs in three 
letters written by Lance -Nail Sayed Khan, Hashmat Khan and Malik Khuda Baksh Khan 
at the Kitchener Hospital in Brighton within a few days of each other.70 
 
A significant reason for the restrictions imposed upon the wounded soldiers was 
concern about interaction between the Indian men and the women of Brighton.  Jeffrey 
Greenhut pointed out that in India, white women kept strictly apart from Indian men, as 
the general feeling was that any relations between the two could lower British prestige.71 
Despite this, it was impractical not to use female nurses at all in the hospitals and women 
were employed at all the British hospitals in various capacities.  A number of magic 
lantern slides showed British women apparently nursing Indian soldiers at the Pavilion 
Hospital in Brighton, two of which showed a nurse on a ward standing beside a trolley 
with a washing jug and basin, apparently actively treating patients.72 However, this was 
not to last as on 29 May 1915, the Daily Mail published a similar photograph of a British 
nurse and the War Office immediately insisted that all British nurses be withdrawn. This 
was acceded to in Brighton but not at the Lady Hardinge Hospital in the New Forest, 
which was owned and run by the Indian Soldiers’ Fund. Its Chairman, Sir John Hewitt, 
protested and a war of words ensued that finally had to be settled by the Secretary of 
State for India, Austin Chamberlain, who allowed the nurses to stay. In his account of 
this, Jeffrey Greenhut made much of Chamberlain’s statement that, ‘it is not apparent 
from the correspondence what are the reasons that have led to the proposal to 
withdraw lady nurses from the Hospitals for Indian troops’, claiming that this showed a 
racist bias on the part of the British Government bearing in mind that there were only 
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some twenty nurses involved and that British women nursed British soldiers in large 
numbers.73 
 
Censor of the Indian Mails Captain Wallinger commented on the annoyance of the Indian 
soldiers in the various hospitals in England about the restrictions on their movements, 
‘the troops in hospitals (vide [letters] Nos 1 & 27) rather resent their close surveillance, 
but it is obviously better to keep a tight hand on them than allow them to conceive a 
wrong idea of the “izzat” of English women, a sentiment which if not properly held in 
check would be most detrimental to the prestige and spirit of European rule in India.’74 
In his report, he took up the same point, ’[letter] 81 is indicative of the crude ideas of 
orientals about European women, they cannot understand the freedom with which the 
sexes mingle. Hence, when they are allowed unlimited freedom from hospitals as to go 
where they please, they are liable to gain many wrong ideas and impressions which might 
be difficult afterwards to eliminate.’75 The offending letter, from Surjan Singh read, ‘every 
evening the youths one and all go to the town where women meet them. The women 
have no modesty but walk with the men who please them most. Marriage is by choice. 
Already there are five women, and after the war is it expected that there will be ten 
women for every man.’76 It is hard to reconcile Mr Singh’s letter with Captain Wallinger’s 
report as Mr Singh appeared to be disapproving of the morals of Brighton women rather 
than representing a threat to them. Thus, it seems that Captain Wallinger’s main concern 
was not so much the reputation of the women of Brighton but the overall authority of 
the British in India and the implication of a loss of authority for British rule, although 
there were letters from Indian soldiers which suggested an interest in the women of 
Brighton such as this from an anonymous Sikh, ‘Here are many pears of the sort you 
have in your garden. They encounter our people on our walks and we sit down and 
enjoy them. Then we are put in jail.’77 Perhaps his reference to being thrown in jail was 
an exaggeration but it is interesting to note that he felt it worthwhile to try to disguise 
the subject of his correspondence from the censors. 
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Note, too, that these protestations occurred in the same place and time as the debate 
above regarding female nurses. Regardless of the behaviour of the women in question, 
be they treating Indians in hospital or behaving in an ‘ill-advised’ manner in the town, it 
was clear that it is less the individuals whose interests were at stake than the overall 
prestige of white women in the Raj. It seems likely that some level of security was 
required for the men, prone as young men are to seeking adventure, but whether the 
level of restriction had found the correct balance is harder to judge.  
 
In March 1915 Sir Walter Lawrence reported that, ‘… when Brighton was selected as a 
centre for Indian hospitals I was attacked for running into the danger arising from 
women. You will be glad to hear that there have been no scandals in Brighton.’78 Note 
that Lawrence considered here that the risk was posed by the women of Brighton, rather 
than the Indian patients. Colonel Seton, in charge of the hospitals, was concerned that 
the ‘ill-advised conduct of the women of the town’ could provoke a scandal and the 
soldiers were escorted when out in Brighton. 79  
 
If the arrival of the Indian troops caused disquiet in some quarters, for some the issue 
was simpler, as the local economy benefited from the soldiers’ presence. An enterprising 
butcher in St James’ Street close to the Pavilion set his shop up as a ‘Mohammedan and 
Hindu’ butchery, presumably having learned how to butcher halal meat.  When the Indian 
soldiers finally left, in February 1916, the Pavilion Hospital was opened to the public and, 
in one week over 10,000 people paid to visit the hospital and many bought souvenir 
postcards or pamphlets.80 The official commemoration of Brighton’s role was A Short 
History in English, Gurmukhi and Urdu of the Royal Pavilion Brighton and a Description of it as 
a Hospital for Indian Soldiers, published in 1915 by the Corporation of Brighton under the 
supervision of The Commander of the Pavilion Hospital Colonel J. Macleod.81 The book 
was a highly positive account, making much of the royal visits and the history of the 
building as a royal residence but did not mentioning any of the complaints put forward 
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by the patients about restrictions on their movements. Copies were given to all the 
departing patients and sold for a shilling to the people of Brighton.  
 
Although the Indian soldiers had left Brighton by early 1916, popular enthusiasm was as 
strong as ever some five years later when official ceremonies took place to remember 
the town’s time as ‘Doctor Brighton’. In February 1921, the Chattri memorial to the 
Sikh and Hindu Indian soldiers who died in Brighton was unveiled by the Prince of Wales. 
In his speech he referred to ‘our Indian comrades [who] came when our need was 
greatest … from this Chattri a wave of sympathy and good will pass to India.’ The paper 
claimed that crowds of tens of thousands lined the six-mile route to the Chattri on the 
downs outside Brighton.82 The Times reported that along the route ‘there were crowds 
and cheers and bunting and the ringing of church bells all the way.’83 The Daily Mirror 
devoted its front page to a montage of photographs of the day, again repeating that 
‘thousands lined the route.’84  
 
Later that year, the Indian Memorial Gateway was unveiled by the Maharajah of Patiala. 
The Gateway was a gift from India to thank the people of Brighton for the help they had 
given to the wounded men. Once again, a large crowd turned out: ‘it extended practically 
the whole way down Queen’s-road and North-street to the Pavilion. The route was 
decorated very effectively with flags and the Maharajah seemed much impressed by the 
very cordial welcome he received.’85 To mark the occasion, a six-course lunch was given 
for the Maharajah with boiled turbot, lamb cutlets and maraschino jelly on the menu.86  
 
It is notable that among all these stories of interactions between the Indian soldiers and 
the people of Brighton, there are very few mentions of the Indians as fighting men. The 
dominant pre-war stereotype of Indian people as exotic remains prevalent and there 
seems to be no inhibition in instigating contact with the soldiers, just as the soldiers 
were keen to interact with the local people. The impression of the interactions and the 
reports in the newspapers give the impression of a relaxed and informal dialogue, not 
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dissimilar to the accounts of interactions between the British soldiers and their Indian 
counterparts, which will be explored later in this thesis. While curiosity and novelty can 
in part explain the onlookers at the railway station and those peering over the fence into 
the Pavilion grounds, this does not account for the ‘tens of thousands’ who lined the 
route to the Chattri for its opening ceremony three years after the war ended.87 
References to holding babies and the people’s willingness to ‘serve’ the Indian soldiers 
seem to suggest an intimacy between the two groups which perhaps would have not 
been predictable from the pre-war representations of Indian people. Likewise, the 
soldiers’ letters suggest a degree of affection not present in the newspaper accounts. 
 
The importance of Brighton’s hospitality was not just of significance to those directly 
involved. Both civilian and military authorities never lost sight of the political importance 
of their actions. Although the issue of the level of freedom offered to the men in Brighton 
is an example of how the British at no time lost their sense of Indian troops as a risk to 
the stature of the white British woman, both within and outside the hospitals, there is 
unstinting praise for the hospitals themselves in the men’s letters. Vedica Kant suggested 
that it was inevitable that placing Indian people in Britain would raise complex ideological 
issues and the playing out of a power dynamic, however imaginary, between Indian men 
and the women of Brighton is a perfect example of that.88 
 
Just as British authorities were aware of the risks of placing wounded Indian soldiers in 
Britain, so too were they aware of the possible advantages. The obvious attraction of 
the Pavilion as accommodation was acknowledged even before the soldiers arrived and, 
in the words of Sir Walter Lawrence, ‘I will never lose an opportunity if impressing upon 
all those who are working in the hospitals that great political issues are involved in 
making the stay of the Indians in England as agreeable as possible.’89 This proved to be 
the case as positive stories abounded in the local and national press accompanied by 
photographs. Although these efforts were appreciated in Britain and especially among 
the people of Brighton, they were also designed for an Indian audience. Lawrence wrote 
to Lord Kitchener ‘that, ‘it was of the highest ‘political’ importance that the soldiers 
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return to Indian happy and not dejected.’90 As Vedica Kant noted, the importance in 
India of proving the British to be ‘just and fair’ was as important a goal for the hospitals 
as the recovery of the men from their wounds.’91  
 
By the time the Indian wounded left Brighton the aim had been achieved. The men were 
overwhelmingly satisfied with their experience, despite the restrictions imposed upon 
them, the media had reported their stay in a highly positive way and the people of 
Brighton had been delighted by their presence. Lawrence concluded to Kitchener that, 
‘from a political point of view, the decision to bring the Indian to English hospitals has 
done more good than harm.’92 More reflective of the attitude of the people of Brighton 
is a letter home from Subedar Hamud Khan, ‘the people here are exceedingly kind and 
sympathetic.’93 
 
THE INDIAN SOLDIERS’ FUND 
While the experience of the people of Brighton was exceptional, The Indian Soldiers’ 
Fund (ISF) will be used as an example of how the community of retired and often wealthy 
and influential former servants of the Raj came together and used their knowledge of 
India and its people to provide not just medical care but ‘comforts’ as well.94 The Indian 
Soldiers’ Fund was established on 1 October 1914 under the auspices of the St John 
Ambulance Association. Lt-Colonel Merewether, in an appendix devoted to the Fund, 
listed its aims, ‘(1) To maintain the Lady Hardinge Hospital at Brockenhurst Park. (2) To 
supply comforts of all kinds to all hospitals in Great Britain and France in which Indian 
wounded were treated. (3) To supplement the clothing and comforts supplied by 
Government to Indian Troops on service.’95 The Fund’s membership was varied, as 
General Willcocks explained: ‘many ladies and gentlemen connected with India became 
members, and Lord Curzon of Kedleston [former Viceroy of India] very kindly lent his 
London residence as a Headquarters.’96 However, it was not just old India hands who 
donated to the Fund. Merewether explained, ‘Amongst those were invalids, a society of 
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blind girls, old-age pensioners, lonely people in remote cottages, and large, well-equipped 
working parties in cities under the leadership of the Mayoress.’97  
 
The inaugural committee meeting minutes of the Fund acknowledged that it was most 
likely to be people and organisations with a connection to India which were likely to 
donate and proposed to target these groups: ‘appeals should be made to all clubs 
frequented by Anglo-Indians in all towns in which they chiefly congregate.’98 The Fund 
raised a considerable amount of money: The Times reported that by 19 November 1914, 
it had already raised £88,853.99 By the close of the Fund in 1919, a total of £255,511 17s 
5d had been raised.100 It is worth noting by comparison that the same Times report 
showed that the Prince of Wales’s National Relief Fund, which was devoted to the care 
of families of British servicemen serving in France, had raised £3,859,000 in the same 
period.101 Given the relatively small number of people in Britain with connections to 
India the difference between the two sums does not appear so great and further 
illustrates the British public commitment to the Indian soldiers. 
 
The list of clothing and comforts provided is as diverse as it is extensive and shows the 
value of the connection between the Fund and the Indian Army. The General Committee 
minutes show several references to the necessity of providing particular treats for the 
Indian soldier, ‘The native Indian prefers his own sweets to any others.’102 The provision 
of Indian tobacco caused much consternation, ‘hookhas and chillums are not easy to 
procure in Europe, and very many of those sent from India have got broken en route.’103 
There was an amusing request in the report of Sir Trevredyn Wynne, Lord Norreys and 
Mr McLeod on their tour of inspection to France in July 1915, requesting black hair dye 
for the Indian officers’ beards, ‘this latter item is really of some importance, the older 
Indian officers suffering considerably in appearance by the dyes they used in India having 
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faded and there being nothing in its place.’104 However, on the next reported visit, that 
of Sir John Hewett, the Chairman, Willcocks refused to sanction sending hair dye.105 As 
well as recreational comforts, the Fund was critical in providing religious objects. In the 
second half year report of the Fund, it was reported that, ‘His religion is very close to 
the heart of the Oriental and the ISF has always borne this fact in mind.’106 Gordon 
Corrigan described how the Fund found a contractor in Sheffield to manufacture Sikh 
artefacts, which often got lost during fighting and are a religious requirement.107 The 
report of the first six months’ work by the Fund told of ‘a very large, and indeed almost 
embarrassing supply’ of Korans being sent.108 Sir John Hewett visited the Stationary 
Hospital in Boulogne and noted the troops’ appreciation of the tombstones that the 
Fund had paid for and the provision of both a Gurdwara and a Mosque at the 
Secunderabad Hospital in Hardelot in France.109 The Fund also supplied the hospitals, 
sending over extra clothing for the wounded as well as entirely financing the Lady 
Hardinge Hospital in Brockenhurst. 
 
Appreciation for the work of the Fund was widespread among the men of the Indian 
Corps, of all ranks. A letter was read to the Committee from Sapper Anokh Singh, who 
was convalescing in the 3rd London General Hospital, 
 
Dear Sir, I was very thankful to have received your package that you sent to me 
and am glad to say that I am in England and hoping to go to Brighton. I do not 
want you to sent [sic] any more parcel as my bad times is all over. I will now 
close with the best of luck, I remain, yours sincerely.110 
 
A report written after a tour of inspection in France by the ISF stated that, ‘It satisfied 
them to know that there was a “Kommittee” [sic] of Sahibs and Memsahibs who knew 
the Indian well and who were showing their goodwill to the Indian soldiers and followers 
in a practical manner.’111 
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Both Willcocks and Merewether, commanders who were well placed to see the effects 
of the work of the Committee, devoted time to it in their memoirs of the war. Willcocks 
described the reach of the Fund when he writes that,  
 
little that could at that time be done was left undone. In the trenches, the billets, 
the hospitals, the India-bound hospital ships and lastly the homes of the brave 
men who had come to share in the toils and glory of the Great War, there could 
be but one opinion, viz. that the Fund so generously contributed and so 
sympathetically administered would long be remembered with gratitude.112  
 
Merewether was typically less effusive but equally grateful, ‘The writers can testify that 
it was impossible to visit the trenches, billets or hospital without meeting at every turn 
evidence of the solicitude with which the comfort and well-being of the Indian soldier 
were considered in every detail.’113 The Fund finally closed on 18 July 1919, having 
improved the health and wellbeing of almost every Indian soldier who served in France, 
with a closing statement which paid tribute to the ‘gallant Indian soldiers who have fought 
in the Great War for their King, Emperor and their Empire.’114 
 
The discussion above shows that the British made a great deal of effort to treat the 
troops in their service with respect. Certainly, the success of the Indian Soldiers’ Fund 
shows that the public were well disposed towards the Indian troops and were prepared 
to support them with donations of money and equipment as does the enthusiasm of the 
British public, demonstrated in Brighton during the soldiers’ stay there. The experience 
in Brighton was paralleled by the people of Barton-on-Sea in Hampshire where a 
convalescent unit was established for former patients of the Brighton and Lady Hardinge 
hospitals. A granite obelisk was erected by public subscription in July 1917 to 
commemorate the 7500 men who stayed at the depot with inscriptions in Urdu and 
English.115 The critical difference in examples such as these, which involved people who 
had encountered the Indian soldiers was the comparative absence of clichéd 
representations of the soldiers and a sense that they were to be treated with the same 
level of respect as the British soldiers. For example, the memorial in Barton-on-Sea, 
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where the greatest impact of the war for the small town had been the presence of the 
Indian soldiers was paid for by subscription. This is also demonstrated by the gifts from 
the people of Brighton to the Indian soldiers and the crowds who flocked to the 
unveilings of the Chattri and India Gate in Brighton, just as other British people had paid 
for memorials and attended the unveilings of local memorials across the country. 
 
CONCLUSION 
There remained opportunities for people to interact with the people of India in the years 
after the war, although not necessarily in person, as has been seen in the Brighton case 
study, when large crowds attended official ceremonies. An example of this was the Peace 
Day celebrations in London. After the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919, 
the Peace Celebrations Committee, which was working towards a date in early August 
for the festivities, had to bring the date forward to 17 July. The most formal part of the 
day was to be a Victory Parade through London, including contingents from the various 
empire countries which had contributed towards the war effort. 
 
With just three weeks’ notice, bringing troops from India was impossible but Brigadier-
General E.W. Costello V.C of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was ordered to bring a 
representative contingent from Egypt to parade alongside the Australian, New Zealand 
and South African troops. In the event, however, they did not arrive in London until 
6pm on Peace Day, too late for the parade. In order to ‘mitigate their natural 
disappointment for the unavoidable non-participation in the historic pageant, and to give 
the public opportunities of honouring them’, a programme of events for the Indian 
soldiers alone was arranged for the men who finally arrived from India to join their 
comrades from Egypt. 116 A reception for 500 British and Indian officers was held at the 
India Office on 30 July and some 1800 soldiers of the Indian Army held their own 
Triumphal March through London on 2 August culminating in a Royal Salute at 
Buckingham Palace before ‘a great crowd.’117 The King gave a speech of thanks to the 
troops, which was afterwards translated for them, 
 
I heartily thank all my Indian soldiers for their loyal devotion to me and to my 
Empire, for their sufferings cheerfully borne in the various campaigns in which 
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they have served in lands and climates so different from their own. At times, 
their hearts must have been sad at the long separation from their homes; but 
they have fought and died bravely. They have rivalled the deeds of their ancestors; 
they have established new and glorious traditions which they can hand on to their 
children for ever.118 
 
As has been seen with previous royal speeches to the Indian troops as they arrived in 
and left France, the King chose his words carefully to chime with the Indian values of 
courage and izzat.  
 
The Times chose to make particular mention of the Cenotaph, past which the men 
paraded, giving their salute and described it as ‘the memorial to the glorious dead – 
raised irrespective of colour, caste or clime, and in memory equally of the brave Sahib 
and the loyal Sepoy,’ and the inscription ‘The Glorious Dead’ indeed allows for the 
presence of all the troops of the empire.119 The Daily Mail printed a detailed itinerary of 
the day’s events under the headline ‘Indians’ Own March’ and reported that the march 
would be ‘accompanied by the bands and fifes of two Guards’ battalions.’120 On the 
Monday following the march, it described the parade,  
 
their elaborate turbans blended into bright splashes of colour in the sunshine. 
The Sikhs, great fellows with black beards and long hair, received the cheers of 
the crown with perfectly impassive faces. The Gurkhas, sturdy little fellows 
wearing the celebrated kukri (or knife) were loudly cheered … the troops had a 
great reception, being cheered by the crowd all along the line of the march. Here 
and there flowers were thrown into the ranks and caught by the soldiers.121 
 
The Daily Mirror gave a full page spread of photographs of ‘their special festival’ under 
the banner headline ‘Eastern Pageant in London: The March of the Indians.’ There were 
two photographs of the King inspecting the troops, a picture of the men saluting the 
Cenotaph as they marched past and a small photograph of two Indian women in Indian 
clothing squatting at the front of the crowd to watch the men pass by, reproduced 
below. 
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                                   Daily Mirror, 4 August 1919, 14 
 
The lengths to which the British government went to publicly acknowledge the 
contribution of the Indian troops seems to speak to both genuine gratitude and respect 
for their sacrifice and worth. The audience for the march was almost exclusively British 
and, beyond the British administration, was unlikely to have made much, if any, impact 
in India. On the day London’s streets were described as ‘seething with people but few 
among them, beyond invited dignitaries, had any formal connection with India. 122 It is 
also unlikely that many people in India were able to see accounts of the Parade, 
particularly bearing in mind that the majority of the men were from pre-literate, rural 
parts of India. Although the parade and subsequent travels in Britain must have made an 
enormous impression on the men involved and the public certainly appreciated a chance 
to give their thanks to the Indian soldiers, the main purpose of the second parade can 
be seen as a show of imperial strength by the British government, although the size of 
the crowds illustrated the commitment of the British public to marking the Indian troops’ 
contribution during the war. 
 
This chapter has shown that the nature of the opinions of British people who actually 
encountered Indian troops were not dissimilar to the media representations which were 
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available to the majority of British people. While the quality of the representations 
changed in tone and became considerably more positive, as seen in the previous chapter, 
the reaction of people who met the Indian soldiers was one of genuine enthusiasm.  
 
Initially, Indian people were known primarily in Britain in terms of imperialist 
stereotypical representations but by the war’s end, public enthusiasm, if not affection, 
was demonstrated by reaction of the people of Brighton: gifts were abundant, more 
visits to people’s homes were offered than could be accommodated and, even three 
years after the end of the war, crowds gathered to commemorate the men. The creation 
and work of the Indian Soldiers’ Fund further illustrates the affection and respect shown 
by those who had known Indian people during their working lives in India and the large 
amount of money raised and considerable efforts to distribute their resources also speak 
to a genuine regard.  
 
Although the formal commemorations do not appear to be an obvious example, 
consider the newspaper accounts of the Peace Day celebrations. There was almost no 
possibility that any of the troops, apart from a select few, would hear or read any account 
of the celebrations, yet the decision was taken to rerun the original parade for the 
exclusive benefit of the Indian soldiers. The function of both the positive accounts of 
their time in Britain and the extensive reporting of their Peace Day Parade was also, of 
course, a means of signalling to the world that the power and extent of the British 
empire should not be forgotten. 
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Chapter Three  
‘Tenacity, Courage and Endurance’1: British Military attitudes to the Indian 
Corps during the First World War 
 
This chapter will examine the development of the attitude of the British military 
establishment towards the Indian Corps in France. To set the context for the origins of 
these attitudes it will examine the history, recruitment and framework of the Indian 
Army and will show that the history of the Army, particularly with regard to the Indian 
Rebellion of 1857 which formed the background for its practice and structure as well as 
its attitudes, influenced the treatment of the Indian soldiers in France nearly sixty years 
later. 
 
The chapter also serves as a comparison between the civilian experience analysed in the 
previous chapters and the military experience of the Indian Corps’ participation in the 
war. Just as with the civilian population, the military experienced a combination of 
representations of the Indian soldiers and personal encounters. It will show that, just as 
the public reacted positively to the participation of Indian troops in the war, so did 
British soldiers and a level of parity between the British and Indian soldiers became 
apparent. A combination of first person accounts of encounters between British and 
Indian soldiers of all ranks and official military documents such as despatches and orders 
will be used to illustrate how military practice was influenced by a combination of 
encounters with Indian soldiers and attitudes derived from the British experience of the 
Indian Army during the nineteenth century. This also highlights the difference in attitude 
between soldiers of all ranks who met Indian soldiers and senior staff officers who relied 
on the reports of others to form their opinions. It will show that, as with the civilian 
population, those who directly encountered Indian soldiers formed more positive views 
than those who did not, who were instead more likely to adhere to traditional views of 
Indian soldiers formed in the nineteenth century context.   
 
The chapter will examine the practical provision by the British military for the religious 
requirements of the men, their medical care in England and how these contributed to 
the morale of the men and, as Susan VanKosi observed, helped maintain their 
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cohesiveness during their time in France.2 It will analyse the reasons behind the 
attentions paid by the British to these requirements to demonstrate that the British 
authorities could not ignore the effect that the war could have had in India. The self-rule 
movement in India was in its infancy but some worried that if the Indian soldiers had 
reported poor treatment this, combined with the grievous losses, could have caused 
difficulties for British rule in India.  Particular attention to the opinions of those in India 
was shown in the English hospitals, where it was, of course, far simpler to control the 
men’s environment but also because it presented a highly unusual opportunity for Indian 
men to study the behaviour and attitudes of the British on their home soil. As will be 
seen, every effort was made to accommodate the men comfortably and with respect to 
their religious requirements and the medical treatment was highly praised and 
appreciated, although problems with security at the hospitals, as has been seen earlier, 
did cause discontent. 
 
THE INDIAN ARMY BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
The primary function of the Indian Army was to protect British interests in Undivided 
India and the army was structured and equipped on this basis. It would have been 
prohibitively expensive to depend on British soldiers alone for the defence of India as 
‘white manpower was both too scarce and expensive’.3 In the context of the early history 
of the Indian Army the words ‘India’ and ‘Indian’ are somewhat misleading. Rather than 
identify themselves by nationality, most of the people of India identified themselves by 
their racial group, religion or locality and the significance of this will appear in the later 
discussion on recruitment and how the Corps was structured. Furthermore, not all the 
troops of the Indian Army came under the governance of the British empire; the Gurkhas 
of Nepal, for example, had never been under British rule but had joined forces with the 
East India Company and, having remained loyal during the Rebellion of 1857, expanded 
their influence. Likewise, the Pathans of far northern India and Afghanistan lived in tribal 
territories and even occasionally found themselves in action against the Raj while at 
                                                          
2 Susan VanKosi, ‘Letters Home, 1915-1916: Punjabi Soldiers Reflect on War and Life in Europe and 
their Meanings for Home and Self’, International Journal of Punjabi Studies, 2, no. 1, (1995), 57 
3 George Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914-1915: A Portrait of Collaboration, 
War In History, 2006, 13, no. 13, 333 
83. ‘Tenacity, Courage and Endurance’ 
 
home on leave. There was however an unwritten rule that no man would be called upon 
to fight his own regiment.4  
 
British military involvement in India dated from the earliest days of its interest in the 
country. Broadly speaking, it divides into two periods: before and after the Rebellion of 
1857. British soldiers arrived in 1668 and had transferred their allegiance from the King 
to the East India Company (EIC), then the prevailing influence, and were not to return 
their allegiance until 1858.5 It was not until 1753 that there was any measure of 
organisation to the military in India. Until this time Indian, British and French influences 
all competed for control over relatively small areas. It was not until Robert Clive and 
Governor of Madras Thomas Saunders defeated the French at Arcot in 1751 that the 
British achieved some sort of European military supremacy in India. Over the next 
hundred years, there were local problems to be resolved between the East India 
Company and local rulers and, until the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, between 
the British and the French, but no significant military campaigns.  
 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the East India Company’s army was stretched 
thin and this began to show in increasing unrest among its soldiers. Philip Mason listed a 
number of incidents in the run up to the Indian Rebellion which fuelled the grievances 
against their British rulers among the Indian soldiers. The loss of the First Afghan War; 
the annexation of Sind in 1844 and the near rebellion when men were not allowed the 
‘batta’ or foreign service allowance they had received for fighting in Afghanistan for their 
work in Sind and the Sikh wars of annexation of the Punjab in the 1840s, when the same 
decision regarding the foreign service allowance led to a minor rebellion, all served to 
make the East India Company appear less powerful and increased the division between 
the British and the men.6 Outside military life, the annexation of Oudh in 1856 and 
increasing unease about British attempts to convert Indians to Christianity also 
contributed to the problems. Missionaries were causing particular distress and there was 
a widespread popular belief that the East India Company was promoting the activities of 
organisations such as the Church Missionary Society, whose Chancellor, the Bishop of 
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Oxford, said in 1857, ‘We have these colonies and dependencies, from which as centres 
of light, from which as garrisons of faith, there ought to go forth on behalf of England 
and on behalf of England’s church a message of salvation, and the ministry of the word 
converting the heathen to the Word of Christ.’7 In fact, the East India Company had 
consistently cautioned against attempts to interfere with religious practice in India. 
During the early years of British involvement in India, missionaries were explicitly barred 
from practising and in some cases from entering the country. The EIC, then in control 
of India, felt that any attempt to convert the population, or interfere with their religious 
practices would upset the status quo and would be ‘bad for business.’8 When the EIC’s 
charter came up for renewal in 1813, a sustained campaign began to allow missionaries 
to enter and practice in India, including various petitions with nearly half a million 
signatories in a highly coordinated effort by a number of church groups.9 The eventual 
East India Act, passed that year, allowed missionaries to practice but they soon found 
that they were largely unwelcome. The incoming Governor-General in 1813, the Earl of 
Moira, told the London Missionary Society that, ‘procedures calculated to alarm and 
revolt those who can be won only by prudent and patient conciliation would defeat your 
object no less surely than it would hazard those interests which I am sent to maintain.’10 
It was a clear statement that any damage to the political and economic status quo would 
not be tolerated and set the tone for the remainder of the century. 
  
Among the soldiers of the Indian Army these issues came to a head with the introduction 
of the new Lee Enfield rifle in 1857, which used a cartridge that required lubrication to 
ram home. As the grease was meant to be made of wax and vegetable fat, there were 
no objections to this.11 However, rumour started that the grease contained beef fat 
which was offensive to Hindus and pork fat which was offensive to Muslims. In February, 
a group of sepoys refused to train with the cartridges. Even though these were in fact of 
the old type, the British backed down and the incident was defused but many took this 
as an admission of guilt and the unrest continued to spread. By April another group of 
soldiers had refused to use the cartridges and were stripped of their uniforms and 
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marched to a civilian jail. Their comrades, who went on to march on Delhi in mutinous 
protest, liberated them. The Rebellion continued to spread across military and civilian 
India and was not contained until the British broke the siege of Lucknow, the capital of 
Oudh, in March 1858. Many thousands died on both sides and the ramifications 
continued for many years as the British attempted to regain control. 
 
As a result of the Rebellion the East India Company was stripped of its ruling powers 
and governorship transferred back to Queen Victoria, who was declared Empress of 
India in 1876, with Governor-General Canning installed as Vice-Roy. The crown’s rule 
was more liberal than that of the EIC and many of the EIC’s attempts to westernise India 
and subdue its religions were reversed. The Indian Civil Service included Indians for the 
first time in the administration of their country, albeit on a small scale in the early stages. 
The Army was forced to restructure in 1858 and as part of the reorganisation 
recruitment practices were altered to more closely reflect the caste structure and 
religious and regional populations of India. Mason described how this brought a new 
ethos to the Army as the Commanding Officer took full command of each regiment 
which brought the seat of power closer to the soldiers than previously and commanders 
were instructed to treat their Indian officers in an entirely new way, ‘you should show 
all the men that you respect and regard them as men; you should get them to respect 
themselves and feel proud of themselves.’12 These changes and their effects can be traced 
forward directly to the practices which will be described below and underpinned the 
relationship between the British and Indian soldiers of all ranks during the First World 
War. 
 
In addition, during the period there was increasing alarm in Britain about the possibility 
of an invasion of India. The Russian Army had been expanding its borders further and 
further until in 1885 there was a small attack on the Indian border in the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP). In the years leading up to the First World War, after the 
reorganisations following the Rebellion, the Indian Army was constantly engaged, 
winning battle honours in China, the NWFP, Afghanistan, Egypt, Sudan, Burma, British 
East Africa and Tibet. The principal concern was the NWFP, where three campaigns 
were fought between 1895 and 1898 alone. This series of engagements meant that the 
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Indian Army by the time of the First World War was an experienced force with 
considerable confidence in its own abilities. 
 
THE MARTIAL RACE THEORY 
The Martial Race Theory (MRT) was the method by which the army identified those 
potential recruits assumed to be most warrior-like men of India. The notion that some 
groups were more martial than others was one that was already well accepted. Consider 
the British Army’s long-standing preference for Scottish highlanders and Irish soldiers, 
both considered to be warlike, or the assumption that, ‘Prussians were better soldiers 
than the Italians, the French better than the Spanish and the Swedes better than the 
Sardinians.’13  
 
Within India, a division was made by the Army between southern Indians, who were 
‘unwarlike because of years of peace and exposure to the hot plains’ and men from the 
more mountainous north ‘which in winter is cold [and] the men comparatively manly 
and active.’14 Note here the link to the Social Darwinist genderisation imposed on the 
men of India referred to in the Introduction. The Madras Army of southern India had a 
reputation for poor soldiering and lack of motivation, although they had rarely been 
tested in battle, as southern India was under no threat of invasion. The geography of 
India was by no means a reliable guide as a particularly well regarded group was the Jats 
of the eastern Punjab, which is neither cold nor mountainous. Equally, the Kashmiris, 
who did come from a cold and mountainous region, were considered to be insufficiently 
martial.15 This preference sat ill with the later assumption made during the First World 
War that the Indian soldiers struggled to perform well in France because of the 
inclement weather. 
 
Another characteristic much favoured by the British was so-called Aryan descent. 
George MacMunn, in his 1933 book, The Martial Races of India, claimed that, ‘The martial 
races, as explained, are largely the products of the original white races.’ Examples given 
of such races were Jats, Rajputs, Sikhs, Punjabi Mussalmans, Dogras and Pathans, although 
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there was much crossover between the groups.16 These men lived in the highlands of 
the NWFP, so as well as their greater height and lighter skin than southern Indians they 
were inured to harsher climate conditions. One characteristic all martial races seemed 
to share was that they had little or no education and came from rural communities. This 
was no coincidence: such men were much less likely to be attracted to political activism 
and thoughts of rebellion.17 To each group were attributed certain characteristics, which 
were considered with the utmost seriousness by both the British and, to a lesser extent, 
the men themselves. Note here the linear racial hierarchy that was at least in part 
determined by Social Darwinist theory which was prevalent in Britain during the 
nineteenth century.  
 
Given that the martial races derived primarily from the north of India, further division 
became more complex. Following the Victorian penchant for taxonomy, the 
administration set about further classifying these groups. A series of guides to the various 
races were written, starting in 1890 with Vansittart’s Goorkhas and, following volumes 
on Sikhs, Pathans, the handbook for whom ran to 200 pages,18 Rajputs, Jats, Brahmins 
and Garhwalis, a definitive Handbook of the Fighting Races of India was published in 1899.19 
The Indian Army was organised according to these classifications from the 1890s through 
to the aftermath of the First World War, when a wholesale reorganisation took place. 
However carefully each group was categorised, the real population was far more 
complex, as census data showed. Households which were nominally Pathan for example, 
could include ‘low class Muhammadan servants of Pathan families … descendants of 
Pathans and low class women, as well as by [sic] many Hindi converts.’20 This meant that 
the exact martial status of a village or group of men was only ever an approximation.  
 
MRT was never a particularly robust concept. It didn’t account for its own circularities: 
the NWFP was the most vulnerable part of British India to invasion; therefore, the men 
of the province had the most to lose by invasion; therefore, they joined the army and 
fought the hardest in the greatest numbers and gained the greatest fighting experience. 
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Equally, from the British point of view, as long as the army acquitted itself well in the 
NWFP, as indeed it did, then the army’s selection procedures (MRT) must be valid. The 
concept lasted until 1917 when losses among the Indian Corps in France meant that 
recruitment had to be widened to cover all of India and a central recruiting board was 
set up, although the men of the north dominated the Corps until 1918. The war was the 
final death knell for MRT, not just because the recruiting net had to be widened but 
because it was a primary cause of the problem of obtaining replacement officers in 
France. MRT provided soldiers who were, by and large, semi-literate and therefore, it 
was assumed, could not be promoted or enlisted as officers. As British officer numbers 
declined substantially during the war the assumption that only a British officer could 
perform that role led directly to one of the most significant problems faced by the Indian 
Corps during their time in France, that of recruitment of fresh officers.  
 
MOTIVATION TO JOIN THE INDIAN ARMY 
There were as many reasons for Indian men to join the Indian Army as there ever are 
to enter military service. The monthly salary was 11 rupees per month in 1915 and, 
although the soldier had to pay for his own uniform, this was a respectable amount and 
he could retire on a pension after 21 years or if he had been wounded and discharged 
because of his wounds.21 The convention that he could retire on a pension after being 
wounded was to cause problems after the Corps moved to the Western Front, as this 
practice was controversially suspended. 
 
For many the concept of personal honour or izzat was the strongest reason to enlist. 
David Omissi translated izzat as ‘honour, reputation, credit and prestige.’22 Mason 
translated it as ‘glory, honour, reputation.’ 23 The word described reputation in the eyes 
of the world as well as the individual’s own community and family. Often, this took on a 
religious dimension for the troops as they anticipated their feats being reflected in an 
afterlife as in this letter from an anonymous Gurkha soldier, ‘If you die, you will make a 
name up to seven forefathers and will go straight to Paradise. You will become as famous 
as the sun. Bravo! Bravo!’24 This phrase illustrates the complexity of izzat for the troops, 
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acknowledging the soldier’s success before his family, ancestors, and contemporaries. 
Bringing together all these strands was extremely powerful, especially for men whose 
life experience outside of the Army was often limited to a small geographical area and 
circle of acquaintance. Major Alexander of the Indian Mule Corps illustrated the limit of 
their experience, ‘practically none of them had ever before seen a building larger than 
an ordinary cantonment bungalow.’25 
 
A strong sense of military identity also drew men to the Army. This was especially 
important to the Indian Army because of the diverse groups of men who enlisted. Early 
models of the Army mixed different religions, castes, languages and regional backgrounds 
together but this was felt to be rather too effective in building cohesion and the British 
were concerned that the men could band together and cause discipline problems.26 From 
this the system of ‘class companies’ and regiments was developed, which maintained the 
social and ethnic groupings of the troops, either within a regiment or as an entire 
regiment and naming regiments to reflect their regional or religious make up reinforced 
this. Both regional significance and the importance of izzat are reflected in the Martial 
Race Theory as they represented the values which the British were trying to exploit in 
their use of MRT for recruitment standards. Susan VanKosi, in her study of the letters 
home from Indian soldiers, asserted that MRT ‘managed to tether regimental esprit de 
corps to the most sacred values of the Punjabi peasantry … In the case of Sikhs … also 
echoed the requirements of the Khalsa identity.’27 
 
The loyalty of India to the King Emperor was also a motivational factor, especially after 
the call to arms in 1914. This is reflected in many letters, for example, ‘it is a noble fate 
for us to be able to sacrifice our bodies for our King,’28 or, ‘keep your thoughts fixed on 
the Almighty and show your loyalty to the Government and to King George V.’29 
 
BRITISH MILITARY ATTITUDES TO THE INDIAN CORPS DURING THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR 
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This section will explore reactions to the Indian soldiers among British soldiers and 
officers and uncover themes which run through the reactions. Some sources were 
private, such as letters home from Indian and British soldiers, and some were written as 
a public account of the work of the Indian Corps, such as the memoirs of Lieutenant-
Colonel Merewether, the Corps’ Record Officer and General Willcocks, Commander 
of the Indian Corps. However, all shared the same positive view, which is echoed in 
formal military accounts such as the despatches of Field-Marshall Sir John French, 
Commander in Chief of the BEF.  
 
To some extent such attitudes were determined by the same Imperial representations 
and stereotypes which influenced the civilian population, such as this exposition of Indian 
soldiers by Willcocks who described in some detail the men he worked with during his 
career in the Indian Army:  
 
the soldier from Nepal has a big heart in a small body; he has the dogged 
characteristic of the Britisher …the Dogras are quiet, steady, clean soldiers, of 
refined appearance … the Sikh can be troublesome when it is most inconvenient 
for him to be so, but he is a fine manly soldier … the Jats are strapping big men 
as a rule. They always impressed me as stubborn fighters … the Pathans have 
quicker wits than other races. Their élan is their chief asset.30 
 
Separate from the old stereotypes, there were also direct references to the Indian Corps 
in the field. Sir John French, in a cable giving his account of the battle of Neuve Chapelle 
to the Viceroy of India, stated that, ‘the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy, 
but nothing daunted them; their tenacity, courage, and endurance were admirable and 
worthy of the best traditions of the soldiers in India.’31 This stoicism was also reflected 
in the men’s letters home. A.S.R.’s letter from the Kitchener Hospital in Brighton gave 
an elegant account of the Neuve Chapelle offensive but did not mention the wound that 
had brought him to hospital in England:  
 
Now that the rain ceased a little from the 10th March we began to attack them 
but as we advanced we lost a lot of men. So we went on but no one could endure 
the firing of bullets and shells which fell thicker than drops of rain … when we 
reached their trenches we used the bayonet and the kukri to such an extent that 
we were all covered in blood but I did not fall. On the 11th the battle was a little 
                                                          
30 Willcocks, With the Indians in France, 56-57 
31 Ibid., 235 
91. ‘Tenacity, Courage and Endurance’ 
 
less and the bullets came as usual then on the 12th about 8 in the morning the 
Germans attacked us but we fired so much with rifles and machine guns that we 
won and all of them were killed; the ground was covered so thickly with them 
that you could not put your foot down without going over the corpses.32  
 
There were no references to any of his comrades, many of whom he would have seen 
fall during the attacks or his own injury. Even allowing for the censorship process 
inhibiting the men, this is typically characteristic of the understatement of the men’s 
letters. 
 
Many of the adjectives used by the British about the Indian soldiers are remarkably 
similar across all the sources, for example, gallantry, duty, dignity and courage. 33 This is 
to some extent predictable as less favourable accounts would not have been used, 
particularly in public accounts such as Despatches but it does present a consistent 
acknowledgement of men who conducted themselves as a professional army of the 
highest quality. A notable comment comes from Sir John French’s Fourth Despatch, 
which concerned the First Battle of Ypres in late November 1914, ‘Since their arrival in 
this country, and their occupation of the line allotted to them, I have been much 
impressed by the initiative and resource displayed by the Indian troops. Some of the 
ruses they have employed to deceive the enemy have been attended with the best 
results, and have doubtless kept superior forces in front of them at bay.’34 This was one 
of the earliest engagements for the Indian troops and an opportunity to show the British 
military command skills and ingenuity they may not have assumed the men to have, such 
as improvising trench mortars from lead piping or fashioning searchlights from car 
headlights rigged up to work using electricity.35 
 
While these words of praise are to some extent generic, there are some expressions 
which would have had particular meaning for the Indian soldiers, imbued as they were 
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with a sense of izzat.  This was made explicit in the King’s message to the troops on 
their departure from India, ‘I look to all my Indian soldiers to uphold the Izzat of the 
British Raj … shoulder to shoulder with their comrades from all parts of the Empire.’36 
It was also echoed in the words of the Prince of Wales, speaking in his father’s stead on 
their departure from France, ‘you have worthily upheld the honour of the empire.’37 In 
the context of men brought up with this concept and then trained by the military in 
exactly this ethos such words would have had a special meaning, particularly from Sir 
John French, ‘The Indian Corps … have not only upheld, but added to, the good name 
of the Army which they represent.’38 These references to the honour of the military and 
the Raj were all carefully designed to appeal to the Indian sense of izzat. The King’s use 
of the words ‘shoulder to shoulder’ implied parity between the Indian and British armies 
and his use of the personal pronoun was designed to strengthen the already robust 
loyalty of the Indian troops to their King Emperor.  
 
The formal military accounts served, at least to some extent, a propaganda purpose and 
some reflected the tropes prevalent in civilian representations as British soldiers 
interacted with the Indian troops. Further accounts brought forward images of parity 
between British and Indian troops. In May 1915, the Indian Corps took part in an 
unsuccessful series of battles in the Festubert and Aubers Ridge area close to Neuve 
Chapelle. Merewether summed up the failure soberly, ‘the Indian Corps failed to attain 
its objective through no fault of its own, but owing entirely to the misfortune of being 
faced by an extraordinarily strong position, an experience shared by the British 4th Corps 
operating on its left. Had success been possible under the circumstances, it would have 
been attained by the troops, British and Indian, who had so recently covered themselves 
with glory at the battles of Neuve Chapelle and Ypres.’39 The emphasis on the shared 
experience of British and Indian troops and the parallels between the British and Indian 
experience of failure is interesting here as Merewether was categorical that British 
soldiers could not have taken the position either and thus assumed the British and Indian 
capabilities to be equal. 
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The theme of mutual respect and equality occurred among British other ranks as well 
as senior officers. In a letter from Private D. Thomson of the Army Service Corps, 
written during the autumn of 1915, he wrote that ‘I am very much afraid that we are 
about to be separated from the Indians a fact which needless to say we all greatly regret 
for we got on so well with them and were treated with the utmost respect, so it was a 
pleasure to work with them.’40 Private Thomson may have noted the respect shown to 
himself and his colleagues because he expected to be treated in this manner by colonial 
soldiers but the letter reads as if he is contrasting this with his experience of working 
with British troops, who may not have had such a co-operative attitude to the Service 
Corps. The phrase ‘work with them’ also implies that he considered himself to be 
working alongside his Indian counterparts, rather than as their superior by virtue of 
British imperial sovereignty. In a similar vein, Merewether noted the cooperation 
between British and Indian men, ‘the camaraderie existing between the British and Indian 
soldiers was very marked during the battle. Cigarettes were freely exchanged as well as 
friendly greetings, the latter evidently unintelligible, but apparently satisfactory to both 
parties. Often when a detachment of [Indian] Sappers was returning from work, the 
British would give them cigarettes and insist on their warming themselves at their fire 
buckets.’41 
 
A similar sense of parity, at least in the sense of military endeavour, occurred between 
Indian and German troops. The following two comments, both from anonymous Punjabi 
men who had been wounded and sent to England to recover in February 1915, show 
that they considered themselves to be at least equal to the German troops. One claimed 
that, ‘One man of our double company was equal to 150 Germans,’42 while his 
compatriot stated that, ‘The Germans were very strong, but as soon as the Indian troops 
arrived their strength was broken.’43 While this pride might be expected, a Sikh who had 
also been invalided to England put his praise into the mouths of the Germans themselves, 
claiming that ‘The German says in letters and newspapers “If any king had German shells 
& French guns & the Indian Army he could rule the world.”’44 Indeed, the Indian soldiers 
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often seemed to respect the Germans for a perceived sense of chivalry, illustrated here 
by an anonymous Punjabi Muslim who was a medic in England,  
 
So God knows whether the Germans picked him up and took him away or not. 
No one knows. But there is rather (ground for) hope (than fear), since they carry 
off the wounded when they see. If a man be wounded then the enemy when they 
see him take him away into their own country & give him the best of medical 
treatment. We do the same by their wounded. This is because it is a war of 
kings.45  
 
A German account appeared to show reciprocal respect for the Indian soldiers. Ernst 
Jünger described coming across a small group of wounded Indians,  
 
in answer to my question “Quelle nation?” one replied: “Pauvre Rajput!” So these 
were Indians we confronted, who had travelled thousands of miles across the 
sea, only to give themselves a bloody nose on this god-forsaken piece of earth 
against the Hanoverian Rifles … we picked them up and dragged them towards 
our lines … one died along the way, but he was still taken along, because there 
was a reward for every prisoner taken, whether alive or dead.46 
 
When Jünger brought his prisoners in they were ‘much gawped at. Here I was able to 
set the minds of our captives at rest – they seemed to have been told the direst things 
about us. They thawed a little, and told me their names; one of them was Amar Singh. 
Their outfit was the First Hariana Lancers, a good regiment I am told. Then I retired 
with Kius, who took half a dozen photographs.’47 Jünger seemed to have enjoyed his 
experience of meeting the Indian soldiers and, while they were enough of a novelty to 
have drawn a crowd and to have had their photographs taken, his attitude was respectful 
and he was sufficiently intrigued to find out about Singh’s regiment. Jünger’s opinions 
were not dissimilar to the pre-war British civilian representations of Indian people as 
exotic, to be ‘gawped at’ and photographed, as was the British civilian experience in the 
years before the war when encounters between British and Indian people were much 
rarer. 
 
There was also sympathy and fellow feeling for the plight of the Indian soldiers fighting 
alongside the British in France. Captain Roly Grimshaw, an officer with the Indian Cavalry 
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Corps, wrote sympathetically of the Indian troops he encountered in France. It is also 
notable that he included British and Indian soldiers equally in the miserable scene he 
described, 
 
The state of the wounded beggars all description. Little Gurkhas slopping through 
the freezing mud … Tommies with no caps and plastered in blood and mud from 
head to foot; Sikhs with their hair all down … Pathans more dirty and untidy 
than usual; all limping or reeling along like drunken men, some helping an almost 
foundered comrade. In most cases misery depicted in their faces. Stretchers with 
groaning wounded and limping stretcher bearers.48 
 
However, among British troops negative, even racist, opinions existed alongside the 
praise.  The Chief Censor, who also censored the letters of British troops attached to 
the Indian divisions, presumably selected the letters below for inclusion in his fortnightly 
reports because he wanted to monitor relations between the British and Indian troops.   
An unnamed English sergeant of the 1/3rd London Regiment wrote that, ‘We get on fine 
with them. They are a decent lot, the ones that are with us, but some of the regiments 
are not up to much – refuse to go over the top in a charge. The ones we have got here 
are Garhwalis and Gurkhas. They are the chaps. As long as a white soldier is going to be 
there, they fight like tigers.’49 He seems to distinguish between Indian soldiers with whom 
he has actually fought and clearly admires and then generalise from second hand 
information about other Indian regiments which he has not encountered.  
 
In the same batch of letters, the Chief Censor came across some very direct references 
to perceived cowardice by Indian soldiers and noted, ‘Several men of the 2nd Black 
Watch, whether rightly or wrongly, ascribe the misadventures which their regiment 
experienced during the recent attack, to the behaviour of the Indian troops who were 
co-operating with them. Expressions such as “At this point the n-----s began to run” 
were found in one or two letters (and of course deleted).’50 These letters in all 
probability refer to the Battle of Loos, in September 1915, in which the Black Watch 
fought alongside the Indian soldiers, to which they had been attached since their arrival 
in France. While it is possible that there were instances of Indian soldiers fleeing the 
battlefield, their overall part in the battle was deemed a success by Sir Douglas Haig, 
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Commander of the 1st Army Corps of the BEF, ‘the G.O.C is very pleased with the 
manner in which the 1st, 3rd and Indian Corps carried out the role assigned to them of 
retaining the enemy on their front.’51 From this albeit small sample, it is clear that that 
the British and Indian soldiers got along well on an individual level and the British men 
respected their abilities but were quick to adopt views they had heard from others about 
cowardice in battle and their dependence on white soldiers to motivate them to fight 
which their personal experiences did not necessarily reflect. This distinction echoes the 
differences in interpretation between both civilians and soldiers who had encountered 
the Indian soldiers and those whose opinions were formed by representations and 
assumptions. 
 
General Willcocks himself seemed to feel that the Indian Corps was not always given 
the respect it deserved by staff officers. He had clashed with General Haig on a number 
of occasions and had anticipated that his services would be dispensed with. In his 
memoirs, he clearly linked his abrupt departure to his command of the Indian Corps, 
‘Even had I been totally deficient in “initiative and tactical skill," there are ways of doing 
things. I had during my thirty-seven years' soldiering served in fourteen campaigns; had 
received the Freedom of the City of London and a sword of honour, and the unique 
distinction of being mentioned by name in King Edward's first Speech from the Throne. 
Had I not the right to expect ordinary courtesy? -  but I belonged to the Indian Corps! 
- that explains much.’ 52 
 
Despite Willcocks’ anger and the relatively small number of complaints about Indian 
troops from their British counterparts, the number of decorations received during their 
fifteen months and five major engagements in France is strongly indicative of their 
success and, perhaps more significantly, the British willingness to publicly acknowledge 
it. The Victoria Cross is the highest military honour in any part of the British Army. It is 
given exclusively for valour under fire and was only made available to the Indian Army 
in 1911. Of the 115 Victoria Crosses awarded on the Western Front during 1914 and 
1915, eight were to soldiers of the Indian Corps. Of these, five were to Indian other 
ranks and three to British officers. In addition to the Victoria Crosses awarded during 
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their stay in France, the British and Indian officers and men of the Indian Corps were 
also awarded 44 Distinguished Service Orders and 81 Military Crosses, the second and 
third highest decorations in the British Army respectively.53  The system of medals in 
the Indian Army was slightly different but held to be of equivalent worth. After the 
Victoria Cross, the second highest decoration in the Indian Corps was the Indian Order 
of Merit (IOM), which was both a military and civilian award. 49 second class IOMs were 
awarded and two first class. The Indian Distinguished Service Medal was the equivalent 
of the Military Cross in the British Army and 137 were awarded to Indian soldiers in 
France.  
 
The themes identified above all demonstrate that the Indian Corps was well received by 
the British military at all levels. The public words of Sir John French: ‘their tenacity, 
courage and endurance’ and the private regret of Private Thomson as the Indian men ‘it 
had been a pleasure to work with’ moved on indicate a strong regard for the Indian 
troops not simply as a product of empire but as efficient soldiers working alongside 
peers in whose company they were respected. The British soldiers who expressed 
negative and racist views represent a small minority in the sources and certainly not the 
official view as propagated by the King Emperor, whose carefully tailored speeches were 
designed to raise the public profile of the men as much as to motivate them and raise 
their morale. This shows that, in a similar manner to the civilian population, when British 
soldiers encountered Indian troops they formed positive opinions of them and 
considered them to be peers. 
 
WELFARE PROVISION FOR THE INDIAN CORPS IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND 
The purpose of this section is to analyse two aspects of the special provision made for 
the Indian soldiers in France: the attempt to meet their religious needs and the provision 
of medical care for the wounded.  Such provision was inevitably separate from that 
necessary for the BEF or their Dominion counterparts, although charitable provision of 
‘comforts’ was widespread across nationalities. These attentions were to make a positive 
impact on the morale of the Indian Corps and thus strengthen and maintain its fighting 
capability. In addition to political concerns about sending Indian troops to Europe, it was 
not known how they would fare from a military perspective and every effort was made 
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to maintain morale in order to guard against the possibility of the men’s unique position 
in France further undermining their morale and thus efficiency. The section 
demonstrates both the importance of this provision to the soldiers themselves but also 
the necessity in the minds of senior staff officers of making sure that only positive reports 
of the Indian soldiers’ treatment by the British authorities reached India. 
 
The religious provision, to be discussed first, was an extension of the existing measures 
in place in India, which were adapted and implemented in France and England. The 
second topic, that of medical care, concerns the provision of specialist hospitals for 
Indian soldiers in England. While there was already a thriving Indian Medical Service, it 
was not equal to the number and complexity of wounds encountered in France and its 
provision was extended under the auspices of the military and the Indian Soldiers’ Fund. 
The extent and quality of hospital care in England was, of necessity, of a high standard 
not least because the shortage of men in France meant that it was imperative to return 
wounded men to the front in the shortest possible time.  
 
Religion had long been a sensitive issue for the British in India for both military and 
political rulers, influenced by the memory of 1857. By the end of the century religious 
tolerance was accepted practice in the Army. David Omissi quoted from an 1893 memo 
from Field Marshall Lord Roberts of Kandahar regarding the importance of religious 
respect being shown to the Indian soldiers, ‘Everything should be done to secure the 
contentment and loyalty of the Native Army by a scrupulous regard for their customs 
and religion.’54 In France there were of course far greater challenges than in India where 
it was possible to keep religious festivals and involve local religious leaders in the life of 
the regiment. This meant that what could be done took on extra significance. Great care 
was taken by the authorities in Britain not to cause offence to the Indian troops in 
France. Mason gives the example of a censor who forbade the use of donated YMCA 
notepaper by Indian troops because the letter heading contained the word ‘Christian’.55 
In a letter to The Times former Indian Army Commander in Chief, O’M Creagh, asserted 
that, ‘the Government of India and its officers are most careful to see that [nothing is] 
done by them which could in any way adversely affect caste rules or religious principles.’ 
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He continued by requesting that newspaper editors refrain from commenting on such 
matters in order to protect Britain’s interests.56  
 
Several letters from Indian soldiers sought guidance on religious practice in the trenches 
and requested religious material and advice. An anonymous Pathan wrote home, ‘Make 
every effort to get me a Holy Qu’ran. Never mind the price: I will pay it,’ as did Sepoy 
Ashraf Khan.57 More complex religious questions show how seriously the men 
attempted to take their practice in the trenches, a mark of its importance to them. Hayat 
Ali Khan wrote to Lance Naik Maulavi Talib Khan, both of whom were in France, ‘The 
arrangements for prayers here are good. But there are two opinions here. Some say 
that the Qsar [short service] should be read: others that the service should be 
performed at length. They are always quarrelling about this, as to how the Command of 
God may be … and what is the order about Friday prayers? Can we read them or not? 
We have agreed to act as our Maulavi Sahib shall direct.’58 It is not clear what role 
Maulavi Talib Khan played as he held a soldier’s rank but the mention of the men ‘always 
quarrelling’ about the matter gives an insight into the importance of religious matters to 
the men. 
 
An important feature of the British commitment to the men’s religious practice was to 
ensure that their food met religious requirements. This meant meeting the requirements 
of Sikh, Hindu and Muslim men, which differ substantially. With typical gusto, Willcocks 
described early efforts in Marseilles:  
 
The Indian troops, as is well known, have their own peculiar customs. Their 
religious scruples and their feeding have to be arranged for on lines entirely 
different to British soldiers. All these details might reasonably be expected to 
cause considerable difficulties, but we had been preceded by Staff Officers 
conversant with all the requirements and General Headquarters gave such a free 
hand in these matters … that in a very few days things were working more 
smoothly than in India itself.59 
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The standard menu for the Indian troops met all religious demands: rice or chapattis, 
dhal and vegetables with tea.60 Difficulties, however, arose when meat was provided, in 
accordance with the orders of commanders anxious to keep up the men’s strength. 
While chicken, goat and mutton were acceptable to all, Hindus cannot eat beef and 
Muslims cannot eat pork and both require meat to be slaughtered in a prescribed 
manner. Herds of animals were kept close to the front and each company sent men to 
oversee the slaughter according to their requirements. An anonymous correspondent 
for The Times found sights and sounds at this camp that reminded him of India, ‘there 
was nothing in that yard hooded with fog to remind him or me that we were not at 
Jullundur still on a thick November morning.’ However, he was amused to hear a Gurkha 
saying that his men would only accept frozen mutton that one of them had seen frozen 
to death themselves.61 
 
The soldiers appreciated the consideration shown to them in religious matters, but 
perhaps more especially the care taken to provide them with suitable food in France. 
Willcocks wrote that the soldiers understood that in battle conditions their exact 
dietary requirements could not be met but ‘the Indians are the easiest soldiers in the 
world to feed when they understand that it is part of the game.’62 Bir Singh, writing from 
hospital in England, whose regiment had been told, presumably in France, that atta, 
(flour) was not available, simply declared that, ‘where there are inhabitants, there atta 
must be obtainable. Besides there are plenty of mills.’ His regiment got their flat bread 
and did not have to eat British ration biscuits.63 This complaint provides an insight into 
how little the Indian men knew of the world outside their villages: it did not occur to 
him that there were different types of flour; he simply thought that where there were 
mills to grind flour and people to eat bread, that it must be atta. Willcocks said that, 
‘Indian officers and men have said to me over and over again, “The British Government 
is wonderful; here in the midst of the Mahabharata (great war) they even label our meat. 
Truly the Badshah (King) is a Rustan and a Hatim (a hero and a just man).’64 While the 
British motivation in their attempts to preserve the special religious requirements of the 
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Indian soldiers may have been as much a reflection of their pragmatism as of any genuine 
religious respect, the effect was the same.  
 
It is unarguable that the medical care for the Indian Army was a high point in the 
relationship between the British high command and the Indian troops. The Indian Corps 
organised itself well from the moment it landed in France and this extended to medical 
provision for both wounded and sick troops. In November 1914, the conditions at 
Rouen for Indian convalescents were ‘strikingly better’ than the British provision and ‘all 
the tents had bottom boards, trestle-beds and braziers,’ while the British facility was 
overcrowded and men had to sleep on the floor. 65  
 
The quality of care, from stretcher-bearer to convalescence, was of an extremely high 
standard and was a source of great pride to both the British military authorities and the 
Indian troops. Treatments were often pioneering, such as the use of X-rays to locate 
embedded shrapnel.66 The British Medical Journal followed events closely and provided 
information about treatments including an analysis of the seven stages of treatment from 
the first field dressing to general hospital in England entitled The Way Home of the 
Wounded Man. The process was a long and arduous one, from the first field dressing to 
the regimental aid post in the front line, by field ambulance to a dressing station behind 
the lines, then to a clearing hospital for further treatment and assessment, then by train 
to a base hospital on the coast and a hospital ship to England and finally a train journey 
to their final hospital.67 Given this, it is hardly surprising that the death toll in the hospitals 
was low, because the most severely wounded did not survive the perilous journey from 
trench to England.68 While this applied to all the men on the Western Front, it was the 
specialist provision for Indian soldiers to which considerable resources were assigned. 
In England, the principal hospitals were in Brighton and Brockenhurst, with various 
smaller convalescent facilities nearby such as Barton on Sea on Hampshire. Once again, 
enormous care was taken to ensure religious requirements were met, such as in the 
Pavilion hospital in Brighton which was converted in just fourteen days to provide 724 
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beds across the site by December 1914.69 Merewether quoted the Victoria Cross holder, 
Subadar Mir Dast, who told the Times of India that, ‘Even in hospital our religious feelings 
are strictly guarded, and we have full liberty and every facility in respect of observing the 
prayer times etc. In respect of this, so far as the Pavilion Hospital is concerned, we are 
thankful.’70 
 
The care and respect extended to funeral arrangements. Although open-air cremation 
had been illegal in England since the 1902 Cremation Act, the government chose to turn 
a blind eye and a pyre was built on the Downs outside Brighton and the deceased’s ashes 
were scattered at sea.71 Muslim dead were buried at the cemetery of the Shah Jehan 
mosque in Woking. A Hindu medical student in Edinburgh who had joined the RAMC 
and volunteered for special duties with the Indian wounded in the Indian Medical Service, 
D. R.  Thapar, was the quartermaster who escorted a number of bodies to Woking. He 
described a cortege of hearse, car and ‘a couple of lorries to carry 40 or 50 mourners.’72 
 
It was in part a result of their medical care that despite early concerns, the soldiers 
sickened little. This was a source of pride for Merewether, who claimed a 4% sickness 
rate for the Indian troops against an 11% rate among the British in the Indian Army. He 
gave various reasons for this: the wellbeing of British soldiers of the Indian Corps had 
been drained by their long stay in India; the positive effects of the ‘extra comforts’ 
provided by the Indian Soldiers’ Fund; and the Indians’ ‘sound working knowledge of the 
important questions of sanitation and conservancy.’73 In other words, those men who 
had been brought up in the hot Indian climate were accustomed to taking more care 
with their hygiene, further acknowledgement of the competence and self-sufficiency of 
the Indian soldiers in the eyes of their British senior officers. 
 
The mental health of the Indian soldiers also held up well. Mason wrote that the censors’ 
reports showed that the men in the English hospitals were no more depressed than can 
be accounted for by being wounded and far from home.74 Colonel Seton, who was in 
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charge of the Kitchener Hospital in Brighton, broke down the diagnoses of those 
admitted for psychiatric problems, listing 14 men as suffering from mania, 4 of whom 
were melancholic, 2 hysterics, 1 idiot, 1 sufferer from Chronic Delusional Insanity, 2 
with dementia and 2 undiagnosed cases among the 24 soldiers sent to the Kitchener 
Hospital in Brighton.75 The Kitchener was the only Indian hospital dealing with psychiatric 
cases, so the number is almost certainly representative of the wounded in England.76 
Coroners’ records of the period reveal one suicide among the Indian wounded. Lackman 
Rai, who was admitted to the York Place Hospital with ‘tuberculous glands’ on 1 
October 1915, cut his throat on 23 October. The Coroner, presumably cautious of 
raising the issue of the mental health of the men, stated that, ‘as to what was his state of 
mind when he committed the act there is no evidence to show.’77  
 
A final insight into British military opinion about Indian soldiers comes from a 1918 
military manual: Our Indian Empire: A short review and some hints for the use of soldiers 
proceeding to India. This offers a view of what the British Army considered to be the most 
significant information for officers and men departing for India. Much was made of how 
to address the men with whom they would come into contact. Advice was given as to 
how to address an Indian soldier: ‘Do not use any fancy terms of your own. We have 
heard an Englishman shout out “Hi, you cooly” to a passing sepoy, who naturally felt 
considerably hurt at the insult.’78 When advising against using an even more offensive 
term of address, the guide continued, ‘After all, when one thinks over it, it is rather 
insulting and most of us in his shoes would get our backs up too.’79 It was also considered 
to be important to learn the appropriate local Indian language, or if not at least ‘don’t 
lose your temper with a man because he cannot understand what you are talking 
about.’80 The book also emphasised that it was unacceptable to beat Indians, not 
necessarily because it was wrong per se but because they may be seriously hurt and the 
case would end up in court if the victim did not accept money or the imposition of a 
military punishment. The authorities would not support an errant British soldier who 
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assaulted an Indian, at least not in court: ‘though you may have only meant to administer 
a mild hiding, there can be no doubt that you are responsible for the damage done and 
you will have to suffer in consequence.’81 
 
A particularly curious aspect of the book was its attempt to convey an impression of 
how Indian people viewed British people. On managing their financial affairs, the book 
claimed that ‘to most Indians we have little individuality; we are all the gara-log, the pale 
faces.’82 Not only that but ‘most natives of this country think we are very rich folk and 
all know that we throw our money about rather recklessly …many people who have 
seen very little of us think we are most unreasonable people, who will demand all sorts 
of impossible things and lose our tempers if we do not get them.’ However, it was not 
all bad news for the new arrival: ‘many years of experience have taught the natives that 
we, as a race, are just and honest. They hold our word as good as our bond, and they 
know that we always try to play the game fairly. They admire British pluck and coolness 
in danger.’83 
 
While the advice appears sensible by the standards of the day, in terms of encouraging 
newly arrived British soldiers to treat Indian people considerately, to try to learn their 
language and not to swear at or assault them; the ‘Necessary Phrases’ section at the 
back of the book suggests a less enlightened approach. The first phrases on the list of 
Hindustani translations were ‘come here’, ‘come quickly’, ‘go away’ and ‘who are you’. 
Although the Guide was written after the Indian soldiers had left France, it did not 
acknowledge their experience either in terms of their military achievements or to build 
on the sense of camaraderie noted in some of the interactions between Indian and British 
soldiers. The tone of the guide did not suggest that the British men were to be in charge 
of experienced and battle hardened soldiers, despite their widely acclaimed contribution 
to the war. 
 
CONCLUSION  
In large measure, the structure and attitudes of the Indian Army had been formed by the 
Rebellion of 1857 which had not only forced the British authorities to question the 
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loyalty of the men but compelled them to account for the men’s religious commitments 
as well as restructuring the army on a much more local basis, which reinforced the sense 
of loyalty among the men who did not rebel which continued into the war years. British 
use of the Martial Race Theory had brought together men with a strong sense of identity 
and commitment to the Army who had gained experience in numerous local 
engagements and, in a similar manner to the British ‘Pals’ battalions, felt a strong sense 
of loyalty to the men around them as well as the Indian Army and Britain. 
 
Attention to the men’s religious requirements had continued in France as it had done in 
India and was acknowledged and appreciated by the men. Willcocks’ comment about 
how easy Indian soldiers are ‘to feed when they understand that it is part of the game’ 
illustrates a level of cooperation between the men and their leaders.84 This respect and 
sense of parity between the Indian Corps and British soldiers recurs throughout the 
narrative, from the words of the King, through French’s comments, to the relations 
between British and Indian other ranks and reflects the developing relationship between 
British and Indian soldiers as well as more senior staff officers.  
 
Willcocks summed up the Indian military contribution thus, ‘it was their good fortune 
to arrive just at the moment when they were most needed; just when our troops were 
using their very last reserves and fighting against terrible odds … and even if they had 
never done another day’s fighting their advent would have more than justified their 
having been sent, for they helped in some degree to save the Army in the hour of its 
great trial.’85 Morton-Jack took up the point, quoting General Keary, Commander of the 
Lahore Division, writing that the Indian Corps was ‘kicked out of France … a squeezed 
orange sucked dry and chucked away.’86 Whether or not their intervention saved the 
BEF remains a matter for debate but it is clear that they served successfully in France 
and, as Keary claimed, at a dreadfully high cost to the Corps, as summarised by 
Merewether: 
 
about twenty-four thousand men formed the two divisions that landed at 
Marseilles. In less than a year more than thirty thousand drafts were sent from 
India to replace casualties. In other words, in about eight months six thousand more 
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troops were dispatched for the single purpose of replacing the killed, the wounded and 
the sick than the force contained when it landed. And the Corps, the original 
personnel of which had been so completely wiped out, was afterwards sent to 
Mesopotamia, where it added, if possible, to its glory, and made further and bitter 
sacrifices in health and life.’87   
 
The official narrative in the speeches of the King and despatches of Sir John French gave 
an overwhelmingly positive view of the Indian Corps’ contribution in France. While this 
is to some extent predictable, as any public comment was unlikely to have criticised any 
aspect of the war effort, it should not be forgotten that the initial response to the idea 
of Indian troops serving in Europe was to consider it to be a ‘hazardous experiment’.88 
In French’s despatch of 22 November 1915 to mark the departure of the Indian Corps 
from France, he stated:  
 
I wish to send a message of thanks to all officers, non-commissioned officers and 
men for the work you have done for the Empire. From the time you reached 
France you were constantly engaged with the enemy until the end of last year. 
After a few weeks’ rest you returned to the trenches, and since then you have 
continually held some portion of the front line … The Indian Corps have also 
shown most praiseworthy courage under novel and trying conditions, both of 
climate and of fighting, and have not only upheld, but added to, the good name 
of the Army which they represent.89 
 
The chapter has reflected on the relationships which formed between the soldiers of 
Britain and India on an individual level. These accounts show that British soldiers were 
accepting and respectful of their new Indian colleagues and when working together 
seemed to hold them in high regard. Given this, it is interesting to note accounts which 
praise the soldiers they have themselves met but criticise the performance of men of 
whom they have heard from other British soldiers. This key distinction has also been 
seen in the reaction of the British civilian population to the Indian soldiers. Just as with 
the population in Britain, it was men, regardless of rank, who had encountered Indians 
and formed relationships, however perfunctory, who were their strongest advocates. 
Despite the misgivings of senior military figures before the Indians arrived in France, the 
chapter has shown that the Indian soldiers were eventually lauded not just by those 
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senior officers who knew them, such as Willcocks and Merewether but also by senior 
staff figures such as Sir John French and General Haig.  
 
 
 
108. ‘Those who take up the Pen’ 
 
Chapter Four  
‘Those who take up the pen to criticise’: British Military assumptions about 
tactical problems in the Indian Corps1  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the prejudicial views of the British 
military establishment in the period leading up to the Indian Corps’ deployment in France 
were comparable with the stereotypical depictions of Indian people which were 
prevalent in Britain before the war. This chapter will consider how the British military 
made a number of assumptions about the potential pitfalls of deploying Indian soldiers in 
Europe before their arrival in France. It will examine each of these in turn and consider 
how these assumptions developed over time and how the attitudes of the British military 
changed as these assumptions proved to be unfounded. The assertions will be compiled 
from both contemporary sources and later commentators and set against British 
accounts and the letters home by Indian soldiers. Later twentieth century commentary 
will be of especial significance as the assertions will be largely found not to be proven 
and the reasons why the various assertions that the Indian experience in France was a 
negative one are discussed.  
 
The majority of the later twentieth century commentators on the Indian Corps’ time in 
France presented a negative perspective. Jeffrey Greenhut, for example, gave four 
reasons why he considered that the Indian Army failed: 1. the battalions became 
dispersed as the war went on, 2. there were problems getting reinforcements, 3. 
replacement British officers struggled to get to know and work with their Indian troops, 
4. the state of the troops ‘deteriorated’ during their time in France.2 In David Omissi’s 
opinion the major issues facing the soldiers were that the Indian troops were inadequate 
soldiers and that their morale was very low.3 Gordon Corrigan concluded that that the 
weather and the troops’ morale explained their poor performance,4 and in Charles 
Chevenix Trench’s opinion, the Indian Army on the Western Front faced three principal 
difficulties: the climate, the loss of the British officers and the problem of 
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reinforcements.5 All these concerns were used by their authors to explain the Indian 
soldiers’ departure from France in December 1915. On the same theme, Rob Johnson 
asserted that they were withdrawn from France because of unsustainable losses, 
particularly of officers6 and Hyson and Lester ascribed their redeployment to poor 
morale, concerns regarding the upcoming winter weather and, in part, the sexual 
anxieties related to wounded Indian soldiers’ continued presence in Brighton.7 George 
Morton-Jack, in his 2006 article for War in History offered a revisionist perspective as he 
sought to reposition the Indian Army against accusations of failure. He found four slightly 
different areas of concern: 1. the weather; 2. the morale of the troops, 3. that the Indian 
troops were simply inadequate soldiers, 4. the British generals did not treat the Indian 
Army fairly.8 He found that, although the Indian Corps inevitably faced problems in 
France, these in no way diminished its overall effectiveness.  
 
It is difficult to trace the origin of these concerns. Some clearly derive from tactical 
difficulties in the field, such as the dispersal of the battalions and the difficulty regarding 
reinforcements. Some were of British strategic making: the lack of available officers 
would not have occurred to the same extent had Indians been appointed to officer rank 
but the British policy of using the Martial Race Theory as a recruitment tool disallowed 
this. However, claims that the men could not cope with the climate, that their morale 
was low and that they were ‘inadequate’ and that their condition ‘deteriorated’ do not 
appear in any contemporary accounts.  
 
As with the earlier discussion regarding how Indian people were represented in Britain 
before the war, these assumptions can be considered in the context of Social Darwinism. 
Despite their extensive previous fighting experience, which was often far greater than 
that of their British counterparts, assumptions were made about the Indian soldiers 
which were not made about British soldiers, for example, that they would be unable to 
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fight effectively in the absence of officers to lead them and that their discipline would 
falter under pressure. This can be related to the hierarchical assumptions  of the Social 
Darwinist school that British people, and thus its soldiers, were naturally and culturally 
superior to their Indian counterparts. 
 
The two principal contemporary sources, General Willcocks, Commander of the Indian 
Corps in France, and Lt-Colonel Merewether, the Corps’ Record Officer, both senior 
officers in the Indian Army during its time in France, differed from later historians on the 
subject. Willcocks concluded his 1920 memoir of the First World War by claiming that 
the British officer was irreplaceable in the Indian Army, although he also bemoaned the 
lack of suitable reinforcements.9 Merewether also stressed the importance of British 
officers and the problems of replacing them as they were killed or wounded.10 Both, 
however, considered that the Indian Corps’ time in France was a success. It will be 
shown that the criticisms of later historians were not supported by contemporaries of 
the Indian soldiers such as Willcocks and Merewether. The chapter will make it apparent 
that among contemporary sources, those who knew the Indian soldiers, such as 
Willcocks and Merewether, showed much less concern about their deployment than 
commentators who did not have a relationship with the Indian Corps. The chapter will 
account for this difference by showing that these fears proved unfounded and that in all 
likelihood, they were not considered significant by the Indian Corps’ senior officers 
because of their prior knowledge of the Indian soldiers and their capabilities.  
 
This chapter will consider how the loss of British officers was expected to affect both 
the morale and military effectiveness of the Indian troops and the effects of the climate 
in France, particularly the severe winter of 1914-1915. It will also analyse rates of courts 
martial, self-inflicted wounds and malingering to assess their morale in general and the 
risk of sedition among the Indian troops, a particular concern for the British. Finally, it 
will discuss a tactical problem not anticipated by the British but considered by the Indian 
soldiers to be the most important of all: the practice of returning men who had 
recovered from their wounds to France.  
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THE IMPORTANCE OF BRITISH OFFICERS TO THE INDIAN SOLDIERS 
A key assumption made by later historians was that the Indian soldiers could not cope 
without their British officer and this section will examine the view of contemporaries on 
the subject. General Willcocks concluded his memoir of life with the Indian Army by 
saying, ‘no argument decked in rhetoric will alter the fact, that you can NEVER replace 
the British officer in the Indian Army.’11 This attitude, which prevailed for many years 
until the end of the war, was to cause substantial problems for the Indian Corps in 
France. Greenhut asserted that it had simply not occurred to the British that officers 
would be lost in large numbers and so did not have contingency plans for this 
eventuality.12 Given that the Indian Army had hitherto fought ‘small wars’ with far lower 
casualty rates than on the Western Front and that there had never been an expectation 
that it would fight in a major war, this is perhaps not unreasonable. However, the issue 
became a central topic of discussions about the Indian Army’s performance in France 
for the next hundred years. 
 
The British officer in the Indian Army was in a unique position. Alexander Watson, in 
his consideration of morale in the First World War, considered leadership to be a vital 
component of high morale. Watson quoted the contemporary psychologist Charles Bird, 
‘the leaders determine the morale of the troops who instinctively are imitators and who 
regard their officers as symbols of duty, discipline and the nation. At times, the loss of 
an officer may terrorise a company and cause disaster to a regiment.’13 Roly Grimshaw, 
a Cavalry Officer in the Indian Army, understood this well; when a fellow officer was 
wounded and another refused to leave him and his men in danger, ‘personally I was not 
sorry as I felt that with De Pass gone, even a partially alive ‘Sahib’ was an encouragement 
to the men and any moment one of us might be knocked out. I know the men were 
greatly encouraged when I told them that Alderson was all right and would stay till the 
finish.’14 
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All the officers of the Indian Army were British and between them and the other ranks 
stood a unique group of Viceroy Commissioned Officers (VCO). VCOs were Indian 
troops who had risen through the ranks and filled a similar role to a NCO in the British 
army. Jeffrey Greenhut explained why British officers chose to join the Indian Army over 
the British Army: the pay was better, promotion more likely, responsibility came quicker 
and the cost of living and mess charges in India were much lower than in Britain. In 1913, 
every one of the top 10 Sandhurst graduates requested Indian military service, a sign of 
the prestige it held.15 Joining the Indian Army was not an easy option: in addition to 
officer training at Sandhurst, Indian Army officers were required to pass exams in 
Hindustani and any other language prevalent in their particular regiment as well as learn 
its religious and cultural norms.16 
 
A combination of the isolated life of a military officer and the insular nature of regimental 
life in Indian cantonments meant that the relationship between a British officer and his 
Indian men was unusually strong. Nevertheless, according to Greenhut, the relationship 
had an added dimension in the Indian Army, ‘A British officer might love, even admire, 
his men, but he never forgot, nor was he allowed to forget by the tight circle of the 
mess, that he was innately better than his men.’17 Morton-Jack agreed that this was 
certainly true of the officers of the British Army, who often held highly racist views 
against Indian soldiers but that this was not necessarily the case for British officers of 
the Indian Army. He cited General Willcocks as an example of an officer who knew his 
men well and respected them and their customs.18 Accounts by British officers seem to 
belie the stance that they saw themselves as ‘innately superior’ to their men. Lieutenant-
General Eric Goddard, who served with the Indian Expeditionary Force during the First 
World War, although not in France, remembered, ‘one of the great differences between 
the British and Indian soldier … was that the latter welcomed close contact with his 
officers off duty ... there developed between officers and men in peace that mutual 
confidence that is the foundation of good discipline in war … none of them felt, or 
indeed were unequal.’19 Two accounts from Charles Allen’s collection of memoirs of the 
                                                          
15 Greenhut, Sahib and Sepoy, 15 
16 Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches, 9 
17 Greenhut, Sahib and Sepoy, 15 
18 George Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to France and 
Belgium in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 35 
19 Eric Goddard, ‘The Indian Army – Company and Raj,’ Asian Affairs 7, no. 3, (2007), 265 
113. ‘Those who take up the Pen’ 
 
Raj seemed to confirm this. General Auchinleck recorded that ‘there was no question 
of ordering them about’20 and Brigadier Dillon described the relationship thus, ‘you knew 
all about him, where he came from, what his family [trade] was. You probably visited his 
village and knew his parents.’21 While British officers in the main certainly did have 
relationships with their men which were closer than those between officers and men of 
the British Army, neither did they lose sight of their superior rank, both in the military 
sense and in the sense that as Britons they were the rulers of India. This presented the 
officer with a difficult balance to strike: his daily work, especially when at war, demanded 
that he treat the Indian soldiers as being as competent in their roles as he was in his, yet 
as soon as he was among his peers, he must often reverse this opinion in order to 
maintain those equally important bonds. 
 
The complexity of the relationships between the officers and men was illustrated by 
Captain Roly Grimshaw in his diary as he defended an Indian soldier against a fellow 
British officer. ‘I nearly had a row with the R.A.M.C. major in charge as he wanted to 
turn my Indian officers out of a first class carriage for his warrant officers. Typical of the 
attitude towards Indians.’22 Just weeks later, Grimshaw, at great risk to himself, tried to 
save one of his men and when he died, ‘I had him carefully put to one side where he 
would not be flung about or trodden on, till I had time to bury him. I moved him myself.23 
Yet, despite his willingness to challenge a more senior officer over his treatment of Indian 
men and the care he took over the body of one of his men, he disagreed with a fellow 
officer’s decision to send a British officer to collect a wounded Indian soldier, ‘A British 
officer is worth more than a wounded Sepoy.’24 While Grimshaw went on to state that 
this was a simple matter of tactical priorities, the language he used remains dependent 
not just on the distinction of rank but their respective races. 
 
In France, British officers of the Indian Army were being lost at an alarming rate. Given 
that the complement of officers per battalion was only twelve, including the medical 
officer, when they arrived in France, it was not long before the situation became critical.25 
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In fact, Merewether reported that German snipers were deliberately targeting British 
officers, which further depleted their numbers. The officers took to dressing in similar 
kit to the men to attempt to reduce casualties, which proved effective.26 Major 
Alexander, of the Indian Mule Corps, referred to this in his memoir, ‘the chances of the 
British officer of the Indian Infantry are not great: there are only fourteen to each 
battalion, and they cannot help being conspicuous, although their uniform is exactly the 
same as the men.’27 It is not known whether the German policy in this case was one of 
killing officers in general, which was an established tactic, or whether they also perceived 
that these officers had particular worth. Mason made a direct link between the loss of 
the officers and the bravery of their men, ‘in some battalions none survived with the 
regiment …in others only one or two were left … yet the men fought like heroes.’28 
 
Unlike later historians, contemporaries such as Willcocks, writing in 1920 about the loss 
of officers, did not link this to criticism of the Indian troops’ performance, claiming only 
that ‘those who take up the pen to criticise should first put themselves in the place of 
these men, who had crossed the seas to fight for England, without any personal cause in 
the quarrel, and inspired alone by the duty they owed their King-Emperor because they 
had eaten his salt,’ by which he meant that they had benefited from serving in the Army 
by earning a salary.29 Merewether’s 1918 account similarly mentioned the loss of British 
officers, calling it ‘the one calamity … which could in any degree shake the morale of the 
Indian soldier, was the loss of his beloved British officers.’30 However, he did not go on 
to criticise the troops or relate this to their performance but sympathised with the loss 
of their final link to home and familiarity. 
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the loss of so many British officers must have been 
traumatic for Indian men already in an unfamiliar situation and with so few familiar points 
of reference. Major Alexander described the effect of the death of his officer upon one 
of the men, ‘one Sepoy told how he had seen poor Mango Browne charging at the head 
of his men with his broken arm dangling in its sleeve. When a comrade told him that this 
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officer had afterwards been killed, the Sepoy burst into tears.’31 Replacement officers, 
however competent, could not have the shared history, experiences, values and language 
that the British officers had laboriously acquired and, given this, it seems likely that trust 
and communication deteriorated. Given the lack of suitably trained British officers to 
replace the lost men, there was very little that could be done to improve the situation. 
To promote Indian soldiers was considered to be out of the question, with a very few 
exceptions. This solution had been precluded by the British high command long before 
the war even started. By making the Martial Race Theory the centrepiece of their 
recruitment strategy, the British had effectively excluded any Indians who may have been 
potential officers from joining the army as those who fitted the martial characteristics 
required were almost all uneducated and thus considered unsuitable for officer training. 
Greenhut concluded that the racist assumptions about Indian troops being unable to 
fight without British officers were a smokescreen for the incompetent construction of 
the Indian Army,32 and further illustrated the bias towards recruiting poorly educated 
men for their martial qualities and the consequences of this, ‘Indians who were intelligent 
and educated were defined as cowards, while those defined as brave were uneducated 
and backward. Therefore, only British gentlemen combined both the intelligence and 
courage necessary for a man to become an officer.’33 The opportunities missed by this 
assumption in the years before the war can be argued separately, but once the war began 
and British officers began to perish, the disadvantage became clear: there were no Indian 
men in a position to step up and lead.  
 
Given that the replacement officers were unfamiliar with their men and that this was a 
more significant problem in the Indian than British army, it seems plausible that the men’s 
performance could have diminished. However, the argument that this loss rendered the 
Indians incompetent or even cowardly, as Greenhut suggested, does not occur in 
contemporary accounts.34 The effect, assuming that there was an effect at all, could 
equally have come from communication difficulties between the new officers and their 
men, the new officers’ general unfamiliarity with their surroundings and lack of 
experience. Despite its many problems, the Indian Corps fought bravely and effectively 
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for many months after the officer losses started to mount. It is also worth noting that 
there are very few references to their officers in the soldiers’ letters: of the 600 letters 
studied for this thesis, fewer than a dozen directly mention British officers. Nevertheless, 
whatever the quality of the relationships between the British officers and their Indian 
men, the assumption that they could not fight without a British officer present became 
widespread during the latter half of the twentieth century. Greenhut quoted General 
Charteris, Sir Douglas Haig's Chief of Intelligence, writing in November 1914 of the 
Indians, ‘They were splendid in the trenches as long as their officers were there but 
afterwards did not know what to do.’35 Morton-Jack claimed that the attitude dated from 
the Peel Commission of 1859, which concluded that ‘deprived of their European officers, 
native troops are a mere armed rabble.’36 Omissi also used the same quotation, adding 
Lord Roberts’ view that, ‘British leaders are essential to the success of Native soldiery.’37  
However, these quotations derive from men who were not familiar with the Indian 
soldiers and certainly were not in contact with them during their time in France. 
 
There is some evidence in the official records of the war to suggest that the men were 
well able to cope without officers in the heat of battle. Jemadar Mir Dast’s Victoria Cross 
citation read, ‘he led his platoon with great gallantry during the attack, and afterwards 
collected various parties of the regiment (when no British Officers were left) and kept 
them under his command until the retirement was ordered.’38 On 25 September 1915, 
Rifleman Kulbir Thapa made three trips into no-man’s land to rescue four men, despite 
his own injuries and with no officer present.39 Merewether told of Sepoy Ghulam 
Hussein who won his Indian Distinguished Service Medal when, after his senior officer 
had been gassed, ‘collected a number of men and set them to work at a trench to form 
a rallying point’ after he had rescued his officer.40 While these are acts of extreme 
bravery and as such exceptional, they do give formal acknowledgment to the Indian 
soldiers as competent men who were able to adapt to a fast moving situation without 
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the guidance of a British officer. This would be entirely consistent with the style of 
fighting they had been used to in India, which involved small units fighting independently. 
 
There are two arguments at work regarding the Indian soldiers’ perceived inability to 
fight without officers, firstly that British officers were held in high esteem by their men 
and their influence was irreplaceable, and secondly that the loss of those officers 
rendered the Indian troops worthless. While it is certain that the Indian soldiers held 
their British officers in high regard, the assertion that their loss rendered the men 
incompetent is not obvious. Later commentators such as Greenhut are certain that the 
allegation of incompetence without British leadership is a given, ‘as the months 
progressed, the view that Indians could not fight without British officers was buttressed 
by events,’ ‘without British officers … the fighting capabilities of Indian battalions 
deteriorated seriously and rapidly.’41 This section has shown that this is not consistent 
with the attitudes of contemporary commentators such as Willcocks and Merewether, 
who had worked alongside the Indian soldiers and who considered that they were 
capable of not just fighting on without their officers but in taking the initiative and in 
doing so showing not just their independence but also their ability to lead as official 
accounts such as the medal citations demonstrate. 
 
Despite this, in no way did contemporary officers view the Indian soldiers as equals. This 
is borne out in the paternalistic manner in which the British officers viewed the men. In 
paying tribute to the officers of the Indian Corps, Merewether reinforced this message,  
 
the degree of dependence upon the officer is on the whole greater … and side 
by side with that dependence, there has grown up on the part of the British 
officer, however young he may be, the habit and frame of mind of a father, and 
sometimes, when the occasion requires it, even more the habit and frame of 
mind of a mother.42  
 
Earlier chapters have discussed the prevailing view of British people of Indians as 
subordinate and childlike and this seems to be played out in the military attitude to the 
men as well. From this, it seems reasonable to argue that the significance of the loss of 
British officers lies not in the perceived exposure of the Indian soldiers’ cowardice and 
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incompetence but to a lack of the camaraderie and support they felt as the officers they 
had spent time with and known, who knew them as people with cultural and personal 
histories and who spoke their language disappeared. Mason acknowledged the 
complexity of requirements for replacement officers, ‘it would have to find officers who 
spoke Pashtu or Punjabi or Marathi as well as Hindustani, who understood the peculiar 
traditions of regiments of the most diverse origins.’43    
 
This section has shown that among contemporary commentators, particularly those who 
were familiar with the Indian soldiers, the view that they were unable to fight without 
their British officers was not held. The opinion developed among later historians and 
appears to be based at least in part on concerns about the Indian army which were 
prevalent among those who knew the soldiers least before their participation in the war. 
 
THE FRENCH CLIMATE 
The question of the climate of northern France and how suited the Indian troops were 
to it was another issue which has drawn attention from commentators on the war. Of 
the later commentators, Morton-Jack, Trench and Corrigan all considered it to have 
been a major problem for the troops.44 The climate of the Punjab, where the majority 
of the Indian soldiers came from, is milder and drier than that of northern France and 
the long weeks of rain and temperatures several degrees below zero were particularly 
severe during the winter of 1914- 1915 and certainly lower than the men would have 
been used to but it was the persistent rain which caused the most annoyance. Writer 
Alan Clarke said of the weather during the winter of 1914 that, ‘from the 25th October 
until the 25th March there were only eighteen dry days, and on eleven of these the 
temperature was below freezing.’45 Contemporaries such as Arthur Conan Doyle, the 
novelist, set out the problem as he and many others saw it, ‘our Indian troops were 
nonetheless the children of the sun, dependent on warmth for their vitality and numbed 
by the cold wet life of the trenches.’46 This suggests that he associated the soldiers with 
the hotter southern parts of India, rather than the more temperate north where the 
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vast majority lived. This section will show that, despite these concerns, the weather 
troubled the Indian soldiers relatively little, as is reflected in comments by Indian soldiers 
and those who worked alongside them. 
 
It was certainly the case that the rain, in particular, was a shock to some of the Indian 
troops. Havildar Ganda Singh compared the French winter with that of Kashmir in the 
far northwest of India, ‘the water was up to the waist in January and February, with cold 
like that of Kashmir and rain constantly falling,’47 The combination of the constant rain 
and the high water table in the area occupied by the Indian troops at this time meant 
that the trenches were more often than not waterlogged and the men had their feet in 
cold water for most of the day. An Afridi soldier wrote, ‘It rains every day. So far I have 
not seen the sun. There is deep water in the trenches and the men all stand in the 
water’.48  
 
However, in the main, the soldiers’ letters were relatively quiet on the subject of the 
weather. While there are some complaints, they tend to mention it in passing. A couple 
mentioned the famous mud and a Muslim from southern India, who was presumably 
much less familiar with the cold, complained that ‘the cold is so great that it cannot be 
described. Snow falls day and night and covers the ground to a depth of two feet.’49 Roly 
Grimshaw mentioned in his diary on 6 November 1914 the ‘damp, moist, poisonous 
weather.’ Two weeks later, on 21 November, he reports ‘twenty degrees of frost’.50 On 
2nd February 1915, Sir John French reported that ‘the operations of the Army under my 
command have been subject almost entirely to the limitations of weather.’51 
 
Willcocks, who was born in India and spent his entire military career with the Indian 
Army, was not especially concerned about the weather.52 In his memoir he discussed 
the weather in November 1914, ‘All ranks felt the bitter cold … but taken all round the 
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Indian troops stood it far better than I had ever believed possible.’53 He went on that 
part of that resilience might be to do with the provision of winter kit and braziers.54 
However, this was not well understood in London and ‘people in England believed that 
the Indians could not stand the severe climate.’55  It seems that the issue lay not so much 
with the Indian soldiers as with the assumptions made by those who had not 
encountered them, although this was a particularly harsh season even by northern 
European standards. Those who were most connected with the Indian soldiers such as 
Willcocks were far less concerned with their reaction to the weather. Merewether also 
discussed the weather and felt that the ‘evil effects of the unaccustomed climate of 
Northern France in winter’ were nullified by the food, medical supplies and clothing 
provided by the Indian Soldiers’ Fund.56  
 
DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS AMONG THE INDIAN TROOPS 
This chapter so far has illustrated the difference between later historical criticisms of 
the Indian Corps and contemporary opinion. Senior staff officers did have concerns 
about their deployment in France and one of these was how discipline among the men 
would hold up. This section will examine the Indian Corps’ disciplinary record in France 
to show that, despite these concerns, their record was not dissimilar to that of the 
British troops. Courts martial, rates of self-inflicted wounds and accusations of 
malingering will be used to illustrate the point that the Indian soldiers acquitted 
themselves in a very similar manner to their British peers in the field. The Indian Army 
was subject to an adapted version of British military law and historically there tended to 
be few disciplinary problems among the troops. The 1911 Manual of Indian Military Law 
provided for the public flogging of soldiers instead of the death penalty but as corporal 
punishment was not permitted in the British Army, Willcocks ordered it to be used only 
sparingly and in private.57 
 
George Morton-Jack calculated that between October 1914 and February 1915, arguably 
the most challenging time for the Indian Army, courts martial convicted just 0.3% of 
Indian troops against a British rate of 2.7%. In March 1915, the statistics were 0.3% of 
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Indian troops against 0.5% of British and in September of that year, 0.08% of Indian 
troops were convicted at a court martial and 0.3 % of British soldiers.58 This seems to 
show that all troops, British and Indian, took some time to adapt to trench life and 
implies that there was no major crisis of discipline among the Indian soldiers, nor by 
comparison with their British counterparts.  This is reflected in those letters from Indian 
soldiers which refer to courts martial, most of which simply mention courts martial as 
news but Gokul Singh Rawat takes a highly critical stance: ‘as for the men who have in 
cowardly fashion returned to India, they are no doubt safely in Rupiman slapping their 
chests and saying “we are the real Chattris” [warriors] … this is not a marketplace for 
cattle and goats as Rupiman is.’59 Certainly, courts martial rates indicate that indiscipline 
was not a major problem among the Indian Corps.  
 
Desertion was a marginal issue for the Indian Corps, if only for geographical reasons as 
India was almost impossible for the men to reach from France. Different accounts give 
different numbers of deserters but all agree that the largest number were Pathans from 
what is now the Afghanistan/Pakistan border which was beyond the reach of the Raj so 
they were unlikely to face any disciplinary action when they arrived home.60 Jemadar Mir 
Mast, whose brother Mir Dast was awarded his Victoria Cross while at the Pavilion 
Hospital in Brighton, deserted during the night of 2-3 March 1915. With German 
assistance, he reached Tirah in the Pathan district and, according to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Strachey at the India Office, had reached Kabul by late November.61 Strachey’s 
correspondent, Chief Censor EB Howell, seemed to be mildly amused by the episode 
and noted in his reply, ‘Did you know that Jemadar Mir Mast the deserter is the brother 
of Subedar Mir Dast VC? Truly truth is stranger than fiction.’62 There was an unverified 
story that Mir Mast was awarded the Iron Cross by the Kaiser, presumably for his efforts 
to outwit the British and possibly even as a mocking reference to his brother’s Victoria 
Cross.63 
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Much has been made by later commentators of the notion that Indian troops were prone 
to self-inflicted wounds. Jeffrey Greenhut made the allegation that the prevalence of hand 
wounds among Indian troops should have shown that the notion of the Indian solider as 
‘totally obedient, loyal and devoted was seriously out of touch with reality.’64 This idea, 
with the statistic that 57% of all wounds requiring hospital admission were hand wounds, 
was repeated by Omissi twice, George Morton-Jack and accepted by Bernard Waites.65 
However, once again, commentators of the day such as Willcocks and Merewether did 
not consider self-inflicted wounds significant enough to refer to at all, although both 
considered morale in general terms. 
 
The statistic that 57% of all hospital admissions were due to self-inflicted wounds appears 
to derive from a sample taken from a single entry in the Medical Services section of the 
Indian Corps War Diary.66 The entry, by an unknown author, dated 4 November 1914, 
contains a table: 
      
No Admissions Hand Wounds 
No 2 Clearing IP    Nil   Nil 
No 15 Lahore Cl. IP    1343   828 
No 20 Meerut Cl. IP     474   220 
No 6 Clearing IP       21     1 
1838   1049            57%’ 
Result of enquiry as to number of hand wounds in native army, from date the Indian troops 
came into action up to evening of Nov 367 
 
By 4 November 1914, Indian soldiers had been involved in two major actions, at Ypres 
and Neuve Chapelle, just weeks after their arrival at Marseilles and journey to the front. 
It seems likely that at this time the men were at their most traumatised, being unrested 
and thrown straight into battle. Morton-Jack noted that rates did appear to rise in the 
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autumn of 1914 and the spring of 1915, both times of heavy engagement, but argued that 
both these times reflect the arrival of fresh troops and could be seen as one off reactions 
to the conditions endured by the Indian troops. He quoted Willcocks as seeming to 
agree with this analysis in a letter on 11 November 1914, ‘I had to shoot two men and 
I hope no more … by these means a stop will be put to this idiotic and dangerous thing.’68 
During the winter of 1914-1915, Willcocks had five men shot for cowardice, although 
this was not necessarily for self-infliction of wounds. 
 
Nevertheless, it was a matter of concern and on 10 November the same medical officer 
toured three of the four clearing stations shown in the table above and ‘carefully went 
into details and statistics of left hand wounds.’69 He made no further note, so presumably 
found nothing of concern. There are only two further references to hand wounds in this 
part of the War Diary, one the following day and one in June 1915. The entry for 11 
November, by a different officer, compared Indian hand wound rates with those of 
British soldiers, who were presumably fighting nearby and thus admitted to the same 
clearing stations. He concluded ‘no. of hand wounds among Indians now 18.5%. British 
is 17.7%.’70 This suggests that, albeit among a small sample, rates of hand wounds 
between Indian and British soldiers were similar. Greenhut’s comparison of Indian and 
British hand wound rates to 14 August 1915 by contrast, gave a ratio of 1808 Indian 
soldiers to 140 British.71 This may be partly explained by Corrigan’s assertion that British 
soldiers tended to inflict wounds to their feet, not hands. He suggested that this 
tendency may have been due to better public transport in Britain, and it seems plausible 
that a higher percentage of Indian troops would have felt that they would require full 
mobility after the war living as they did an agricultural lifestyle.72 Nevertheless, it is a 
significantly higher ratio than that recorded by the medical officer nine months earlier. 
It also suggests a sharp drop off in the number of hand wounds among Indian soldiers, 
which by November 1914 totalled 1049 and in August 1915 was 1808, suggesting the 
relatively small number of 759 incidences in nine months when compared to 1049 in less 
than two months. This would support Morton-Jack’s theory that the rates peaked as 
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new arrivals faced battle but that they soon acclimatised and hand wound rates settled. 
In addition, the fighting diminished considerably during the cold winter months which 
could explain why the rates dropped during that period as the fighting lessened and thus 
the men felt safer and less inclined to attempt to escape the trenches by self-inflicted 
wounds. Large numbers of Indian troops were also rested from the front line during the 
winter of 1914-1915. 
 
However, some British personnel remained convinced that the Indian soldiers were 
inviting self-inflicted wounds. Royal Army Medical Corps officer Captain Maberly Esler 
was in charge of a hut of 30 wounded Sikhs in 1915, ‘they all had hand wounds, all 
through the palm of their hand. The conclusion was pretty obvious that they had been 
putting their hands up to be shot at.’73 Medical staff had some influence as to whether 
or not a wound was deemed to be self-inflicted as Baghi Singh indignantly reported from 
the Kitchener Military Hospital in Brighton, ‘here there is great tyranny on the part of 
the doctor. Anyone whose hand is wounded … is branded with a hot iron.’74 While this 
is almost certainly metaphorical, a doctor did have the power to report a suspected self-
inflicted wound. An anonymous Indian correspondent wrote that a friend had recently 
been arrested on the word of a doctor and only released when another soldier vouched 
for how he came by his injury. Nevertheless, medical staff were often reluctant to involve 
themselves in disciplinary matters. A medical officer wrote of a meeting concerning self-
inflicted wounds wherein he asserted that ‘it was agreed that a M.O. could only give an 
opinion as to the range of the bullet causing the wound. The stopping of this class of 
wound must be a matter of regimental discipline.’75 However, the distinction between a 
bullet wound from a distance and one from point blank range does not wholly solve the 
problem as a bullet from a distant gun could have hit the soldier as he deliberately held 
his hand above the parapet of his trench. 
 
Colonel Sir Bruce Seton, Commander of the Kitchener Hospital in Brighton, made a 
detailed study of the first thousand cases to be brought into the hospital, which opened 
in early 1915, in order to determine the extent of hand wounds and their causes.  Seton 
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found that of 280 hand wounds, 162 could have been self-inflicted, 78 to the right hand 
and 84 to the left. Assuming that self-inflicted wounds would be exclusively to the left 
hand, as Indians who were left-handed were raised to use their right hand, Seton 
concluded that the enemy caused 78 of the 84 left hand wounds so at most the remaining 
six were self-inflicted, a rate of 0.6% of all 1000 injuries.76 Although Seton’s sample was 
of a relatively small group, all of whose injuries were severe enough to merit transfer to 
England and obviously does not cover those who were well enough to be treated in 
casualty clearing stations or in hospital in Boulogne, his rate of 0.6% seems improbably 
low. Nevertheless, the 57% rate at the casualty clearing stations quoted above also does 
not bear weight, as Seton also showed that not all hand wounds should be admissible as 
self-inflicted. 
 
Although many of the military records of the British army were destroyed in the Blitz 
during Second World War, two ledgers containing details of self-inflicted wounds seen 
at the 39th Casualty Clearing Station between May 1916 and April 1917 still exist. The 
39th moved three times during this year but was never far from the Somme area. The 
two books contain details of 1050 self-inflicted wounds during the year among British 
soldiers of various ranks.77 Of the first 100 cases between May and October 1916, 42 
are wounds to the leg or foot and 53 are to the arm or hand with a smattering of wounds 
to the face, throat, shoulder and chest and some have more than one wound. It is almost 
impossible to make a meaningful comparison between the 1050 British cases in one year 
and the 1808 Indian cases in the first nine months of the war but it is worth noting that 
the British figure represents patients at just one casualty clearing station, while the Indian 
number represents all the Indian soldiers deployed in France at the time, a far larger 
number.  
 
It was no less of a stigma for a British soldier to fall under suspicion of wounding himself. 
Private George Coppard enlisted in August 1914 at 16 years of age. On 17 October 
1916, he was accidentally shot in the foot by a friend. On arrival at the 39th Casualty 
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Clearing Station, he found the atmosphere hostile, ‘Next morning I discovered that there 
was something queer about the place which filled me with misgivings. None of the 
nursing staff appeared friendly, and the matron looked, and was, a positive battle-axe. I 
made anxious inquiries, and quickly learned that I was classed as a suspected self-inflicted 
wound case. Unknown to me, the letters SIW with a query mark added had been written 
on the label attached to my chest.’78 
 
A method of ‘malingering’ unique to the Indian troops which received more attention in 
the letters from the troops was the use of bhalwar, which was noted by the censor as, 
‘the use of the marking nut causes the body to swell and pimples etc. to appear,’79 The 
nut is a type of cashew and can cause allergic reactions, particularly skin rashes. One 
letter from a correspondent in India, apparently replying to a request for advice, 
suggested its use to cause an inflammation or to pretend to have sciatica, although he 
did not think his correspondent would get away with it.80 Another, an explicit request 
for ‘something which will make the doctors declare me unfit for service’ was deleted by 
the censor.81 As late as September 1915, troops were still writing to request supplies, 
although the censor let no references through.82  
 
It seems most likely that, although a small number of men did wound themselves to 
escape battle, especially soon after they had arrived in France, there was not a serious 
problem of self-inflicted wounds or malingering among the Indian troops. It was also 
difficult, as Seton’s 1915 report showed, to reliably conclude whether or not certain 
wounds were self-inflicted. On 27 December 1915, Sir Walter Lawrence, the 
Commissioner for Indian Sick and Wounded, wrote to Lord Kitchener of Seton’s report 
that, ‘there is no evidence of self-infliction of wounds which could be supported by 
statistical examination. It was an unfortunate thing that persons should have jumped to 
the conclusion that self-infliction of wounds was a common practice, and I know that 
the Sepoys felt this’. 83 It seems that this is another example of, as Lawrence implied, 
Indian soldiers being pre-judged. Through the twentieth century, however, this 
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inaccuracy continued to be perpetuated and, by its very repetition, gained acceptance. 
This was despite the assurances of contemporary commentators such as Lawrence that 
there was nothing to support these assumptions.  
 
SEDITION AND CENSORSHIP 
A major concern for the British authorities before the Indian soldiers arrived in France 
was that they would be influenced by seditious material being sent to them and that this 
would lead to indiscipline or even desertion. On 15 October 1914, the India Office 
obtained a warrant ‘to enable the letters written by the rank and file of Indian native 
regiments, who were lying wounded or sick in hospital in Brighton, to be censored ... It 
was in effect a field censorship and was to prevent leakage of information and the 
spreading of reports in India which would alarm the native population and discourage 
recruiting.’84 The British authorities had good reason to be concerned about seditious 
material reaching the Indian troops in France. The major source of concern at the time 
were the activities of the Ghadr Party which was founded in America and Canada in 
1913 by Har Dayal and Sohan Singh Bhakha initially in reaction to the increasing hostility 
towards Indian immigrants to America and Canada during the early part of the twentieth 
century.  
 
The Ghadr movement’s ultimate aim was to oust the British from India by violence if 
necessary. It published a newspaper called The Ghadr which was read across north 
America and also distributed in India. After the war, a government commission was 
formed to investigate all rebellious activity in India during the war and it noted the 
inception of the newspaper on 1 November 1913. The report briefly summarises the 
tone of the newspaper from the British perspective,  
 
The paper is frankly seditious and it urges preparations for mutiny and the 
freedom of India by expelling the English.  ‘This is the time to prepare yourselves 
for mutiny while this war is raging in Europe. Oh, brave people! Hurry up and 
stop all these taxes by mutinying. Wanted: - Brave soldiers to stir up Ghadr in 
India. Pay - death; prize - martyrdom; pension - liberty; field of battle - India. Get 
up, and open your eyes. Accumulate bags of money for the Ghadr and proceed 
to India. Sacrifice your lives to obtain liberty. ’The issue presses everyone to 
return to India for Ghadr to free the country from British rule. The theme of all 
                                                          
84 Edward Wells, Mailshot: A History of the Forces Postal Service (Chatham, Kent: Defence Postal and 
Courier Services, Royal Engineers, 1987), 187 
128. ‘Those who take up the Pen’ 
 
these issues is the same, namely, to go to India and stir up Ghadr to defeat the 
English and take the government of the country from them.85 
 
Their fears were vividly illustrated by an undated letter from Bande Matarasent during 
this period from Vancouver in Canada to a man of the 15th Sikhs in India, which was 
written ‘in an educated hand’,  
 
I pray to all my brothers, Hindu and Mussalman, to join together & break the 
English lock. There is no withstanding Germany. Germany breaks up all who 
come (against her). Let no army come from India. Soon there will be mutiny in 
India. Let all men join & put an end to the English   Very soon the whole world 
will come under the German sway. India will come next year. On one side you 
have Germany, Austria, Turkey, Chine [sic] & Holland, these five. Germany is a 
giant in strength and religion. On the other side are England France, Russia, Japan, 
Serbia, Belgium, these six. But giant Germany is utterly destroying the whole six. 
She has captured & imprisoned lakhs of their men … hail Germany hail. Tear off 
the veil and listen. Verily my words are true.86 
 
At the outbreak of war, the Party decided to make the most of the opportunity and 
approached the German authorities in both America and Germany for support. The 
Germans were happy to contribute and ‘a special fund amounting to several million 
marks was provided by the Imperial Government and emissaries were sent to India to 
promote sedition.’ 87 By October 1914, many revolutionaries had returned to India, led 
by Sohan Singh Bhakha, to spread the word and try to recruit members for the Party as 
well as plan attacks on the government. In the event, there were a number of attacks 
with varying levels of success and the Indian Government was moved to pass the 
Defence of India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act in the spring of 1915 in order to allow 
them greater intelligence gathering measures. There were several trials of failed 
conspirators during the coming years and the Ghadr Party never achieved its aims and 
its influence quickly waned in the face of repeated failure and legislation. The censors 
reported that the men did not appear to be overly affected by reports of unrest: one 
noted that, ‘number 22 refers to the recent outbreak of lawlessness in the Southern 
Punjab, and shows unmistakeably that in the last resort the sympathies of the ordinary 
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decent man are on the side of law and order. This attitude is undoubtedly the main prop 
on which the British Raj in India rests.’88 
 
Despite these early concerns, there were almost no political expressions or even the 
mildest of seditious material or references in the soldiers’ letters. One of the few such 
references is a passing comment from Ram Jewan Singh, a civilian storekeeper at the 
Kitchener Indian Hospital in Brighton, in a letter to his father as to how he expects 
England to show her gratitude to India after the war: 
 
the public at large are really very sympathetic towards India and the Indian people 
as a whole on account of the war and the services – the invaluable services – 
India is rendering at present. But I do not know what they will do for India after 
the war, at least there is a deep feeling of gratefulness and love for Indian people 
in the hearts of the public and they are thinking to give something substantial to 
the Indian nation in the Imperial Parliament of England.89   
 
Finally, on 31 July 1915, Chief Censor Howell was able to report that he had found and 
withheld seditious material, The Hamdard newspaper,90 about which he said ’if I am not 
mistaken, has recently been attracting the unfavourable notice of government. Their 
tone was rather offensive, and the package containing them was withheld.’91 In mid-
October 1915, Howell reported that ‘it seems clear that if any Pan-Islamic or Anti-British 
propaganda had been making serious headway in India some reflection of it would appear 
in the letters from that country. The information from Hindu sources is not so complete 
and is very much more colourless, but here too very little that is actually bad has so far 
come to light.’92  
 
Howell referred to the collection of letters as holding up a mirror to the views of the 
men and their correspondents,93 but the selection process by which some letters survive 
today also held up a mirror to the concerns of the British authorities. It is interesting 
that one of the primary concerns of the censorship team, unrest and rebellion in India 
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and the receipt of seditious material in general, coincides very little with the actual 
content of the letters. This is despite the efforts of the Ghadr campaigners and others 
to incite rebellion among the men. While some seditious thinking was uncovered, it 
tended to be mild and the men were far more occupied in writing about their present 
situation and the war. The scale of the censorship operation suggests the level of British 
concern and distrust towards its Indian troops among those who knew them least well. 
The circulation list for the weekly reports of the censors included ‘(War Office, India 
Office, Foreign Office), to Buckingham Palace, and to the commanders of the Indian 
divisions,’ among others.94 As with the examples above, their concerns eventually proved 
to be unfounded. 
 
THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE 
A difficulty which was not anticipated by British senior officers but caused significant 
distress among the Indian troops was the practice of sending recovered wounded troops 
back to the front line, ‘as grain that is flung a second time into the oven, and life does 
not come out of it.’95 The problems with finding reserves for the Indian units meant that 
troops whose wounds were not permanently disabling were sent back to the trenches 
against the pre-war policy of retiring them from the army.96 There were more complaints 
about this than any other topic in the soldiers’ letters, although exactly the same 
conditions applied to British troops, albeit that it had always been the case for them. An 
anonymous Punjabi soldier wrote home of a comrade that, ‘he is getting on all right. It 
is difficult for him to return to India, because his wound is getting quite well.’97 
 
Senior British officers agreed with their men. Mason quoted Sir Walter Lawrence who, 
as chief of the Indian hospitals, spoke to many wounded men and was told that they 
found the British decision to be zulm or treacherous.98 Willcocks, while still Commander 
in Chief of the Indian troops, and the Adjutant-General both agreed that the troops 
should not be sent back into battle and by the spring of 1915 they were often sent to 
Marseilles, where Willcocks felt that they did more harm than good, ‘it was folly to mix 
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them up with fresh drafts, who were not cheered on first arrival by meeting a lot of 
bandaged men. The Indian is not built that way.’99 Towards the end of his command he 
set up a working battalion to accommodate them at the front but out of the trenches. 
Many soldiers complained bitterly in their letters home about being sent back to the 
trenches after being wounded, ‘[Only] the man who has lost a leg or an arm returns to 
India,’100 wrote a soldier who was also in hospital in England. Another soldier who had 
reached an English hospital in February 1915 sought to explain why, ‘The Government 
has only a few men. Therefore, they send wounded men a second time to fight.’101  
 
Mir Dast, who won a Victoria Cross, was granted permission to make an application to 
the King during his visit to the Kitchener Hospital in Brighton on 15 August 1915 to 
present him with his decoration. He stated that, ‘when a man has once been wounded, 
it is not well to take him back again to the trenches. For no good work will be done by 
his hand, but he will spoil others’ also.’102 Dast, who was recovering from a gas attack 
and bullet wounds, must have felt extremely strongly to have made such a request in 
such intimidating circumstances. In his case, his bravery was rewarded and he was 
returned to India when he had recovered sufficiently to travel.103  
 
Morton-Jack considered that the main problem for troops returning to the front, apart 
from a sense of injustice, was not that they were particularly reluctant to fight but that 
by the time they had recovered from their wounds and travelled back to France, their 
unit was likely to be unrecognisable because of new recruits and, even more importantly, 
reconstructed not along the original lines and without any men with whom they were 
familiar. Omissi agreed and claimed that the kinship ties that had made the units so 
strong initially were now ‘[impeding] the strategies of the military elite’ because of the 
resistance of troops to rejoining their now so altered units and the time it took them to 
adjust to new officers and comrades when they did return.104 This certainly chimes with 
the opinion of the censor,  
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in fact, it would be not far from the truth to say that instead of being a regiment 
at all it has become an agglomeration of men. Those who are aware how much 
the efficiency of the Indian Army depends upon the regimental spirit must be 
surprised as well as gratified at the cohesion and gallantry which these sorely 
tried units continue to display.105  
 
Of course, this also applied to the British troops as their original units were disbanded 
and reformed but they did at least have the advantage of sharing a common language, 
religion and culture with their new comrades. Although the Indian troops found it unjust 
that they were sent back to the front and the British commanders were well aware of 
this, there was no other option. Casualty rates were extremely high and replacement 
troops so scarce that there was little choice but to send men back. The debate went 
backwards and forwards through the spring and summer of 1915 but was not resolved 
until the men left France and the relative proximity of Mesopotamia meant that wounded 
men could return to India. 
 
Although it cannot be doubted that this did have an effect on the morale of Indian 
soldiers, it is worth noting the censor’s comment that the units were managing to hold 
together despite the many problems faced by returning troops. There is also no evidence 
to suggest that there was an increased rate of disciplinary problems, self-inflicted wounds 
or malingering among the men who had been returned to the front after their wounds 
had healed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed at the start of this chapter, it has been alleged by several historians that the 
Indian Army left France for Mesopotamia because of some of the perceived problems 
discussed in this chapter. In fact, as has been shown above, this was not the case. The 
decision was a purely practical one, based upon a variety of factors: the extreme 
difficulties the Indian Corps faced in obtaining reinforcements; the increase in action on 
other fronts in the Middle East, Gallipoli and Africa; the arrival of both the first Canadian 
troops and Kitchener’s New Army, the first two battalions of which had fought at Loos 
in the late summer of 1915.106  However, of more relevance is the finding that these 
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negative views were not shared among contemporary commentators. Not only was it 
not the case that the Indian Corps left France under a cloud, but these negative views 
were not shared by those who interacted most with the Indian soldiers. In fact, 
Merewether contended that the Indian Corps had ‘saved the Empire.’107 
 
The later contention that Indian troops could not fight without their British officers 
present does not bear scrutiny. The relationship between officers of the Indian Army 
and their men was more intense and reverential than equivalent relationships in the 
British Army and shows a degree of personal contact and even affection not present in 
the British Army. It is also certain that the rate of losses among the British officers of 
the Indian Corps was extremely high compared to the British army and the relatively 
low numbers of British officers available both initially and as reinforcements only 
exacerbated the problem. The replacement officers often did not have the close 
relationship that the original officers had and this clearly had an effect on morale but it 
is not clear that this was a direct cause of poor performance.  
 
The second example given was the common accusation that the Indian soldiers could 
not cope with the climate of northern France, especially during the winter. It is true that 
the winter of 1914-1915 was especially harsh but the Indian Soldiers’ Fund had provided 
equipment which lessened the problem, although much of this did not arrive until later 
in the winter. Also, the soldiers came, in the main, from northern India, where the 
climate is not dissimilar to that of France. There is little evidence that, apart from some 
routine grumbles, the climate affected their performance and certainly not to a greater 
extent than it affected any other troops. The issue appears to derive from a mistaken 
belief that all India is equally hot, which is not the case, especially in regard to the north 
where the majority of the men came from. The third example, the issue of discipline can 
be traced in part through examining rates of courts martial and the levels of self-inflicted 
wounds and malingering among the troops, which reflect discontent. Courts martial 
rates were low among the Indian troops by comparison to the British Army and do not 
appear to reflect any major discontent or imply any serious loss of effectiveness. There 
were instances of self-inflicted wounds and malingering but it is difficult to make accurate 
comparisons of their rate against that of British troops, although they are not 
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dramatically higher. Certainly, although occurrences of self-inflicted wounds peaked 
twice and the reasons for this are not completely clear, this does not appear to have 
been an ongoing problem and was of far less concern to contemporary military leaders 
than to later historians. 
 
However, to contemporaries in the British Army, perhaps the most dangerous of all the 
perceived tactical risks to the British eye was that the troops would become infected by 
the seditious material sent to them in the trenches. A mutiny or outbreak of indiscipline 
would have had serious consequences for an army already under pressure. The Indian 
Army had never fought on European soil before or against a white European enemy and 
the British were cautious as to how they would react. In the light of the self-rule 
movement gaining momentum and the Ghadr party’s intention of exploiting the war to 
forward its aims, the concerns were genuinely felt. However, the movement never really 
gained ground in India and the troops in France showed only the most cursory interest 
in the Indian political situation as was recognised by the censors of the time. This 
recognition is critical as the censors perhaps had the most intimate knowledge of the 
thoughts and feelings of the Indian soldiers and certainly more insight than those in 
London who had expressed concerns about the Indian soldiers’ loyalty. 
 
The decision to send wounded troops who had recovered back to the Front was the 
single most significant issue for the troops. This had not been pre-war practice and many 
felt extremely resentful, especially as the units they returned to were unrecognisable. 
This caused a great deal of discontent among the troops who were returned and also 
fear among those not yet wounded that they would suffer the same fate. Whether this 
disaffection was significant enough to reflect in their combat performance remains moot 
but there is no direct evidence to support this. The most curious aspect of this issue is 
that the British did not anticipate it. Even if they had, it seems unlikely that, given the 
practical problems, wounded troops would have been returned home despite the 
misgivings of several of their senior officers. Whether or not the problem would have 
worsened over time cannot be known as the practice was stopped when the men moved 
to the Middle East. 
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As this chapter has shown, the assumption of Indian military failings by senior British 
officers proved unfounded and the ‘natural inferiority’ propounded by the Social 
Darwinist perspective was shown to be illusory, even to the extent that, in the years 
after the war, Indian soldiers were granted commissions and thus were permitted to 
command British junior ranks.  
 
Despite this, the myth of the ineffectiveness of the Indian Corps was perpetuated though 
the twentieth century. As was shown at the start of the chapter, there has been a 
constant stream of criticism by historians and commentators which, under analysis, is 
not borne out. Morton-Jack wrote in the introduction to his 2014 book that he felt that 
it was time for a revival of acclaim for the Indian Corps and this comment reflects the 
negative nature of historical writing about them during the hundred years since the end 
of the war which has become part of the narrative of the Indian Corps’ service in 
Europe.108 His defence of the Indian Corps was from a purely military perspective and 
attempted to rebut this. It remains notable, however, that this perspective has persisted, 
despite the almost universal praise for the Indian Corps from influential senior officers 
of the time such as Willcocks and Merewether and the endorsement of senior royal and 
military figures. Contemporaries who knew the Indian Corps and its men intimately, 
such as Willcocks and Merewether, despite being bound in the imperial hierarchy, were 
overwhelmingly positive about the Indian soldiers, as illustrated in the introduction Lord 
Curzon, former Viceroy of India, wrote for Merewether’s 1918 memoir:  
 
They came to a country where the climate, the language, the people, the customs, 
were entirely different from any of which they had knowledge … confronted by 
the most powerful and pitiless military machine that the world has ever seen. 
They were consoled by none of the amenities or alleviations, or even the 
associations, of home. They were not fighting for their own country or people. 
They were not even engaged in a quarrel of their own making.  They were 
plunged in surroundings which must have been intensely depressing to the spirit 
of man.  Almost from the start, they suffered shattering losses.109 
 
 
                                                          
108 Morton-Jack, The Indian Army, 2014, 27 
109 Merewether, The Indian Corps In France, xi 
136. The Immediate Post-War Period: British Society and Indian Soldiers 
 
Chapter Five – The Immediate Post-War Period: British Society and Indian 
Soldiers 
 
This chapter will analyse the impact in Britain of the Indian soldiers’ service in France in 
the years after the First World War. Three sections will examine the public, political 
and military reactions. It will be shown that while there were clear positive changes in 
how each group viewed and reacted although the changes found were highly complex 
and in many ways contradictory. It will show that the British political aim was to preserve 
the status across the world of its empire, even if this was at the cost of, for example, 
India, which saw wartime political restrictions extended after the war. The public 
appeared to embrace the Indian soldiers, either those with whom they had encounters, 
such as in Brighton or by large attendances at the Peace Day parade for Indian soldiers. 
However there remained an undercurrent of racism and Indians in Britain faced 
legislation which denied many their right in live in Britain and of those who retained that 
right, local prejudice such as difficulty findings landlords who would let them property. 
The military experience is perhaps the most straightforward: the war had exposed the 
difficulty of replacing British officers list in combat and the army implemented the 
obvious solution of permitting Indians to obtain commissions. Although this was a clear 
step forward in terms of the view of Indian soldiers of the Indian Army, full 
implementation was delayed until the Second World War once again forced the point. 
 
THE BRITISH CIVILIAN POPULATION 
This section will examine the public attitude to Indian people in the years after the war. 
Reactions were deeply contrasting: even as the Peace Day parade for Indian soldiers in 
1919 was attended by huge crowds and widely reported in the press in glowing terms, 
race riots were taking place in port cities elsewhere in the country. When military action 
in India killed hundreds of people, the British public and their MPs were outraged, yet 
Indian people resident in Britain struggled to find landlords prepared to rent property 
to them. 
 
Race Riots In 1919 
Despite the apparent support for India after the war, in many ways the Indian experience 
in Britain remained that of ‘aliens’. During 1919, as demobilised men returned to Britain 
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from the war and jobs were scarce, there was resentment towards the small number of 
foreign sailors who had taken work in Britain’s docks during the war. In the years before 
the war, tensions had developed as they undercut the wages and food allowances paid 
to English sailors and thus easily gained employment. During the war, many ‘deserted’ 
their ships to earn higher wages in British factories as the men went to war. It was not 
until the British troops returned from the war to reclaim their jobs that this became a 
problem and the Board of Trade lost no time in setting up a repatriation scheme in 
February 1919. The scheme was designed to prosecute employers who had hired Lascars 
who had seaman’s contracts elsewhere and to prevent the men claiming unemployment 
benefits when they lost their factory jobs.1  
 
The combination of ‘alien’ labour taking British jobs and housing resulted in a series of 
race riots in the major seaports in the first half of 1919, until the repatriation plan 
lowered the numbers and the issue calmed. The Times reported that in London ‘a large 
body of police were employed until a late hour quelling disturbances’ outside the 
Strangers’ Home for Asiatic Seamen and that the residents had to be escorted indoors 
and the door to the home barred.2 Just over a month later, an incident which took place 
during the riot came to trial and was reported in The Times. The defendant was a black 
sailor who was accused of shooting a white sailor while ‘flourishing’ a revolver. The 
police officer attending said that the crowd would have killed the defendant if he had not 
run into the lodging-house and that the riot carried on for the rest of the week after the 
incident occurred on Tuesday 27 May. The defendant, who was on 28 days’ leave from 
the Navy and who had no gun and had himself been attacked by the crowd, was 
acquitted. The prosecutor said that the men who lived in the lodging-house were sailors 
who had been demobilised and stated, ‘whether they undersold the white sailors or not 
he (counsel) did not know but whatever the cause the ill-feeling was very great. If there 
was one thing more than another that white seamen resented it was black sailors 
associating with white women.’ This view was confirmed by a police inspector who gave 
evidence that, ‘the trouble started through black men speaking to white girls. The whites 
wanted to clear the blacks out of Limehouse. The police had received numerous 
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complaints.’3 It is notable that the economic explanation, that black sailors were taking 
British jobs, quickly gave way in the face of the simple racist objection to black men 
speaking to white women, which was apparently the root issue. This echoes the 
provisions made for the ‘protection’ of white women in Brighton during the time the 
Indian soldiers were in hospital there and derived from the perceived necessity of 
maintaining white women’s status in the imperial hierarchy. 
 
The episode illustrates the undercurrent of racism in Britain during the years after the 
First World War. In the particular case of Indians, this was intimately linked to the British 
view of its inherent superiority as rulers of India. Jaqueline Jenkinson contended that the 
British colonial process, with its inbuilt set of prejudices, influenced British feelings 
against the Indian minorities it encountered.4 A similar point is made by May and Cohen 
in their discussion of the Liverpool Race Riots. They argued that the racial theories about 
colonial subjects that were used to justify the rule of the empire were fed back to the 
British population as broad stereotypes which reinforced Anglo-Saxon superiority.5 
Although Indians in Britain were struggling to find work and support themselves, and 
despite the widespread reporting of the Indian military achievements during the war and 
the increased opportunities for personal contact between Britons and Indians during the 
war years, when times were hard for the British a racist and aggressive tendency 
emerged. Jenkinson asserted that this was reinforced by the behaviour of the authorities: 
during the war by the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914, which focussed on the repatriation 
of enemy aliens and thus marked them out as different and undesirable, followed by the 
policy of internment as the war went on and secondly by ‘rewarding’ the rioters by 
repatriation schemes such as those above.6 However, none of this should imply that the 
riots were accepted without challenge. The press in Liverpool were sharply critical of 
the riots. In June 1919 the Liverpool Daily Post called for the ‘generous treatment of the 
black races’ and the Bishop of Liverpool exhorted the city to ‘deal fairly and humanely 
with our fellow subjects.’7 Eventually the Lascars drifted back to employment at sea 
prompted by the repatriation measures but it nevertheless illustrated a racism towards 
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the Indian population on an individual level at odds with the local and national celebration 
of the military contribution during the war. It is also notable that this happened at the 
same time as Indian soldiers were being feted at the Peace Day Parade in London. 
 
Indians In Post War Britain 
In the years after the war the Indian population in Britain developed gradually. In addition 
to the existing population a group of Punjabi pedlars grew up outside the big cities largely 
consisting of demobbed soldiers who chose to stay, according to Shompa Lahiri, 
although this is disputable. They were soon joined by Sikh immigrant pedlars.8 The 
relatively inexpensive cost of setting up as a pedlar and the ease with which licences 
were issued made it an attractive and lucrative business.9 However, during the decade 
after the war, the Indian population became much more middle class, numbering in 1932 
‘students, doctors, merchants, civil servants and aristocrats.’10 Perhaps because, as 
professionals and thus working principally among British people, they tended more 
quickly towards becoming ‘integrated and Anglicised.’11 Many, too, experienced a great 
deal of support and friendship from their British neighbours and Rozina Visram contends 
that ‘the many examples of mixed marriages provide another indication of the absence 
of prejudice.’ This is not to suggest that this acceptance was universal, and many 
experienced difficulty, particularly in renting accommodation, and both Visram and Lahiri 
give a number of examples of this.12 On balance, however, the Indian population in Britain 
thrived in the years after the war, although the demographic groups represented as the 
years went by were far removed from the soldiers of the Indian Corps and the Punjabi 
pedlars who followed them.  
 
The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre13 
The British public’s apparent newfound respect for India was put to the test by the news 
of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in 1919 when many took the part of the Indian victims. 
The Government of India Act received Royal Assent in December 1919 and provided 
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for extended influence of Indian people in government and established dual control of 
large areas of the country. However, its positive measures were set against the Rowlatt 
Act of March 1919, which extended the government’s power of control of those 
suspected of committing acts of sedition originally set out in the wartime Defence of 
India Act. A month after the Rowlatt Act came into force, Mahatma Gandhi organised a 
hartal, or day of purification, in support of the self-rule movement and which the British 
interpreted as a general strike, according to Niall Ferguson.14 Violence developed over 
a number of days, culminating in General Dyer’s decision to open fire on protestors on 
13 April, killing 379 people. The Times reported on the emerging problems, stating that 
three British bank managers had been attacked and burnt to death in Jallianwala Bagh 
and other disturbances had occurred in Bombay and Lahore and described the hartal as 
‘a widespread day of humiliation [arranged] as a protest against the passing of the 
Rowlatt Act.’15 Note the absence of references to Indian deaths. 
 
The continuing historiography of the massacre is complex and divided and swings 
between assertions that the massacre was an inevitable consequence of British abuse of 
power, an opinion still propounded in India,16 or that it was an aberration by a single 
individual.17 This confusion reflects British public opinion of the time. The official enquiry, 
the Hunter Commission, which reported in March 1920, was divided into two parts to 
reflect the opinions of the British and Indian members of the committee. While both 
halves of the report are critical of General Dyer’s actions, that written by the Indian 
members is considerably more so, in the opinion of Derek Sayer.18 There was a long 
delay in substantial information reaching the British public via early reports from Lord 
Hunter’s investigative committee, which added to public dismay. It was not until 
December 1919 that The Times, noting the delay in detailed information reaching Britain, 
reported that, ‘it was vaguely known that very severe measures were taken at Jallianwalla 
Bagh … that troops dispersed the rioters with very heavy casualties. It was certainly not 
known that an unarmed gathering which had met, in defiance of a military proclamation, 
in an enclosed space at Jallianwalla Bagh, had been fired upon without any immediate 
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warning, and that 400 had been killed.’19 Prime Minister Lloyd George made a furious 
speech to the House of Commons on 22 December 1919 in which he gave a graphic 
description of the events at Jallianwalla Bagh, taken from evidence given by General Dyer, 
and said, ‘This is what is done in 1919 in British India … Think what this means. There 
has never been anything like this before in English history, and not in the whole of our 
relations with India has there been anything of this magnitude before.’20 In 1920, at the 
recommendation of the Hunter Commission, General Dyer was relieved of his 
command and the CBE which he was due to be awarded was cancelled.   
 
Newspaper reports of the Commons debate reveal the extent of political and public 
disquiet. The Globe commented, ‘how profoundly public opinion has been stirred by the 
extraordinary evidence … is shown by the bombardment of questions to which Mr 
Montague was subjected.’21 In a letter to The Times, a Mr Beechey, who claimed to have 
been present at the scene, declared the events to be ‘disgraceful’ and questioned the 
account of Sir Michael O’Dwyer, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and referred to 
the people of the Punjab as being in a ‘state of tranquillity’ which belied the need to 
prevent them from gathering in protest, let alone shoot civilians.22 
 
However, there was also widespread support for General Dyer. A benefit fund was set 
up for him by the Morning Post which raised some £26,000.23 This included £10 from 
Rudyard Kipling, given to acknowledge that Dyer ‘did his duty as, he saw it.’24 The Daily 
Mail interviewed General Dyer as soon as he reached Southampton and reported Dyer 
to have described the incident as ‘my horrible, dirty duty’ but, ‘I have yet to find an 
Englishman who knows India who condemns me for my action.’25 Indeed, a letter to the 
Times claimed that General Dyer saved the lives of the British in India, who were ‘at the 
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mercy of the seething millions of the Punjab, of the murderers of bank managers, of the 
would be murderers of Miss Sherwood.’26 
 
That the massacre was debated at length in both the House of Commons and House of 
Lords, reflected the disquiet in the country about the massacre. The significance, it 
seems, is that there was a debate at all. In earlier years, the fact that a rebellion was 
violently put down by British troops would not have been subject to question in the 
manner in which this was. It seemed that the memory of the recent cohesion of the 
empire set against an act of extreme violence did not sit well with a British people already 
moving in the direction of ‘progressive humanitarian imperialism’.27 This reflects what 
Brad Beaven described as ‘a distaste for jingoism in the post war aftermath’ inasmuch as 
the public appeared to consider Indian people in a more generous light, despite the 
difficulties they still faced in Britain.28 
 
Such was the contradictory and rather confused picture in the period following the First 
World War. The public was broadly supportive in the abstract, such as attending parades 
and bemoaning the treatment of Indian people at the hands of the army but in daily life, 
the picture became one of prejudice when Indian people sought work and 
accommodation in Britain. 
 
THE POLITICAL STAGE  
This will examine how the British Empire Exhibition and the Empire Marketing Board 
were used as propaganda vehicles to promote the new vision of empire as a trading 
collective and contrast this against less positive measures such as the manner in which 
the Imperial War Graves Commission chose to commemorate Indian soldiers in very 
different ways in Europe and further afield. There will be a brief discussion about how 
the war service of other Colonial countries and the Dominions brought about change in 
their nations, while their treatment by the British government barely changed at all. As 
with the reactions of the public in the years following the war, the government position 
can appear to be contradictory, although its actions prioritised the status of the British 
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empire as a source of power and influence both at home and abroad, a position that was 
consistently maintained. 
 
The British Empire Exhibition and The Empire Marketing Board 
In Chapter Two, representations of Indian people as exotic and, by extension, alien in 
the major exhibitions and festivals of the pre-war years was discussed. However, the 
first great national exhibition after the war presented a very different picture of India. 
The British Empire Exhibition of 1924-25 was a considerably less colourful spectacle than 
the earlier extravaganzas, although the sheer number of visitors, some 24 million, 
illustrates the British public’s continued interest in imperial matters. Its focus, rather 
than a straightforward display of imperial power, was to emphasise the empire as a 
commonwealth of trading partnerships, with India presented as a swiftly modernising 
trading partner. It required much behind the scenes negotiation in India to secure the 
participation of all the provinces in the face of opposition from nationalist protestors. 
However, the Indian Pavilion proved highly successful, featuring ‘illustrations of carpet 
making, of the tea, cotton, timber and other leading industries … and much else that 
shows the enormous growth in the industrial and commercial importance of the Indian 
Empire.’29 A newspaper advertisement stated that ‘to catalogue the contents of the 
Indian Pavilion would be as difficult as to estimate the importance of India to the 
Empire.’30 According to The Times, the lesson of the Exhibition was one ‘of development 
… the seed is in the hearts of all, as the deeds of all in the Great War showed.’31 Note 
the reference here to India’s war service and the inclusive tone of the statement. The 
exhibition continued in 1925 but, as its Indian administrator refused to participate 
without subsidy from Britain, it did not include India.32 By comparison with the Franco-
British Exhibition of 1908 or the Festival of Empire in 1911, India in 1924 was 
represented by its economic contribution rather than in terms of stereotypical nautch 
girls and performing elephants and had sufficient confidence not to feature at all in its 
second season. 
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Nevertheless, the Exhibition fulfilled a propaganda role for the government in promoting 
the empire in Britain and abroad, albeit in a rather different light than in previous years, 
and was described by Bernard Porter as ‘the imperialists’ greatest propaganda coup.’33 
Indeed, it seems likely to have had an effect on public awareness of empire in general, if 
not India specifically, as half the population saw the exhibition.34 This propaganda effort 
was part of a larger endeavour by the British government to reposition the empire as a 
trading partner rather than a subjugated colony, which of course it remained. Various 
groups had been set up to this end during and after the war and eventually, in 1926, the 
Empire Marketing Board was formed to promote trading links.35 It is difficult to imagine 
such an organisation being created before the war, designed as it was to present the 
public with an inclusive message, via lectures, pamphlets and educational materials for 
schools, under slogans such as ‘Keep Trade in the Family.’36 It was not the empire itself 
that was being promoted as it remained a dominant presence in Britain in the forms of 
goods, media and the other ‘shards’ which made up its representation in John 
Mackenzie’s view, it was the notion of the empire as a family member and trading partner 
that the public was required to grasp. By extension, this also implies a degree of parity 
not previously seen. This, said Stephen Constantine, was the ideological message which 
was being implanted in the minds of the British people.37 
 
The very language used to describe the empire changed in the years after the First World 
War. Less obvious was Government representation of empire as exotic, alien or in need 
of assistance from the mother country. Instead developed what Bernard Porter referred 
to as depictions of empire as ‘community, co-operation, tolerance, freedom and even 
love.’38 John Mackenzie was less ebullient, acknowledging the changed attitudes in terms 
of  the necessity for Britain to stress the economic importance of the empire and the 
‘international trust involved in [the] relationship … to give the enterprise international 
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respectability’ in the face of the new status accorded to Indian and the Dominion nations 
by their membership of the League of Nations and presence on the international stage.39 
This is clearly demonstrated in the positioning of India in the Empire Exhibition as a 
trading partner and slogans referring to keeping trace in the Family. Barbara Bush 
considered that a central aim of this new attitude to the empire and India was to maintain 
the strength of the empire in the unstable years after the war when ‘the empire ‘family’ 
had stood together … fostering ‘empire intimacy’ a new domestic motif of empire.’40  
 
Despite all the positive propaganda and new relationship that the British government 
promoted with its empire, the legal framework under which Indian people lived in Britain 
in the post war years was a difficult one. The repatriation schemes of 1919 referred to 
above were specifically designed to deal with a particular group of people, foreign born 
seamen who had found work in Britain during the war. These men, often Lascars from 
India, were not required to carry passports, as citizens of the empire, whereas other 
foreign seamen were able to use evidence of their employment as identification so 
tended not to obtain passports either. For these reasons neither group were 
immediately affected by the 1919 Aliens Registration Act which was an extension of the 
wartime Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 or the extension to the Act, the Aliens Order 
of 1920, which further required all aliens to register with the police. Rozina Visram 
described the difficulty of obtaining a passport which was a process that involved 
obtaining a birth certificate and other information from India and took 11 months to 
organise.41 However, the exemptions for Lascars and other seamen meant that, while 
numbers decreased from the wartime peak, there still remained pressure on the labour 
market and in 1925 the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order, produced 
in part at the request of the National Sailor and Fireman's Union among others, 
demanded that all but white sailors should produce passports. As the difficulty in 
obtaining passports for Indian people, particularly sailors, had been well known since the 
introduction of the 1919 Act, this can only be seen as a deliberately hostile move 
towards sailors of the empire. Visram stated that ‘thousands of seamen born in India, 
Malaya, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East were reclassified as aliens, their British 
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nationality and their rights of domicile snatched away.’42 It is also worth noting that the 
process would have been considerably simpler for middle class Indians seeking to live in 
Britain, such as the doctors and merchants referred to above, to obtain a passport, if 
only because they were already resident in India and more easily able to obtain the 
correct documentation.  
 
The Domestic Political Stage 
As with the Dominion countries, internationally, India was starting to gain recognition 
after the war as reflected in its participation in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and 
subsequent membership of the League of Nations. Despite the reluctance of the USA, 
which felt it would have its influence diminished by a large number of Indian and 
Dominion delegates, India attended as part of a British delegation of 75.43 The departure 
of the Indian delegation in Paris was reported in the Daily Mail with the same emphasis 
on exoticism as before the war, describing ‘their fine olive faces and lustrous black eyes, 
and a young man whose noble features were framed in a light brown turban, had a great 
success. “They say he is the son of a king,” said a working woman with respect.’44  
 
However, in addition to the continued representations of Indians as exotic, they were 
now also portrayed as people of influence and the Daily Mirror showed a picture of Sir 
Satyendra Sinha and the Maharaja Bikaner in a montage of pictures of influential delegates 
leaving for Paris under the headline ‘British Peacemakers’ Departure for Paris.’45 Sir 
Satyendra Sinha attended the Conference in his capacity as newly appointed 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India, a position he had attained alongside 
his baronetcy as Baron Sinha of Raipur. The appointment reflected Sinha’s contribution 
as a member of the war cabinet and provided him with the necessary status to influence 
events not only at the Peace Conference but also in bringing the Government of India 
Act to the House of Lords in 1919.46 His appointment to the House of Lords was 
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announced in the Daily Mirror as being among the ‘more interesting appointments’47 
which was presumably a reference to his being the first Indian peer in the House of 
Lords. The Times History also highlighted the appointment, stating, ‘His appointment at 
this stage was a peculiarly significant step. It was clearly intended to be an earnest [sic] 
of the determination of the Imperial Government to build a permanent structure of 
Indian Constitutional Reform upon the proposals of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.’48 
Sinha made his maiden speech in March 1919 and was given a warm welcome by his 
peers. He was introduced by Lord Islington who described his years of work of ‘the 
highest distinction’ and, with reference to the complexity of the Indian political 
establishment, asked for the ‘support of your Lordships during the time he is in office.’49  
 
Sir James Guthrie, Statesmen of World War One, National Portrait Gallery, NPG2463 
 
To commemorate the war, the National Portrait Gallery commissioned a series of 
paintings. One of these was a group portrait of the ‘Statesmen of World War One’, 
shown above.50 Alongside the Prime Minister and senior military figures is the Maharaja 
of Bikaner, representing India, as well as other leaders from the empire and Dominions. 
Although the Maharaja is to the far left of the portrait, the fact that a representative of 
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India was chosen as a ‘statesman’ at all is a significant development and reflects the legacy 
of India’s participation in the war.  
 
The Imperial War Graves Commission 
Although the government and military permitted Indians to become officers in the Indian 
Army, in part in recognition of its service during the First World War, this inclusive 
spirit was not universal. An example of this is in the complexities of the built memorials 
to the Indian soldiers across the world. Although these memorials were superficially 
similar to those for British troops, a critical difference lay in how individual men were 
commemorated. Commemoration of the First World War is a complex subject in its 
own right and the focus here will be on how the British imperial commitments 
overshadowed the memorialisation of the Indian troops. From London to Delhi the trail 
of built memorials demonstrated not just the sacrifice of the men but the power of the 
British empire which brought them to the fighting fronts in its defence. Michèle Barrett 
argued that the need to project imperial power overrode in some instances the impetus 
to mark the fallen and on the memorials in Mesopotamia the names of the Indian men 
who died are not listed while those of white officers were recorded despite to the 
founding principle of the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC), now the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission.51 Jenny Macleod noted that there was no 
single English national war memorial; whereas the Scottish, Welsh and Irish all built their 
own memorials, London’s memorials are Imperial efforts.52 Macleod was clear that the 
memorials served as much to project British authority across the empire as to 
commemorate its dead. The story of the various Indian war memorials sheds some light 
on how the British chose to project that message.  
 
The memorials were almost completely inaccessible to the families of the men of the 
Indian Corps except for a relatively small number of wealthy individuals, often Muslims 
on hajj, who did make the journey. There would have been no possibility of a Cook’s 
Tour after the war to view the places their family member fought and where he was 
buried or commemorated, such as became popular with British families in the years after 
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the war. For many from the North West Frontier Province even the official memorial 
in India, the India Gate in Delhi, would have been almost as inaccessible as the European 
memorials. Indian relatives of the dead would have no grave to visit but also no public 
monument to their dead son or brother in the way that the small local memorials which 
sprung up across Britain served the bereaved British.  
 
In Belgium, at Ypres, the Indian soldiers are commemorated at the Menin Gate, which 
was built in 1927 and lists the names of all the men who have no known grave who 
fought in and around Ypres. In France, the Indian soldiers are commemorated at the 
Neuve Chapelle Memorial, which was built in 1927 and gives the names of 4843 men 
who fell in battle in the area. The Basra Memorial, built in 1929, commemorates the 
forty thousand soldiers who died without graves in Mesopotamia, now Iraq. 206 Indians 
are also buried in Germany at Zehrensdorf Indian Cemetery, close by the Zossen 
Prisoner of War camp in which they were held. During the Cold War, the cemetery 
was not maintained and their names were added to a panel at the Neuve Chapelle 
Memorial in 1967. Although the Indian soldiers played a relatively small part in the war, 
the memorials were often unveiled by royalty and people of high standing, such as the 
Governor-General in Delhi in 1931, the Prince of Wales at the Chattri in Brighton in 
1921 and the Maharajah of Patiala at the India Gate in Brighton the same year. These 
unveilings were always substantial events and extensively reported which created a 
public impression of the value of the memorials and the men they commemorated. The 
Times focussed in its report on the unveiling of the Neuve Chapelle memorial on the 
military success of the Indian soldiers, describing those at the ceremony as ‘ablaze with 
medals.’53 This is an example of the continuation of the earlier propaganda about the 
Indian soldiers as heroic and loyal which also served to emphasise the power and reach 
of the British empire. 
 
The graves and memorials were managed by the IWCG, which was established in 1917 
with the support of the Prince of Wales.  The IWGC chose at an early stage to adopt 
the most egalitarian possible approach to commemorating the fallen; gravestones were 
of a standard size and of a shape which was non-religious and officers and men were 
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accorded identical gravestones. Its founding principles included the provision that ‘there 
should be no distinction made on account of military or civil rank, race or creed’54 The 
IWGC’s charter of Incorporation of May 1917 includes the Principal Secretary of State 
for India as a founding member of the board and explicitly stated that ‘the word 
“cemetery” may or shall include a Hindu or other non-Christian cremation ground.’55 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Frederick Kenyon was appointed as advisor and was explicit as 
to the importance of commemorating the Indian soldiers: 
 
The religious requirements of the different castes and creeds must be 
scrupulously respected … the Commission will no doubt desire that no less 
honour should be paid to the last resting place of Indian and other non-Christian 
members of the Empire than to those of our British soldiers.56 
 
Kenyon set up a sub-committee to deal specifically with the Indian dead which met for 
the first time on 20 March 1918 and consisted of Lord Islington, Under Secretary of 
State for India, W.P. Schreiner, High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, 
Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan to represent Muslim interests and Sir Prakhashankar D. 
Pantani to represent Hindus.57 The meeting made four recommendations: that existing 
Muslim graves should, where possible, be left undisturbed, that any Hindus who had 
been buried should be exhumed and cremated, that a separate Muslim cemetery should 
be constructed and that at the respective cemeteries a mosque or temple should be 
built.58 Designs for both a temple and a mosque were later taken to India for approval59 
but these plans were later watered down, partly because Sikhs and Gurkhas were by 
then also requesting separate memorials which would have proved prohibitively costly, 
so a memorial to all the Indian dead in France was decided upon. 60  
 
The various IWGC memorials differ in one important respect. The Menin Gate and 
Neuve Chapelle memorials both listed the names of the fallen but the Basra Memorial, 
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which was also under the auspices of the IWGC, did not list names but recorded them 
on a register in the UK. Michèle Barrett noted that this was a clear policy decision on 
the part of the then IWGC, and quoted the Principal Assistant Secretary’s 1924 
statement: 
 
bearing in mind that the memorials themselves will in all probability not be seen 
by any of the relatives of the rank and file, the memorials in question outside 
Europe will contain only the names of the regiments concerned ... in Europe, 
where the memorials will be seen by many visitors, and where the numbers of 
Indian names are not so great, the British and Indian officers and the Indian rank 
and file will be commemorated by name.61   
 
The distinction seems to be based on the assumption that Indian relatives were not likely 
to be able to visit a memorial in Basra. Barrett further noted a phrase from the briefing 
notes for the unveiling of the Basra Memorial by Sir Gilbert Clayton, the British High 
Commissioner to Iraq, that ‘the white officers and men are recorded by name on the 
memorial, but the names of the Indian soldiers did not appear on it.’62 Here, in a slightly 
less formal document, not intended for publication, was an explicit distinction between 
white and Indian soldiers, laid out both in writing and implicitly on the memorial itself: 
white names were recorded but Indian ones were not. Apart from the obvious 
explanation of a clear racist separation of the men, another factor was at play in 
Mesopotamia. Here the Indian troops vastly outnumbered the British. Barrett recorded 
that 33,887 Indian officers and men are mentioned by name at Basra and a total of 8,000 
British officers and men are listed by name.63 The memorial to the Indian soldiers at 
Neuve Chapelle in France, by contrast, listed all 4843 names of the Indian dead. The 
main inscription, in English and French, but no Indian language, read ‘To the honour of 
the Army of India which fought in France and Belgium, 1914-1918, and in perpetual 
remembrance of those of their dead whose names are here recorded and who have no 
known grave.’  
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The comparison of these two memorials demonstrates that the IWGC treated the 
commemoration of the Indian soldiers differently inside and outside of Europe. Given 
that the Indian government paid for all the building work so cost was not an issue for 
the British, the contrast between the Basra and Neuve Chapelle memorials remains open 
to interpretation. Barrett asserted of the IWGC’s actions that ‘subaltern colonial troops 
were not commemorated equally, but the history of these decisions has not been fully 
acknowledged. In this way, a further silencing of the subaltern takes place: not only are 
these lives not commemorated, the acts of exclusion are themselves erased.’64  
 
It is fair to assume that the IWGC intended to treat all the fallen equally, so it is worth 
asking why it could be that those in Basra were not acknowledged as were those in 
Europe. One explanation could be that on the Belgian and French memorials, the Indian 
names are lost in a sea of European names but in Mesopotamia the reverse would have 
applied. The impression sought by the inclusion of Indian names on the Western Front 
of Britain as a powerful imperial nation would have appeared in Mesopotamia as a small 
number of British names among many thousands of Indian names. While that was 
certainly the true picture, it would not have given the impression of power sought by 
the British administration in the newly formed Iraq and the wider region. It seems likely 
that the IWGC must have had an eye to the British and international audience, of whom 
many thousands did visit the far more accessible memorials on the Western Front. By 
creating memorials to Indian as well as other empire troops, Britain could send a clear 
message that it did not fight alone but was part of a vast empire which extended far 
beyond Europe. 
 
Empire and Dominion Troops During and After the First World War 
Although in 1914 the British empire was the largest and mightiest in the world and could 
thus produce the most men and resources for the war effort, the French and Germans 
also had colonial holdings which needed to be factored into military planning. At the 
start of World War One, the French empire was as far reaching, if not as large, as that 
of the British and spread from South America to Antarctica.65 The German empire, 
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outside Europe, consisted of German East Africa, German West Africa, German South-
West Africa, Samoa and a number of Pacific Islands.66 The German African colonies 
provided no men for the European war and their forces did not leave Africa during the 
war. Although covering enormous amounts of land, these colonies were economically 
and strategically of little importance to Germany and thus were only lightly defended.67 
The German military kept the smallest possible military force, known as the 
Schutztruppen, of just 6,500 men, which was never integrated into the main German 
army.68  When the war broke out in Europe, the orders from Germany were to take no 
aggressive action in West Africa and to merely defend the colonies against any incursions 
by the allies.  
 
The French system was very different from that of the Germans because the French 
African colonies were less stable and the French had expansionist aims in Africa right up 
to the start of the war. In 1857 (coincidentally the year of the Indian Mutiny, after which 
the British recognised the need for an organised army), the Governor-General of French 
West Africa, Louis Faidherbe, founded the Tirailleurs69 to protect and expand the West 
African holdings.70 By 1914, there were 14,000 Tirailleurs, mostly serving in French West 
Africa, and a further 15,000 in Morocco. In the autumn of 1914, six battalions 
(approximately 6,000 men and officers) of Tirailleurs left for France, while the remainder, 
with other French African colonial units, were left to continue fighting in Morocco. 
France’s keenest concern was its defence against Germany, not its colonies, so the 
Tirailleurs remained in the thick of the fighting until the end of the war, usually in mixed 
units of African and white soldiers. By 1918 215,000 French colonial troops had served 
in France and the Dardanelles, including Tirailleurs as well as the Spahis and the Zoaves of 
French North Africa.  
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The Dominion countries were necessarily at war from the moment of the British 
declaration and former Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier declared that ‘It is our 
duty to let Great Britain know and to let the friends and foes of Great Britain know that 
there is in Canada but one mind and one heart and that all Canadians are behind the 
Mother Country.’71 The battle which is forever linked with the Canadians is the fight for 
Vimy Ridge on 9-12 April 1917 in which 3,598 men died and a further 7,000 were injured 
to take the Ridge.72 The Commander of the 6th Canadian Brigade, Brigadier-General A. 
E. Ross said of the battle ‘In those few moments I witnessed the birth of a nation.’  
 
Many Australians regarded themselves as ‘Australasian Britons’ and were content with 
their junior partnership in the empire.73 The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps 
(ANZAC), spent the winter of 1914 in Egypt training and preparing for their assault at 
Gallipoli in April of 1915. The Australians in particular ended the war with little respect 
for the British high command, and to a lesser extent, the British private. After numerous 
failures from Gallipoli onwards, they saw the British as hidebound by rules and 
regulations, to the detriment of their fighting ability. ‘Searching for explanations, they fell 
back on the archetype of the Australian bushman’ wrote Peter Stanley, who credited 
Australian writer Charles Bean as the man who propagated this view and did much to 
promote Australia’s own identity in the years following the war: 
 
He idealised the virtues of the bushman. On Gallipoli he virtually created what 
has become known as the 'Anzac legend', the celebration of the archetypal 
virtues of the Australian soldier... Anzacs were almost defined by their 
differences with Britain. Many qualities - independence, casual proficiency, and a 
disregard of rank for its own sake - specifically contrasted with the qualities of 
the British regular.74  
 
The troops of the British West Indies Regiment (BWIR) served in France from 1916 to 
1918, having been formed in Seaford, Sussex on 26 October 1915. Although the West 
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Indies Regiment had existed for many years, large numbers of West Indian men set sail 
for Britain to volunteer for European service in the British Army at the start of the war. 
At first the British Government was uncomfortable with the idea of black soldiers serving 
alongside white British troops but pressure from the West Indies and Allied losses lead 
to the formation of the BWIR. Eventually 15,204 men and 397 officers served in the 
BWIR, of whom 10,280 were Jamaican.75 While the structure of the British Army gave 
some protection from overt racism to the men of the BWIR, this was by no means the 
whole picture. BWIR men were often used to fill the roles of Labour Units, to their 
disgust. A Trinidadian soldier complained in 1918 that ‘instead of being drawn closer to 
the Church and Empire, we are driven away from it.’76 This dissatisfaction reached its 
height after the Armistice, when the BWIR was moved to Italy to await repatriation. 
Due to labour shortages, the regiment was used to load and unload cargo ships arriving 
at Taranto and on 6th December 1918, the men mutinied and the 9th BWIR was 
disbanded. News of this soon reached the West Indies and fed into an existing campaign 
to gain greater independence. The news, and the already prevalent discontent in the 
West Indies, followed by the arrival home of the soldiers from September 1919, fuelled 
the nationalist movements in the West Indies which carried on through to the 1930s 
and eventual independence.   
 
The situation in Ireland was the most complex. At the outbreak of war Unionists were 
keen to join up and support Britain and large numbers of the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) went to war. Separately, the Nationalists committed themselves to the war, 
nominally in defence of smaller countries such as Belgium and Serbia, with whom they 
identified.77  Within three months 40,000 Irish soldiers, regulars and reservists hauled in 
to fill the gaps left by casualties, would be involved in the fighting on the Western Front.78  
The primarily Nationalist New Army divisions saw action in Gallipoli in the summer of 
1915 and the Unionists were active in France during the Battle of the Somme in July 
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1916. As the 1st of July is the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, it came to 
be particularly identified with their cause.79 
 
In Ireland some Nationalist groups were planning a rebellion against the British rule 
which culminated in the Easter Uprising of 1916. As this was considered to be an act of 
treason, the British hit back hard and some 500 people were killed and the ringleaders 
executed. The reaction to the uprising left Unionists marginalised and Irish soldiers in 
the British Army facing trouble, even in France. Private Arthur Baxter, writing of the 
time of the Battle of the Somme, described the plight of an Irish gunner, Mick Flemand, 
‘Poor old boy, he could neither read nor write. He’d come from Ireland and I used to 
read his letters for him. He come from Southern Ireland, they had a terrible job there 
in 1916 didn’t they? When he had his leave from France, he daren’t go home, you know. 
There was a place in London where the likes of him went. He told us he’d be killed if he 
went home, bring in the British Army, you see.’80 On their return after the Armistice, 
neither Unionist nor Nationalist troops met with a warm welcome. Nationalist feeling 
had hardened against Unionists after the Uprising and the Nationalist Divisions had been 
broken up by the British Army in an act many saw as a further insult. In 1919, Joe Devlin, 
MP for West Belfast, speaking at a rally for former Nationalist soldiers said, 
‘unfortunately, the close of the war brought to Ireland no peace and freedom, but strife 
and repression.’81 The post war situation in Ireland was, if anything, exacerbated by its 
involvement in the war. Its men returned, especially in the Nationalist areas, not as 
heroes but as unwelcome reminders of Ireland’s uncertain future. Tom Kettle, a 
Nationalist who had served on the Somme said of his return, ‘These men [the 1916 
leaders] … will go down in history as heroes and martyrs; and I will go down – if I go 
down at all – as a bloody British officer.’82  
 
After the war in the Caribbean the achievements of its men in the war was used to fuel 
demands for greater independence, although here the soldiers were given a heroes’ 
welcome and made a significant contribution to the struggle in the years after the war. 
The post war experience of the Dominion countries was different again. Before the war, 
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these countries had no British military presence and only relatively small armed forces 
of their own. This meant that the cost of raising men to join the war was largely met 
from their own economies. Their motivation, at both an individual and governmental 
level, was a complex combination of obligation and loyalty. The most significant change 
for the Dominions after the war was that they were made signatories of the Treaty of 
Versailles and included in the League of Nations, formed as part of the Treaty.83 They 
had entered the war merely as adjuncts to the British empire and ended it as 
internationally recognised countries. While this made no difference to their dominion 
status, this was a breakthrough in the self-image of these countries. The war had left an 
impression from which there could be no return: that the Dominions were viable nations 
with their own identities and now a formalised place in the world order. Perhaps more 
significantly, they now saw themselves as emerging nations with clear identities separate 
from that of their connection to the British empire.  
 
This section has shown that, despite the positive propaganda and language demonstrated 
by the government in the post war years and the improved status of India and the other 
colonial nations on the international stage as a result of their participation in the League 
of Nations, the government view changed very little. Overall, despite minor, and largely 
cosmetic, gestures the British continued to view its empire citizens as subjects. Its main 
aim continued to be to promote the British empire at home and abroad as a dominant 
and influential world force. 
 
THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 
The Indianisation Of the Indian Army 
The British military had, by and large, treated its Indian soldiers who fought in Europe 
respectfully and maintained good relationships with the men throughout the war, which 
continued in its aftermath. However, the deep inequality produced by the rule that 
Indians may not become officers remained a sticking point and the British government 
and military sought to rectify the issue. The government had been made aware of the 
difficulty of replacing British officers during the war and the absence of Indian soldiers 
or potential recruits who would be able to step into the role and had been petitioned 
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extensively on the subject by the Government of India, as this extract shows: ‘from the 
day that the Indian regiments valiantly passed through their baptism of fire on European 
battlefields, they have seen how quickly their small band of British officers can be swept 
away … and they must ask themselves why to Indians alone this privilege should be 
denied.’84 A meeting of the War Cabinet acknowledged the point in a fiercely argued 
debate, in which Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, and Lord Curzon, the 
former Governor-General of India, argued that it was causing recruitment difficulties 
and that Indian soldiers, through their gallantry in France, had won the right to become 
officers. Their argument carried the day and the decision was taken ‘to sanction an 
announcement that they accepted in principle the appointment of Indians to 
commissioned rank in His Majesty’s Army in August 1917.’85  
 
By the 1918 it had been decided that a number of substantive and honorary commissions 
would be given to men who had distinguished themselves in the war and cadetships 
would be set up at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for ‘ten Indian gentlemen.’86 
This development broadly matched the civil and governmental processes of increased 
Indian influence under the Government of India Act. Initially, eight battalions would be 
‘Indianised,’ which meant that they would be formed of Indian soldiers only, and Indian 
officers commissioned during and after the war would be transferred to these battalions, 
along with newly trained officers from Sandhurst. The process of promotion would 
eventually mean that these battalions were staffed only with Indian men of all ranks. 
Indian Sandhurst graduates had to serve for a year in a British battalion in India before 
taking command of an Indianised battalion, as did British officer recruits. The intention 
was to ensure that as far as possible Indian men did not command British troops. 
However, when one of the first ten Indian Sandhurst cadets refused to leave the all-
British 2nd Royal Lancers which he had trained in and the regiment refused to let him go 
he was quietly allowed to stay with the Lancers. As time went on the issue of segregated 
units became more and more contentious as its basic premise became increasingly 
obvious. Early explanations for the necessity of Indianised units such as the justification 
that the new Indian officer class must be tested without British officers to shore up any 
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failings was only sustainable as long as the Indian officers were in the training system. 
Once they had passed out of Sandhurst and completed their introductory year, they had 
exactly the same training, experience and status as a junior British officer.87 
 
The problem of the new Indian officers’ social status had been considered in a dispatch 
from the Indian Government in August 1917, referring to the importance of their 
training at Sandhurst, rather than establishing an Indian cadet school, as ‘the best 
guarantee for the elimination of racial prejudice on the part of British officers and men 
… is to give them such a training as will enable them to start on their regimental careers 
with the manners and ideas of an English gentleman.’88 The aim was presumably to reduce 
prejudice by making the Indian soldiers appear more British, because British soldiers 
would be more willing to treat Indians as peers or superior officers if they behaved in a 
suitably British manner. Philip Mason asserted that even the Indian soldiers and public 
largely agreed with this, ‘feeling that on this kind of thing the British really did know best 
and that their kind of officer was the best kind to have.’89 The incipient racism within 
this policy is drawn out in a comment by Major Alexander who described Captain Singh, 
who was entitled to hold officer rank by virtue of being a doctor and who gained a 
Military Cross in October 1914: ‘Singh was educated in England, and was as white a man 
as ever lived.’ Whether this was intended as a simple reference to his education and, 
after a British education, presumably his manner, the remark defines the standard upon 
which men should be judged as the ‘whiteness’ of their conduct. One positive 
consequence of a British demeanour for Indian officers was that it went some way to 
addressing the religious and ethnic differences between the Indians soldiers, as illustrated 
by Lord Rawlinson’s question, ‘will we ever get a young educated Indian to lead a charge 
of veteran Sikhs against a sangar held by Mahsuds, and, if he did, would the Sikhs follow 
him?’90 
 
The process of becoming more British at Sandhurst, to walk the ‘narrow tight-rope 
between being offensively bumptious and insignificantly dull’, according to Mason,  was 
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not a simple one for a middle class Indian boy; not only did he have to learn a complex 
dress code, such as never wearing brown shoes with a dark suit, he had to do without 
servants, polish his own kit, live without his parents and manage his money carefully, as 
his parents would almost certainly not have provided him with enough money to furnish 
him in the style of his British peers.91 Once he had mastered all that, as well as his military 
training, he must serve with a British battalion in India, commanding a platoon of British 
soldiers of his own. The social aspect of the Sandhurst training came in useful once the 
officer was commissioned as for the first time as in the years immediately after the war 
Indians were invited to join the many clubs across India from which they had previously 
been excluded. However, some clubs seemed to need more encouragement than others 
to uphold this and the Peshawar Club only agreed when its local colonel stated that 
unless all his officers could join, none would and he would therefore have no reason to 
lend his cavalry horses to the Club for hunts.92 This is an example of changing attitudes 
among British military figures: the Colonel had clearly not previously objected to the 
lack of Indian members of the Club, yet when civilians failed to recognise the new status 
of his officers, he threatened with withdraw his cooperation from the Club. 
 
Given the unique difficulties faced by Indian cadets, the relatively low success rate at 
Sandhurst is perhaps not surprising. Of the first batch of five candidates, who joined in 
January 1919, just two were commissioned and of the second, from September 1919, 
four of five cadets were commissioned. It is notable that four of these officers were from 
outside the traditional recruiting areas of the North West Frontier Province and the 
Punjab and all were middle class and educated.  Although their subsequent careers 
varied, several were illustrious. The very first graduate, Syeed Iskander Ali Meerza, left 
the Army four years after he was commissioned and ended his career as the first 
President of Pakistan.93 Kumar Shri Rajendrasinhji was commissioned in June 1921 and 
became the first Indian officer to be awarded the DSO in 1941 and served as Chief of 
Staff of the Indian Army between 1953 and 1955.94 By the time of the Second World 
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War, 165 cadets had been through Sandhurst, of whom 143 had been commissioned.95 
A smaller number had also been through the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and 
the Indian Military Academy, which opened in 1932. Just as the Indianisation of the Indian 
Army was precipitated by the First World War, it was hurriedly completed during the 
Second for the same reason, as once again demand for officers exceeded supply. In June 
1940, all units of the Indian Army were ‘thrown open’ to Indians and by the end of the 
war there were some 8,300 serving Indian officers.96 
 
By beginning the process of allowing Indian soldiers to become officers while the men 
were still in France, the British government had tacitly acknowledged its responsibility 
for one of the most intransigent problems the Indian Corps had faced, as well as 
contributing to the improved status of Indian people and, at least in part, helping to 
maintain the support of the Indian soldiers of the Indian Army for the Raj. This was 
precipitated directly by the participation of the Indian soldiers in the war, which 
highlighted both the structural problems with the system of allowing only British officers 
and also the men’s collective bravery and achievements. It is notable, however, that full 
implementation of Indianisation did not happen until the problem of a shortage of officers 
recurred in the Second World War. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this section has been its illustration of how 
inconsistent and even contradictory the attitudes and actions of the British people and 
government were towards both India and its soldiers who had served in Europe. 
 
The controversy surrounding the events of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre is illustrative 
of changed British public attitudes towards Indian people after the war. While General 
Dyer enjoyed support for his actions in many quarters, the parliamentary debates 
demonstrated a new distaste for the use of extreme violence to maintain British rule in 
India. Even as these events were taking place, race riots broke out in port cities in the 
summer of 1919. The fact of the protests is less informative than the swift degeneration 
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into racism seen in the crowd. Events such as the Peace Day Parade in London and local 
events such as the unveiling of the Chattri in Brighton celebrated the Indian soldiers in 
the abstract but when called upon to interact with Indians in Britain, this tolerant attitude 
ceased and gave way to aggression and more passive acts such as the refusal of landlords 
let to Indian tenants.  
 
The Government of India Act did indicate willingness on the part of the British 
government to consider greater influence for the people of India but its positive effects 
were diminished by the restrictions of the Rowlatt Act and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre 
of 1919. Among other troops of the empire which served during the war, very little 
changed in their status as far as the British government was concerned, although 
alongside the Dominion countries, their sense of value and desire for independence did 
grow. The British government continued to see India as a subject nation, despite small 
concessions and the growing public demand in Indian for self-rule. The most significant 
impact of the Indian war service appeared to be the decision of the government and 
army to permit Indian soldiers to train as officers and to lead British soldiers. 
Nevertheless, this did not occur in significant numbers until the Second World War 
some twenty years later. The refusal of the IWGC to publish the names of Indian soldiers 
on its memorials in Mesopotamia, where the numbers of Indian names would have far 
exceeded those of British ones, and to some extent even the Peace Day parade and 
British Empire Exhibition can be seen as statements of the power and reach of the British 
empire across the globe, even as the government was promoting a new language of 
family and shared endeavour towards its empire.  
 
Taken together, these changes reflect an ambivalence on the part of British people and 
their government to India after the war. While undoubtedly prepared to celebrate its 
efforts with events which were attended in large numbers and to consider the empire 
in generally less jingoistic and more humanitarian manner97 as a trading partner and family 
member, overall this did not bring forth enduring change and the relationship between 
Britain and India did not substantially change for another generation. 
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Conclusion  
This thesis has examined how the ‘hazardous experiment’ of deploying Indian troops in 
France came to influence the opinions of both civilian and military Britons towards Indian 
people. It has shown that both groups were indeed influenced by the presence of Indian 
soldiers serving the British in France, although the extent to which this lasted beyond 
the end of the war is less clear. 
 
A key aim of this thesis has been to explore civilian reactions to the Indian soldiers’ 
service in France and how this affected attitudes towards Indian people. In the pre-war 
years, the manner in which Indian people were represented in the press, literature and 
entertainment such as festivals and music halls was one dimensional and focussed on 
depicting Indian people as subordinates in a variety of ways: as rebellious students, 
passive recipients of charity or exotic aliens. Charitable institutions such as the London 
City Mission set up homes for ayahs and Lascars without means or accommodation in 
Britain, fostering the image of Indian people as unable to help themselves as referred to 
in Chapter Two; students were seen as rebellious and even dangerous following the 
assassination of Sir Curzon Wyllie and the activities of the Lee Warner Committee and 
yet others lived among the establishment as Members of Parliament and landowners. 
These representations changed during the war to a new emphasis on the Indian troops 
as stoic, valiant and loyal, characteristics they shared with the British Tommy in France. 
This change was necessitated by the need for the government to project the men in a 
positive light to reassure the public that they were competent and effective fighters, as 
was seen in the Press Bureau stories in Chapter One. In the years after the war, the 
focus of representations changed again and India and the empire in general were now 
presented as trading partners and family members. 
 
The picture for British people who encountered Indians was initially just as positive. The 
population of Indian people in Britain before the war was both very small and very 
diverse and somewhat detached from the British people. For this reason, as in the case 
study of Brighton, which hosted the largest number of wounded Indian soldiers in its 
hospitals, the war provided a first encounter for many with Indian people, as discussed 
in Chapter Two. By the war’s end, public enthusiasm, if not affection, was demonstrated 
by the reaction of the people of Brighton: gifts were abundant, more visits to people’s 
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homes were offered than could be accommodated and, even three years after the end 
of the war, crowds gathered in large numbers to commemorate the men. The creation 
and work of the Indian Soldiers’ Fund further illustrated the affection and respect shown 
by those who had known Indian people during their working lives in India and the large 
amount of money raised and considerable efforts to distribute their resources also speak 
to a more general regard.  
 
The post war period proved an inconsistent and contradictory time for Britain’s 
relationship with India and its people, both those in India and those who were residents 
in Britain. On the one hand, in 1919, a portion of the British public condemned the 
events that took place at Jallianwalla Bagh at the same time as others were rioting against 
the presence of Lascars in port cities. In March of the same year, the Rowlatt Act 
extended the British government’s power of control of those suspected of committing 
acts of sedition originally set out in the wartime Defence of India Act and in December 
1919 the Government of India Act received Royal Assent provided for extended 
influence of Indian people in government and established dual control of large areas of 
the country. While there was still prejudice and it was beyond question that the Social 
Darwinist norm prevailed and Britain still ruled its empire with a rod of iron at times, 
the thrust was towards a more cooperative relationship with its colonies. This 
progression above was demonstrated in the case study of Rudyard Kipling’s writing on 
India in Chapter One which showed the development of representations of Indian 
people from humble servants to soldiers complaining about the weather in France to 
men for whom prayers of gratitude are to be offered.’1 
 
The second principal aim of the thesis was to analyse the changes which took place from 
a military perspective. At the start of the war, and even during its course, the Indian 
Army was seen as something of a backwater. As Willcocks claimed when writing about 
his summary dismissal from France, his thirty-seven years of service counted for little as, 
‘I belonged to the Indian Corps! – that explains much.’2 As was shown in Chapter Three, 
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there were considerable concerns in the military establishment about deploying Indian 
soldiers in Europe and they were only sent to France after considerable losses in the 
BEF put the British contribution in jeopardy. Their task was to hold an eight-mile section 
of the line until such time as reinforcements could be sent. In the event, this took 
fourteen months until the early drafts of Kitchener’s Army and the Canadian troops 
were ready to deploy. Despite enormous losses, equivalent to greater than the original 
number of men who arrived in France, the Indian Corps succeeded in their task. There 
was no German breakthrough to the channel ports in the autumn of 1914 and the line 
was held until the men left in November 1915.  
 
Hard lessons had been learned by the British military after the experience of the 
Rebellion of 1857 and these continued to inform policy even in France. Care and 
attention was paid to ensuring the religious requirements of the men were met and that 
their medical treatment was seen to be as good, if not better, than that of British troops. 
This served two purposes. Firstly, the men’s morale held up well and this made them an 
effective fighting force and they justifiably garnered much praise. The second purpose 
was to maintain the prestige of the Raj in India and the rest of the world. As has been 
seen, this was made explicit in the case of the hospitals in Britain, where the commanders 
were keen that the troops fared well and had no complaints about the conditions which 
could have brought about discontent in India.  
 
The fourth chapter dealt with the problems that the British military assumed would be 
faced by the Indian troops in France. The purpose of this discussion was to illustrate 
how this prejudice fitted in with Social Darwinist perceptions concerning Indian people 
and soldiers as well as to illustrate that these problems proved spurious in the event. 
Just as the civilian population was forced to re-evaluate their opinion of Indian 
competency and agency, so was the military. No longer could it be assumed that Indian 
soldiers could only function if they were carefully led by British officers. While the loss 
of British officers certainly had an impact on the men, the impact was in terms of their 
morale, not their ability to fight. It was this re-evaluation that ultimately resulted by the 
1920s in Indian officers commanding not just Indian but British soldiers, a vast attitudinal 
change from the ‘hazardous experiment’ undertaken less than ten years earlier. While 
this shift was undoubtedly significant, it should be borne in mind that in no small part it 
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was a result of sheer necessity as the very small number of British officers available to 
the Indian Army was soon exhausted and replacing them proved to be more difficult 
than had been anticipated. While the process was rather hesitant and the numbers low 
in the first few years, the shift this represents cannot be underestimated, although 
numbers of Indian officers remained relatively low until the same considerations became 
apparent in the Second World War. Likewise, the assumptions that the Indian soldiers 
would not be able to cope with the climate in France and that they would be subject to 
disciplinary problems and seditious behaviour were shown to be untrue. Set against this 
was the IWGC’s decision not to commemorate Indian and British soldiers equally at the 
memorial in Basra, a choice which reflected the hierarchical norms of the British empire. 
 
Praise for the Indian Corps during the war was widespread, not just by those senior 
officers who knew them, such as General Willcocks and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Merewether, both of whom had long careers with the Indian Army behind them, but 
also by senior staff figures such as Sir John French and General Haig, neither of whom 
were familiar with the Indian Corps before the war and had relatively little direct contact 
with them during their time in France. Similarly, as was shown in Chapter Three, British 
troops who fought alongside the Indian soldiers formed largely positive opinions of them 
and praised their courage and military skills. In Britain as well, there were endorsements 
of the Indian Corps in the highest circles, for example in the speech made by the Price 
of Wales on the Indian Corps’ departure from France or his attendance at the unveiling 
of the Chattri in Brighton in 1921 and the visits of the King George V, Queen Mary and 
Queen Alexandra the Queen Mother to the wounded soldiers in Brighton hospitals.  
 
This thesis offers a contribution to the historical literature in two ways. Firstly, it 
contributes to the revival of interest in the Indian soldiers of the First World War. In 
recent years, interest in the subaltern view of the Indian Corps has become a live topic, 
with current research in India potentially uncovering new aspects of the Indian First 
World War experience such as the upcoming publication by Santanu Das, India, Empire 
and First World War Culture: Literature, Images and Songs.3 Britain’s former empire and the 
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domestic aspects of this continues to be researched and it is at the intersection of these 
subjects that this thesis offers both new evidence and a new perspective by analysing 
how the Indian Corps’ contribution came to affect British attitudes to Indian and its 
people. Alongside this, the thesis has re-examined the negative conclusions drawn by 
historians and commentators during the twentieth century and found their criticism to 
be largely illusory.  
 
The work of Jeffrey Greenhut, David Omissi et al took up the problems anticipated by 
the British military before the Indian Corps was deployed to France and perpetuated 
them. However, as George Morton-Jack asserted, these claims do not bear further 
analysis from the viewpoint of a military historian and he wrote in the introduction to 
his 2014 book that he felt that it was time for a revival of acclaim for the Indian Corps.4 
This reflected the negative nature of historical writing about it during the hundred years 
since the end of the war which has become central to the narrative of the Indian Corps’ 
service in Europe. It is notable that this perspective has persisted, despite the almost 
universal praise for the Indian Corps from influential senior officers of the time, such as 
Willcocks and Merewether and, despite being bound up in the imperial hierarchy, were 
overwhelmingly positive about the Indian soldiers.  
 
The thesis further contributes a new perspective on the long-standing debate about the 
British public’s interest in its empire which began with the work of John Mackenzie and 
Bernard Porter. The heightened interest in the Indian soldiers and the improved 
representations of Indian people in the years after the war seem to support Bernard 
Porter’s view that British people had little interest in their empire. If the empire was a 
constant presence, as claimed by John Mackenzie, the novelty felt by people who 
encountered Indian people would surely not have been so pronounced. Even given this, 
the interest shown in the Indian soldiers does not appear to have gone beyond the novel 
and the evidence does not show that any privileged treatment derived from it. In fact, 
the increasing Indian population in Britain suffered prejudice both on individual and 
legislative levels in the years after the war, as was shown on Chapter Five. This further 
supports Porter’s view that Britain had but little interest in its empire after the war and 
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that, while people were happy to acknowledge its collective service, that too was soon 
forgotten and the empire faded once again into the background.  
 
Bernard Porter noted the change in the language used towards the empire, attributing 
this to the creation of a new myth of ‘uniquely gentle’ imperialism, designed to move 
away from a militaristic model to one of co-operation.5 The work of historians such as 
Barbara Bush and Brad Beaven also refer to the developing ‘family motif’ which reflected 
the new found ‘distaste for jingoism’ that was being promoted concerning Britain’s 
relationship with its empire.6 This is not to say that the British view of India changed 
completely and John Mackenzie found jingoism alive and well in the new media such as 
cinema and, for him ‘Social Darwinism and imperial developmental concepts underlay all 
the expedition, documentary and newsreel material of the time.’7 Despite this, Porter 
contended that ‘popular ignorance of and apathy towards the empire can be pretty well 
established for these interwar years’ and added that, although British people certainly 
benefited from the empire materially, the relationship was one of apathetic tolerance.8 
John Mackenzie does not consider that the war made a considerable difference to 
Britons’ commitment to the empire but does acknowledge the change in focus towards 
a ‘beneficent, idealistic imperialism’ which he considered to be an attempt to justify the 
existence of empire at home and abroad in the face of the growing independence of the 
Dominion countries and the importance of the changing economic relationship between 
Britain and its empire.9 Nevertheless, he remained certain that Britain was dominated by 
its imperial culture far beyond the post-war years.10  
 
This thesis has shown that British interest in its empire before the war took the shape 
of a bell curve: at one end small numbers of people held it as being critical to the British 
self-image and at the other equally small numbers disregarded it entirely and in between 
sat the majority, whose level of interest sat between the two extremes. It seems that 
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during and immediately after the war, the curve tipped towards regarding the empire as 
being of critical importance as it fought alongside British soldiers and positive reports 
flooded the media and a few people met Indians for the first time, but in the end all this 
faded away and the old curve re-established itself.  
 
It is the contention of this thesis that encounters between individual soldiers and civilians, 
as well changed representations of Indian people due to the Indian soldiers’ time in 
France gave the British public a clearer and more positive opinion of Indian people.  It is 
apparent that the military contribution of India, in combination with personal 
encounters, gave the British public an insight into India and its people that they were not 
previously aware of and from this grew a sincere appreciation. At least in part this 
informed attitudes to India and the empire and the development of a more progressive 
view of empire and an increasing but by no means complete sense of parity between 
Britain and its empire. Despite this, hierarchical and racist attitudes were by no means 
eliminated and in the medium and longer-term picture these attitudes did not fade from 
view and the old Social Darwinist hierarchy prevailed for another generation. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Merewether summed up the Indian experience in France and 
illustrated once again that those who knew the Indian soldiers best had never doubted 
them and their abilities: 
 
No man could be bold enough to predict the result of flinging Oriental troops 
into these horrible scenes, in a pitiless climate, to lose life and limb in a quarrel 
remote from their own experiences, uninspired by fears on behalf of their own 
peoples, or even of their own property … those who knew the Indian soldier 
best were confident, however sudden his immersion into the Great War would 
be, that his traditions, his loyalty and his sense of duty would carry him through. 
And they did.11 
 
At least for him, the ‘hazardous experiment’ had been an overwhelming success. 
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